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# The Catholic University Bulletin.

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
"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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VOLUME XIII, 1907

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# The Catholic University Bulletin.

*Vol. XIII.*

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## THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN FRANCE.

In this hour of supreme trial every Catholic worthy of the name owes to the Church of France his fullest sympathy. The storm that has been long threatening, and that in the near past has already worked partial ruin, has broken in all its fury over the heads of the clergy and people of what was once the most Christian nation of Europe, but now seems to aspire to another primacy, that of Antichrist himself. With our sympathy go our earnest prayers, first that the leaders of the Church may be enriched with the prudence, courage, and moral stamina needed in the dire conflict that is opening; second, that the sacrament of unity be not broken amid all the passions that are likely to be let loose over the battle-field now spread out before the gaze of a somewhat puzzled humanity, to which the intensely anti-religious character of the French Revolution has never been quite clear enough. The Apostolic See, never wanting to its faithful children in their gravest calamities, has taken up the gage of battle, and we may rest assured that the outcome of the conflict will not be dishonorable; that the principles of religious liberty and ecclesiastical independence will be safeguarded at whatever cost; that the See of Peter, which has countless times, and under every form of government, maintained with success the rights of the Church of Jesus Christ will issue victorious from the present battle, no matter how great the astute ingenuity of its opponents, or how carefully planned their control of every exit from the new prison that the enemies of Catholicism have constructed for it in the heart of Europe, on the morrow of the German Kulturkampf, and before we are ready to celebrate the first centenary of

Catholic Emancipation in Great Britain. It is admitted on all sides that in this religious combat a new factor, Public Opinion, will have much to say, and will help greatly to brush aside, at every phase of the battle, the hypocritical pleas and excuses that the enemies of all genuine religion will not fail to put forth. THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY BULLETIN will keep its readers duly informed of the great principles at stake, the arguments of our adversaries and their successful refutation. We shall continue to publish all important documents bearing upon the situation, and have made arrangements with capable writers in France to put before the Catholic public the actual situation as it develops from time to time. We shall also publish articles dealing with specific points of principle that do not greatly differ in this persecution from the points at issue in other memorable conflicts from the time of St. Gregory VII to the time of the saintly Pius VII. The nature of the Church as a perfect society, her right to self-government, her right to own and freely administer the gifts of the faithful and her places of worship, her willingness at all times to meet half-way the civil authority in all matters of disputed jurisdiction, and other theses, ever old but ever new, will come up for treatment in our pages, by competent writers, and from a modern and actual point of view. In the meantime we commend to our readers the ancient motto of the City of Paris, borrowed from the language of the Christian Fathers, and now eminently applicable to the condition of the Church in France: *Fluctuat nec mergitur*, she bends before the storm but she rides the waves with confidence, for her Captain is Jesus Christ, who has never yet failed to make the "portus salutis" in proper time, however violent the tempest and hopeless the outlook.

In the struggle into which he has entered, in the cause of truth and justice, the Holy Father may count on the heartiest devotion and the most steadfast loyalty of the Catholic University of America.

THE EDITOR.

## THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN FRANCE.

The religious question in France is attracting the attention of the whole world. The American people more than any other, perhaps, are viewing the situation with particular curiosity, and all Catholics are awaiting with anxiety the result of the struggle, since the conflict which is going on there between the Church and the State is certainly the gravest in the whole history of Catholicism in its relation with any nation. And now that we are at the very moment of the crisis, it is more than interesting to summarize the elements and to review the successive steps of this vital problem. To place the facts, all the facts, before the reader with only such explanations as are necessary for a right understanding of their full import, is the purpose of this article. The reader will thus have matter sufficient from which he may form his own judgment. Our opinion when expressed will always be based on and supported by clear facts.

After the French Revolution, a convention took place between Pius VII and the French Government. This convention, known as the Concordat, was signed on the 15th of July, 1801 (26 Messidor, an IX), by J. Bonaparte, Cretet and Bernier in the name of the French Government, and by Cardinal Consalvi, Spina and Caselli in the name of the Pope. It was ratified on the 10th of September, 1801 (23 Fructidor, an X), and promulgated on the 18th of April, 1802 (18 Germinal, an X). By this convention it was agreed that a new division of the French dioceses should be made, that the archbishops and bishops were to be nominated by the Government, that to the Pope was to be reserved the right of giving the canonical institution to the candidate (art. 3, 4, 5). The bishops were to have the right to choose the curés although their choice was to be limited to persons agreeable to the Government (art. 10). All the churches not already alienated and which were needed for worship were put at the disposal of the bishops (art. 12); the Pope abandoned all claim to ecclesiastical properties already alienated (art. 13) and the

Government was to assure a suitable stipend (*traitement*) to the bishops and curés (art. 14) and to allow donations (*fondations*) in favor of the churches (art. 15).

Such are the conditions agreed upon by the Pope and the French Government. As to what is known as the "organic articles," added to the Concordat without the knowledge of the Pope, the latter never ceased to protest most emphatically against them; yet the Government held them as law and applied them as such throughout the nineteenth century. These "organic articles" singularly aggravated the situation of the Catholic Church. No bull or decision of council, no legate of the Pope could be received in France without the Government's authorization; the bishops could not meet in a national council or provincial synod, nor could any single one of them even go to Rome without the permission of the Government. What constituted an infraction of these regulations was decided by the Council of State and ordinarily such infraction was punished by the withholding of the "*traitement*."

#### I. THE OPENING OF THE CONFLICT.

In 1901, in spite of the good will of most of the congregations to make their application, in spite of the readiness of the Pope to treat with the Government on the subject, the law of associations suppressing the religious orders and confiscating their properties was passed. This law was indeed a great blow to the Catholic Church, and though it could be maintained by the State that this law was not a violation of the Concordat,—since there was in that agreement no explicit word concerning the religious—its effect was to suppress one of the most important elements of the Catholic religion whose cult was to be exercised freely in France according to the Concordat (art. 1).

The Pope protested strongly against the law, and the relation between the Church and the State became more and more strained. The situation became more acute under the ministry of Waldeck Rousseau when the Pope refused to give the canonical institution to several of the candidates presented by the Government; negotiations were going on when Combes took the office of Premier. He presented the names already

rejected and even made them public before they were accepted by the Pope. This manner of acting, if strictly legal, was contrary to the usual course, which was to have a previous understanding before the publication of the names. Premier Combes demanded also that the Pope should give the reason why, in the case of one of the names proposed, he refused the appointment, adding that these reasons should be exclusively reasons of faith and morals; moreover, he asked that the formula "nobis nominavit" (has named to us) used by the Holy See in the Bulls to indicate the part of the Government in the election of the bishops should be abolished. To the last point, the Holy See agreed, finding in the letters of nomination a sufficient guarantee of its rights, but rejected the other clause. In spite of all the efforts of the Holy See to have at least some appointments made, no bishop was named during the ministry of M. Combes. Then came the visit of President Loubet to Rome on April 24, 1904. As is well known, from 1870 the Pope has always protested against the spoliation of his temporal power, and has always considered as an offence to his rights and to his person any visit made by a Catholic sovereign to the King of Italy in Rome. As a matter of fact no Catholic sovereign had from that time made such a visit. After the visit of King Emmanuel to Paris, it was natural for the President of the French Republic to return it. The Pope was glad to witness the friendship of the two nations and had no objection to Mr. Loubet visiting the King of Italy, provided that the visit should be made in any other city than Rome. So he told the French Government through his Nuncio in Paris, and through the French Ambassador at the Papal court. President Loubet went to Rome on April 24, 1904; and on April 28, the Pope sent a protest to the French Government and also informed the other Catholic sovereigns of it. A short communication of the *Osservatore Romano* May 4, announced the sending of the notes. On May 6, the French Government through its ambassador informed the Cardinal Secretary of State that the protest was rejected both as to substance and form. The protest made to the different governments and which was intended to be kept secret, was, through some indiscretion, published in the socialist



paper *L'Humanité*; in it was contained a phrase, not to be found in the protest sent to the French Government saying, that if at the occasion of President Loubet's journey, "the Nuncio had not left Paris, it was solely for reasons of an altogether special nature." On the 20th of May, the French ambassador was ordered to inquire about the authenticity and meaning of the sentence. The Cardinal Secretary of State asked that the question be put in writing, promising a written reply within an hour or half an hour. The French Ambassador accepted the proposal. Having received no communication from the French Ambassador, after two hours, the Secretary of State made known to him that the reply was ready. The written questions were not presented, but on the following day the Ambassador called on the Secretary of State and told him that his government considered his demand for written questions as a pretext to elude them and that he had been ordered to take a leave of absence, adding, however, that his action did not mean a rupture or a suspension of diplomatic relations. Soon afterwards he presented one of his counsellors as chargé d'affaires and left Rome. The rupture was evidently imminent; it was completed by the question of the two bishops of Laval and Dijon. As early as 1899, accusations of an exclusively spiritual and ecclesiastical character had been made against Mgr. Geay of Laval and on the 26th of January, 1900, the Holy Office had invited him to resign. The bishop hesitated and during four years the Holy See waited; under Pius X on the 17th of May, 1904, the Holy Office again asked by letter for his resignation announcing its intention to use canonical measures in case he should not obey within a month. Appealing to the organic articles, the bishop communicated the letter to the French Government which, through its chargé d'affaires demanded its annulment. Finally the Bishop went to Rome and presented his resignation. At the same time Mgr. Le Nordez of Dijon was called to Rome to answer certain accusations. The situation had become so grave that the seminarians in his diocese had refused to be ordained by him. Like Mgr. Geay he transmitted the letter to the government, which forbade him to leave his diocese. Finally threatened with suspension by the



Holy See, he went to Rome and likewise tendered his resignation. On July 30, 1904, the chargé d'affaires by order of the French Government, and on the plea of a breach of the Concordat on the part of the Pope, sent a note to the Holy See, in which it was announced that the government of the Republic had decided to put an end to the official relations existing between France and the Pope. On the same day the Secretary for foreign affairs, Mr. Delcasse, announced to the Nuncio Mgr. Lorenzelli that the French Government considered his mission as finished. The rupture was complete.

The Government presented then to the Chamber of Deputies a project of separation. The discussion began on the 21st of March, 1905. After a long debate in which the Catholics and Liberals fought step by step each title and article, the law was voted and published in the *Journal Officiel*, December 11, 1905.

## II. THE LAW OF SEPARATION.

The law of separation includes six titles and forty-four articles. In the first title containing the general principles, the Republic declares liberty of conscience for people of every creed and suppresses all support of worship by the State.

The second title, treating of the disposition of properties and pensions, prescribes that an inventory be made of all public establishments of worship and of what they contain; also of all the properties of the State, departments, or communes of which these establishments have the use (art. 3). Within one year, all properties appertaining to worship are to be transferred to the "associations cultuelles"; the properties of the State, department or communes are to revert to them (art. 4, 5). The properties not directly appropriated to the use of worship but to charity are to be transferred to an institution of public utility having the same purpose, unless claimed by the donor or his direct heirs (art. 7). If no "association cultuelle" is formed within one year, the properties of worship shall be sequestered; if several "associations cultuelles" of the same "culte" assert claims to these properties, the case is to be settled by the council of State, which will take into account all the circumstances of fact (art. 8).

If no "association cultuelle" is formed or if the one formed is dissolved, the properties are apportioned by a decree of the Council of State to the establishments of assistance in the same ecclesiastical territory, unless such properties are claimed by the donor or direct heirs (art. 9). Art. 11 provides for a pension to be given to those who have for 20 or 30 years performed ecclesiastical functions, and an allocation or a part of an allocation during four years for the others.

Title III deals with the edifices used for worship and includes art. 12-17. According to art. 12, "the buildings which were put at the disposal of the nation and which, in virtue of the law of 18 Germinal, an X (Concordat), serve for public religious service or for the residence of the ministers (cathedrals, churches, chapels, temples, synagogues, archbishops', and bishops' palaces, rectories, seminaries) with their associated properties and the furniture which they had when put at the service of the "culte," are and are to remain the properties of the State, departments and communes." Art. 13 decides that the edifices used for public worship with their furniture shall be left gratuitously to the disposition of the cultural association, the cessation of the use being pronounced by decree in the case of dissolution of the association or cessation of worship in those buildings for six successive months or of misuse of them for purposes other than those of religious worship.

As to the ministers' dwellings, art. 14 says that the palaces of the archbishops and bishops, the rectories and their dependencies, "grands séminaires" and protestant faculties of theology are to be left gratuitously to the disposition of the public establishments of worship and cultural associations for five years from the promulgation of the law." Then they are to return to the free disposition of the State, departments and communes. Art. 15 deals with the special regulation of the departments of Savoie, Haute Savoie and Alpes Maritimes annexed to France after the Concordat; art. 16 with historical monuments.

Title IV lays down the constitutive principle of "associations cultuelles." These associations must be for the ex-

clusive purpose of religious worship and formed of 7 persons for the communes having less than 1,000 people, 15 for the communes having between 1,000 and 20,000 people, and 25 for the others. These associations shall have the power of making the collections for worship and of receiving fees for ceremonies, pews and funeral supplies; they can give their surplus to other similar associations but cannot receive any assistance from the State, department or commune (art. 19). They may, by conforming themselves to the law of 1901, form a central administration and directory (art. 21). These associations may institute a financial reserve to be used exclusively for worship; this reserve cannot exceed a sum equal, for the associations having a revenue of more than 5,000 fr. (\$1,000), to three times, and for the other associations, to six times the annual average of the sum spent by each one of them for the expenses of worship during the five preceding years. Besides this reserve which must be placed in nominal values, the associations may keep a special reserve deposited in money or nominal titles in the "Caisse de dépôts et consignations" to be appropriated exclusively to the purchase or repairs of the buildings used for worship (art. 22). A fine shall be imposed on those guilty of violating regulations (art. 23).

Title V deals with the Police regulations. In art 34 it is said that "a minister of worship, who in a place where worship is exercised shall have, by speeches or lectures or distributions of writings, publicly outraged or defamed a citizen in charge of some public service, shall be punished by a fine of 500 fr. (\$100) to 3,000 fr. (\$600) and by not less than one month nor more than one year of confinement in jail, or by one of these penalties only (art. 34). If a speech pronounced or if a writing fixed publicly in the places of worship contains a direct provocation to resist the execution of laws or legal acts of public authority, the minister guilty of such an act shall be punished by an imprisonment of not less than three months nor more than two years (art. 35).

Title VI deals with general dispositions. Such are the chief points of the law of separation.

On the 31st of December was published the decree regulat-

ing the inventories. These inventories, most of the time a very summary visit through the churches, were attended usually throughout France by lively protestations and sometimes by violent resistance on the part of the Catholics.

On February 11th the Pope published the encyclical "Vehementer" in which the law of separation was condemned as "injurious to God," as "a violation of natural and international law," "contrary to the constitution of the church and to her rights," and "gravely offensive to the Apostolic See"; the Pope moreover promised some practical instructions about the attitude to be taken toward the new law.

At the same time Catholics were divided on the question whether the law should be given a trial or not. Anticipating a meeting of the bishops in Paris already announced, twenty-three eminent Catholics sent to each one of them a secret letter which was an appeal for a trial of the law of separation. The letter was published by the *Figaro*, and was the cause of much discussion. On the 30th of May, by order of the Pope all the bishops had their meeting. It was held in secret; yet by indiscreet disclosures, the journal *Le Siècle* published several documents which give us some results of the episcopal assembly. After having condemned the associations as imposed by the law, the bishops proposed (by a majority of 25, it is said) to the Holy See a form of association which they believed both legal and canonical.

Two month afterwards on August 10th, the Pope sent his second Encyclical "Gravissimo officii," wherein he rejected the project presented, and all similar ones, so long as the law would not guarantee the hierarchical constitution of the Church and its authority over ecclesiastical properties. Again on the 7th of September, 1906, the bishops had a second meeting which was secret, and wrote a collective letter which was read in all the churches on the 29th of September, in which they announced the decision of the Pope and exhorted all Catholics to obey.

According to the latest news some bishops had expressed the intention of continuing worship under the régime of the law of 1881,—a police law regulating public meetings—and the "Secrétaire des Cultes" on the 1st of December issued

a circular letter adapting this law in an apparently liberal way to religious ceremonies. It seems that the Pope has again forbidden the priests to submit the religious ceremonies to this law and ordered them to continue the exercise of worship in the churches until they have been driven out by violence.

We shall examine the most important questions involved in the present struggle between Church and State in France, viz., the ownership of the churches, the maintenance of the clergy, the reasons why the Pope has rejected the law.

### III. THE OWNERSHIP OF ECCLESIASTICAL PROPERTY.

Here we speak only of the churches existing at the time of the Revolution. As to those built since the Concordat, it would be necessary, to determine their ownership, to know under what conditions they have been built. Sometimes they have been built by a family, sometimes by the contributions of all the parishioners or the resources of the fabrique, sometimes also the State and the commune have helped by a certain sum of money the fabrique or the parishioners.

This question of ecclesiastical properties is an important one and about which there is much disagreement. The French Government holds as a principle that the religious edifices are the property of the State (cathedrals) and of the communes (churches). The Catholics maintain that the churches are their property. Let us consider the facts. On the 24th of November, 1789, the National Assembly decreed that "all ecclesiastic properties are at the disposal of the nation on the condition that it provide, in a convenient way for the expenses of worship, the maintenance of the pastors, the relief of the poor, under the supervision and instructions of the administrators of the provinces. The maintenance of the pastor is not to be less than twelve hundred francs (livres) a year, the residence and gardens not included." Divers decrees of the years 1789 to 1792 ordered both the sale of these properties as national possessions and the suppression of the fabriques. A decree of Prairial II and III<sup>1</sup> gave temporarily to the communes the free use of such edifices of worship as had not been alienated.

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<sup>1</sup> In the revolutionary calendar An (year) I began September 22, 1793.

In the year X (1802) the Concordat was promulgated. "The bishops are to make a new division of the parishes of their dioceses, which division shall take its effect only after the consent of the government" (art. 9). "All metropolitan, cathedral and parish or other churches not already alienated and which are necessary to worship, shall be put at the disposal of the bishops" (art. 12). "His Holiness, for the sake of peace and happy restoration of the Catholic religion declares that neither he nor his successors will in any way disturb the purchasers of the ecclesiastical property alienated, and consequently the possession of this same property, with its privileges and revenues, is to remain intact in their hands or in those of their assignees" (art. 13). "The Government shall assure a convenient stipend (*traitement*) to the bishops and curés whose dioceses and parishes may be included in the new territory" (art. 14). These documents, especially the first and the last, form the chief matter of the discussion, but they will not be understood, nor will the full import of the arguments based on them be realized, unless after a brief review of the situation which preceded and also which followed them.

In the first place, must we consider as law the different decisions rendered by the revolutionary assemblies from 1789 to 1800? So to regard them is certainly to acknowledge the same standing both for anarchy and a normal government. Now, before the Revolution, most of the churches belonged to the parish. The commune and the parish were indeed very closely united, since all the inhabitants of the commune being generally Catholics, were also members of the parish, and this is a point to be very carefully noted, for it has been, to our mind, the source of much misunderstanding. Also at this time, when Church and State were so closely united, their laws were very often mixed; yet the distinction exists; it is the "*fabrique*" which has the ownership of the churches. Next comes the decree of 1789 declaring that the ecclesiastical properties are "at the disposal of the nation." It must be remarked that this expression was the result of a compromise. It was proposed to declare that the ecclesiastical properties "*belong*" to the nation. As some protested, although admit-



ting that in certain cases the ecclesiastical properties could be used by the State, Mirabeau proposed to substitute the expression "at the disposal" which was agreed to. As a matter of fact, the Assembly considered itself as real owner of the properties and disposed of them accordingly.

In the Concordat, it said that the churches necessary for worship are "put at the disposal of the bishops." What is meant by this expression? Evidently more than a mere use. And when we remark that this disposition is made in the same terms by which the State in 1789 took possession of, and used as owner, the Church property, it is very difficult not to conclude that these churches were given over to the ownership of the bishops for the organization of the new parishes. Moreover in art 13, it is said that the Pope will not disturb the actual owners of the ecclesiastical property already sold. Is not the insertion of such a clause in the law an implicit but clear acknowledgment that, in spite of the decree of 1789, the Church had preserved its rights over the property? It is true that Bernier, one of the signers of the Concordat, on the part of the government, and a Gallican, denies in his commentary on the preparatory project, that the Pope has any such right, but he affirms that the ecclesiastical property belonged to the Gallican Church. This article, therefore, whatever be its interpretation, remains a clear acknowledgment of the possession of ecclesiastic property by the Church, and this interpretation is made more evident if, as we shall see later, we consider that the stipend given to the clergy is a compensation for the properties alienated.

The "organic articles" (18 Germinal, an X) provided that "fabriques should be established in order to watch over the maintenance and preservation of the temples and the administration of charities" (art. 76). Many bishops then established fabriques to take charge of the ecclesiastical property. This right having been contested, a decree of 9 Floreal, an XI allowed them to organize these fabriques, but granting them the right of making only provisory regulations. These fabriques organized by the bishop were called "interior fabriques." As they had almost no revenue, a decree of 7 Thermidor an XI decided that the property of former fabri-

ques not already alienated should be restored to the service of their original purpose, given back to the churches and administered by special officers named by the prefect. These officials formed what was called "exterior fabriques." Hence there were two fabriques, one under the control of the bishop, the other under that of the prefect.

It is true that two decisions of the Council of State (Nivôse 3, Pluviôse 2-6 an XIII) declare that the churches restored to worship by the law of 18 Germinal an X (Concordat) must be considered as communal property. But it must be remarked that these decrees were not inserted in the *Bulletin des Lois*, and so do not fulfill a condition necessary for their becoming a law. It is true that the Emperor, six months later (25 Prairial, an XIII) declared that the decrees not inserted in the Bulletin, and yet publicly promulgated, are laws from the day of their promulgation. But it is very doubtful whether this decree can have a retroactive effect; and as a matter of fact, tribunals have refused to admit the force of decrees given before 25 Prairial, an XIII because they were not inserted in the Bulletin. A decree of May 30, 1806, considers the churches and rectories as such property of the fabriques; this is the case with the important decree of March 17, 1809, which declares that in the case of the ecclesiastical properties already alienated, but forfeited by failure on the part of the purchaser to pay the price demanded, these properties shall return to the parishes or the fabriques, which will have to support the charges, or profit by the indemnities attached to them. Moreover, as we shall see, the principle that the churches belong to the communes is not at all universally accepted.

The existence of two fabriques brought up many difficulties. By a decree of December 30, 1809, made by Napoleon, when Pius VII was a prisoner at Savona, they were both united in one which was given the right and powers of the two, and was made up of their different elements. According to this decree the curé and mayor are members by right; the prefect is to name four members out of nine, two out of five, the bishop naming the other members. The Church never approved of this decree but by force of events she had to submit to it. By this power given to its representatives, the



Government gradually took a greater part in the administration of the fabriques. More and more the fabriques came to be considered by the Minister of the Interior as part of his department and a communal administration. The Council of State also acted upon this view in several decisions. Portalis himself, the Minister of Worship and the real reorganizer of the fabriques, shared for a time of this opinion—probably because to his mind, commune and parish are practically the same, since the citizens of the commune are also the members of the parish. But he soon perceived the confusion; and on the 4th of March, 1806, he made a report to the Emperor in which he protests strongly against the theory that the fabriques are a communal organization. The fabriques, he says, do not represent the communes nor do they administer in their name. They are to the Catholics what the consistories are to the Protestants; and the consistories, he adds, do not represent the communes. The fabriques do not represent the communes but the churches. And in a letter to the Minister of the Interior (April 17, 1806) he maintains that the true fabriques are those organized by the law of the 18 Germinal, an X. Over these, he says, neither the prefect nor the mayor has any authority, but it is the bishop who is at their head. From 1814 to 1824 Interior and Worship were united and it is easily seen how the opinion which considered the church as communal property gained more ground. Yet this theory is not unanimously admitted, and we see the Cour de Cassation (1836) ascribe the fabriques to the Church. In 1840, it affirms that they belong neither to the Church nor to the communes; and then comes the time when in government administration the principle prevails that the cathedrals belong to the State, the churches to the communes, a principle which is admitted in the Law of Separation.

But perhaps it is not necessary to enter into so many details. On the question of the churches we have one fundamental document: the Concordat, a convention where the two parties interested are represented and in which the principles which must rule every subsequent decision are laid down. Every decree which is contrary to these principles, and is rendered by one of the contracting parties without the consent of

the other, is illegal and null. Now the Concordat, we have said, acknowledges, implicitly at least, the claims of the Church on the ecclesiastical property; according to the Concordat also it is to the bishops that churches are returned, without condition; and it is the bishop who has the charge of organizing the parishes. And now that the Concordat is abolished! It remains, in spite of the decree of the Assembly of 1789 which did not even dare to settle the question of their ownership, that the churches have been built, maintained and repaired by the Catholics as Catholics and not merely as citizens. It is to Catholics as Catholics that they belong. A government can be strong enough to deprive them by force of their possession, but no government, no law, can despoil them with justice of their rights.

#### IV. THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CLERGY.

We have seen that by article 13 of the Concordat, the Pope abandoned all claim to the ecclesiastical property already alienated; by article 14 the government is to insure a convenient competence to the bishops and curés. Is there any relation between these two articles? The Government answers negatively and considers this competence as a salary consented to by the State; and often a bishop or a curé has been deprived of it for alleged infraction of the law. The Catholics maintain that this competence mentioned in the article 14 is only a compensation for the property mentioned in art. 13. It will be remembered that the decree of 1789 says that "the ecclesiastical property is at the disposal of the nation upon the condition that it shall provide for the expenses of worship and the maintenance of the pastors, etc., . . . which maintenance should not be less than twelve hundred francs (livres) a year." This provision for the expenses of worship and the maintenance of the pastors is not considered, even by the Assembly, as a free gift, but as a debt. In the Constitution of 1791, under title V, on Public Contributions, art 2, it is said: "Under no pretext can the funds necessary for the payment of the national debt be refused or suspended. The maintenance of the ministers of the Catholic Worship pensioned, elected, retained or nominated in virtue of the decree of the As-

sembly, is a part of the national debt." The Concordat has not suppressed this debt; the Church has not given it up any more than it has given up the property not alienated. It seems logical also that the maintenance mentioned in the Concordat coming immediately after the cession by the Pope of the property alienated, is a debt, a compensation for this property. Moreover, if the text does not express this relation, the negotiations preparatory to the Concordat show it. Bernier speaking of the titles VII and VIII, which contain the substance of these two articles, declared to Spina (one of the signers on the part of the Holy See) that these two articles seem to form only one; and on the eleventh of July, presenting a report on the two measures which were destined to be the articles 13 and 14, he comments in the following way upon the last one: "This article is the natural compensation for the one which precedes it. It is admitted under the form in which it has been proposed, and it cannot be objected to." So it is that, with the Concordat or without the Concordat, the French Government has the duty of paying not a salary but a debt to the Church, so long as the property alienated is not given back.

#### V. WHY THE POPE REFUSES TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE LAW OF SEPARATION.

In the Encyclical "*Vehementer Nos*" the Pope has pronounced the Law of Separation "injurious to God," "gravely offensive to the Apostolic See," "a violation of natural and international law," since it was the breach of a bilateral contract without the consent of one of the contracting parties, viz., the Holy See, and finally "contrary to the constitution of the church and her right."

Many people have been surprised by this condemnation. They were still more surprised when they learned that the condemnation was not merely theoretical but a practical one, accompanied by a prohibition forbidding the formation of "associations cultuelles." They have been tempted to charge the Pope with intolerance when he refused to accept a project of association approved and presented by the majority of the French bishops. Yet the position of the Pope is clear: as long as the law remains what it is, it is contrary to the essential

constitution of the Church. Besides the question of property, finance, and police of worship, the fundamental question is that of the organization of the "associations cultuelles": and in this organization the law ignores the bishop, or at least, does not give him the place and part in Catholic discipline which it is essentially necessary for him to have. According to the art. 8 of the Law of Separation, if the ecclesiastical property "is claimed by several associations formed for the exercise of the same worship, the attribution, which will have been made of the property by the representatives of the establishment or by a decree, can be disputed before the Council of State which will pronounce after taking into account all the circumstances of fact." The legitimacy therefore of an "association cultuelle" shall be established, not by the bishop but by the Council of State; the bishop is not even so much as named once in the whole law. Now it is true that the Council of State is bound by art. 4 which states that the property shall be transferred to the associations that shall have been formed "in conformity to the rule of general organization of worship whose exercise they intend to secure." It can be deduced from this that the Council of State is bound to acknowledge the associations which are in union with the bishops, this being an essential character of Catholic discipline. Moreover, in the discussion of the law, the "rapporteur," Mr. Briand, the actual Minister of Worship, has declared that such was the meaning of the article. But is it not strange to see the Council of State sitting as a judge in matters of Catholic discipline and doctrine? Who assures us that the Council of State will not have its own way of interpreting the general organization of Catholic Worship? That submission to the bishop and the recognition by him of the "association cultuelle" shall necessarily be recognized as an essential part of the general organization of Catholic Worship has indeed been declared by Mr. Briand, the "rapporteur" of the law; but it remains a mere declaration of Mr. Briand, and not a part of the law. It will be observed, perhaps, by him as long as he is Minister of Worship, but it does not bind his successors, and we know that the Cabinets in France are changeable as well as the decrees.

And even if the legitimate associations cultuelles are the ones recognized by the bishop, does it mean that he will have the right to organize and regulate them? It is far from certain; and some provisions of the law are, on this point, susceptible of dangerous interpretation. In one word, the Law of Separation does not guarantee, but is even capable of radically offending, Catholic discipline and worship.

Why, then, it will be asked, have the bishops by a great majority proposed the acceptance of this law? It must be remarked, in the first place, that the French bishops themselves in their meeting have condemned the Law of Separation and its enactments. This explains the statement of the Pope in his encyclical "*Gravissimo officii*" speaking of confirming "the almost unanimous deliberation of the Assembly of the bishops," which statement, misunderstood by some, has led them to accuse the Pope of misinformation or even of dissimulation. Pressed however by the prospect of dangers to the Church, very evident in their eyes, and having, perhaps (it is simply a hypothesis) some assurance that the Government would examine in a conciliatory spirit their proposition, the bishops presented their plan of association. To respect the rights of the Church, it had to contravene the law, and to accept the law it had to sacrifice something of the rights of the Church; as a matter of fact, these two objections were made against the project. The Pope who has charge of the whole Church, who has to consider more than the mere actual and national conditions, saw the danger of their project; it could be accepted by the present Government and rejected by the following; it could little by little become a means for it to impose the letter of the Law of Separation; and this is not an illusory supposition for those who understand the disposition of the French Cabinet, most of whose members are absolutely anti-religious. In his wisdom the Pope refused to agree to the project.

It has been often objected also that he acknowledges such a law in other countries, and we know that the actual law of worship in Germany was an argument developed in the very meeting of the bishops as a precedent in favor of the project presented. It is true that the German legislation

does not respect all the rights of the Catholic Church and a strong protestation was presented against it by the German episcopate. Yet it was tolerated. Perhaps the consideration that Germany is, in majority, a Protestant country, may have been a motive for its tolerance. But had the project ignored the hierarchical constitution of the Church, it also would probably have been rejected. As a matter of fact, it is not so. It is true that the president superior decides in last place when the council of administration appeals from the decision of the bishop (art. 49) and this point must have been the one the most objected to; but even in this case the side of the bishop is presented since it is an appeal from his decision. Moreover his authority is acknowledged in most of the important circumstances. We see in this law that the bishop has the right to call a meeting of the council of administration (art. 14), and to name the president if the one elected refuses to fulfill his functions (art. 15). Again in certain cases of renunciation of their functions by the members of the administration, the final sentence is reserved to the bishop, to be pronounced with the assent of the district president (art. 32); the bishop, with the assent of the president superior, can decide whether or not in small communes there is a necessity of electing representatives (art. 36). The bishop has a right to dismiss a member of the council of administration in case he lacks the requisite qualities, or does not properly fulfill his functions (art. 37); if the council of administration refuses to meet the expenses necessary for worship, the bishop has the right to incur those expenses *ex-officio* and to take the necessary measures (art. 53). So it appears that in Germany the authority of the bishop is explicitly acknowledged and that the Catholic hierarchy is, if not as fully as it ought to be, at least in important points, respected.

There is therefore a great difference between this law, whatever be its defects, and the French Law of Separation; let us add also that the Prussian Law is much more liberal in relation to administering finances.

As to the law of 1881, how could this law be accepted, which was never intended for religious meetings? This law contains dispositions absolutely contrary to the character of



religious worship, especially of Catholic worship. Of this Mr. Briand himself was aware and that is why he sent his circular with proper modifications. But here again, we are in presence of a personal circular of Mr. Briand, of the Minister of Worship *pro tem.*; it does not bind in any way his successors and leaves the law unchanged. And it is even disputed whether or not this circular is legal. Here again we cannot help admiring the far-seeing prudence and wisdom of the Pope in refusing submission to it.

#### VI. SEPARATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND SEPARATION IN FRANCE.

It has been said and written that the Separation Law gives to the Church in France the same position which it has in the United States. It can be seen from the facts mentioned how utterly false is this statement. During the time of the discussion of the law, the motto of the Catholics was: "Give us freedom as in the United States." Their cry was not heard. Here in America there is really separation without privileges for the Church or obligation for the State; nay, there is a mutual and sincere respect of one for the other. In each diocese the bishop is the head of the Church and the State acknowledges him as such. In religious matters as establishing of new parishes, building of churches, schools, etc., he is absolutely independent. He has the title of ownership or the supervision of all the ecclesiastical properties and finances. The question of ecclesiastical property in the Philippines has shown to the whole world, to the French Government, how a Republic acts with justice towards the Church without being bound by any special contract. In a word, Separation in the United States means freedom; in France it means, according to the very words of Pius X, oppression of the Church by the State.

#### VII. THE FUTURE OF THE CHURCH IN FRANCE.

What shall be the future of the Church in France is difficult to say. There will be indeed difficulties and suffering of all kinds. A new era begins for the Church, and the people will have to be educated to the new circumstances. But there

is no room for despair or discouragement. The French people are by nature generous and self-sacrificing; and they know that defending their faith, ultimate success will be theirs. Clergy and bishops give an admirable example of obedience to, and union with, the Pope,—obedience and union which, if courageously and constantly maintained, will overcome any obstacle, injustice, or violence. Indifference has been the great sin of France during the nineteenth century; this struggle at the beginning of the twentieth century will recall to the many who are indifferent that there is a religious question, and that this question is a fundamental one in the life of a nation, of the French nation especially.

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## EARLY MISSION SCHOOLS OF THE FRANCISCANS.

### NEW MEXICO.

In attempting to trace the history of the Catholic parochial school system of the United States, we are led back step by step to the earliest organized work of the Church on the North American continent. In the Western World, as earlier, among the barbarian peoples of Europe, the work of the Church was one of Christianization and civilization, and it was clearly seen from the very first that the shortest and surest path to the attainment of this double end lay through the instruction of youth. Catholic schools sprang spontaneously from the development of Catholic life. The school-teacher followed close after the missionary and the explorer, and in many instances the first school-teachers were the pioneer-missionaries themselves.

The earliest schools within the present limits of the United States were founded by the Franciscans in Florida and New Mexico. In the year 1629, four years before the establishment of the oldest school in the thirteen original colonies,<sup>1</sup> there were many elementary schools for the natives, scattered through the pueblos of New Mexico,<sup>2</sup> and from the number, character, and distribution of these schools, it is evident that the date for the foundation of the first school there must be set back considerably before the year 1629.

Doubtless the work of founding these schools was begun in 1598, the year in which Don Juan de Onate conquered and took effective possession of the country for the King of Spain.<sup>3</sup> Onate's force, which set out from Mexico early in that year, included 7 Franciscan friars. As the expedition ad-

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<sup>1</sup> The oldest school in the thirteen English colonies was the school of the Reformed Dutch Church, established in 1633. The next was the Boston Latin School, opened in 1635 or 1636. Report of the Bureau of Education, 1903, Vol. I, p. 555.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Memorial of Benavides to the King of Spain, dated 1630, and printed at Madrid that year.

<sup>3</sup> Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, p. 124.

vanced northward into New Mexico and took possession of the country, the Franciscan Fathers were installed in the chief towns of the tribes, and the work of evangelization and education began. Churches were erected, as well as convents or dwelling-houses for the friars, and, alongside of each convent, if not attached to it, was usually built a school.<sup>1</sup>

Nor was this prominence given to education in the work of the missionaries due to circumstances or to accident. It had all been provided for almost a full century before, in the legislation framed for the liberty and protection of the natives of the New World by the great Ximenes, at the prompting of the saintly bishop Las Casas. That legislation dates from the year 1516.<sup>2</sup> By its terms, each village of the natives in New Spain was to have its school, as well as its church and hospital.<sup>3</sup> The sacristan of the village church was also to be the schoolmaster, and was charged with the duty of teaching the children to read, taking particular care to gradually accustom the Indians to the Spanish language. The parish priest was to see that each individual was taught according to his faculties, besides being instructed in the faith. As early as 1531, the Bishop of Mexico was able to report that each convent of the Franciscan Order in his diocese had a school attached to it, and that the college which Peter of Ghent, a Franciscan lay brother, had established in the City of Mexico, was attended by more than 600 Aztec youths.<sup>4</sup> The Bishop also reported the foundation of many schools for girls.<sup>5</sup> For the native children schools were organized all through Mexico, and the work of erecting school-buildings and organizing and teaching classes went on hand in hand with that of erecting churches, administering the Sacraments, and preaching. The school, in fact, was considered essential to the complete organization of the parish. The aim was to give the entire native school population the benefit of at least a rudimentary education.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Helps, *The Spanish Conquest in America*, III, p. 209.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 353.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, von Hefele, *Life of Card. Ximenes*, p. 509 *seq.*

<sup>4</sup> Clinch, *California and its Missions*, I, p. 57, 63.

<sup>5</sup> Helps, *The Spanish Conquest*, III, p. 210.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. in this connection, the early Spanish educational legislation for the Philippine Islands, in *Amer. Eccl. Rev.*, XXXV, p. 595.

Such was the system which led to the erection of schools alongside of the churches in New Mexico, as fast as the peaceful conquest of the country was effected by Onate. The instruction given in these schools, in accordance with the plan of Ximenes, was of a two-fold character. Up to nine years of age, the children were taught reading, writing, catechism, singing, and playing on musical instruments. Much stress was laid upon music, especially singing. It was an accomplishment that was made of by the heathen medicine-men, and was held high in popular esteem. The native children took to it naturally, and the Missionary Fathers themselves marvelled and praised the Lord "to see in so short a time so many organ choirs."<sup>1</sup> Spanish was also taught.

A striking feature of this system of education was its practical character. From nine years of age on, the work of the pupil in school was almost wholly industrial. The common arts and trades of the civilized world formed the curriculum—tailoring, shoemaking, carpentering, carving, blacksmithing, brick-making, stone-cutting.<sup>2</sup> The girls were taught to sew and to spin. In their case also the instruction was admirably adapted to native character and talent, as well as to the needs of practical life. The Indians had a natural skill in many lines of industrial work, and the missionaries made the most of this in their system of instruction. So proficient did the pupils become in these trades, that, with the help of the women—upon whom, by a curious reversal of ordinary custom, the work of brick-making and house-building fell, the men disdaining to take part in it,—they were soon able to erect buildings for churches and schools which were larger and finer than anything which the natives had ever attempted to build before. "Over fifty churches of very curious carved roof and the walls very well painted" had been erected in this way by 1629.<sup>3</sup>

The missionaries themselves were the first teachers. Some of them were men of eminent learning, and nearly all had had the advantage of years of experience in the missions

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<sup>1</sup> Benavides, Memorial, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Benavides, Memorial, p. 13.

of the Western World.<sup>1</sup> They taught the elementary branches, while training up the more promising pupils to become teachers. In course of time, probably, the teaching came to be largely done by these natives, but at the beginning, the Fathers had to bear the whole burden themselves. They taught the skilled native artisans how to develop their trades along European lines; they introduced domestic animals; they taught the use of the horse, the cow, and the sheep; they followed the plough, and sowed the seed with their own hands, supplanting the primitive practices with the more scientific and fruitful methods of agriculture brought from the Old World.<sup>2</sup>

The schools were scattered among the various tribes inhabiting that region which extends for hundreds of miles along the upper Rio Grande. To the westward, the missionaries penetrated far into what is now Arizona, and here too, among the powerful Mogui Nation, churches and schools were established.<sup>3</sup> The Memorial or Report of Benavides shows that in 1630 there were about 50 Franciscans in New Mexico, serving over 60,000 Christian natives, in 90 pueblos, grouped in 25 missions, each pueblo having its own church.<sup>4</sup> Many of these pueblos had schools. Benavides does not give the exact number. He enumerates some dozen places where there were schools, but intimates that the inhabitants of all the pueblos had opportunity for instruction. Thus, speaking of the Tepas nation, he says: "All the pueblos have their churches, and they are very well instructed in all branches."<sup>5</sup> We cannot be far from right, therefore, in concluding that the system of schools set up in New Mexico by the Franciscan missionaries comprehended in its scope the entire school population of the tribes or natives converted to the Faith. The fact is of interest when we reflect that it was not until some years

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<sup>1</sup>Among these may be mentioned Father Joseph Truxillo, who had labored in New Mexico for many years preceding the outbreak of the rebellion of 1680. He had acquired great renown in Mexico by his learning and eloquence, cf. Vetancurt, *Teatro Mexicano*, Menologio, p. 87; Shea, *History*, Vol. I, p. 208.

<sup>2</sup>Benavides, *Memorial*, p. 27.

<sup>3</sup>Bancroft, *History of Arizona and New Mexico*, p. 162.

<sup>4</sup>Benavides, *Memorial*.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, *Memorial*, p. 8.

later that the first school was set up in the English-speaking colonies of America, and further that, at the time, no comprehensive system of public schools existed in any European country.<sup>1</sup>

It is a matter of great regret that our knowledge of these schools and their practical working is so scant. Most of the knowledge we have of them is contained in the Memorial of Benavides. Nor have we any precise information about their influence. They must have been a potent factor in winning the good will of the natives and effecting their conversion, and an evidence of their influence is to be seen in the conversion of entire tribes within a few years and their adoption of European standards of civilization. Not all the tribes were converted, but it is worthy of note that where the missionaries gained a foothold at all, the conversion of a great part of the tribe almost invariably followed.

Whether the schools were kept up until the very outbreak of the great rebellion in 1680, we have no means of knowing. Very likely they were. But the schools themselves together with whatever records may have existed in New Mexico of their history and work, were completely destroyed in that uprising, and the only sources of information we have regarding them are contained in the accounts of the missions that reached the outer world before that date. Most of the Friars were massacred. School-houses, convents, and churches were burned or razed to the ground. In 1690 there was not a church, or priest, or Spaniard within the whole of New Mexico. Hatred of Spanish cruelty and tyranny seems to have been at the bottom of the revolt. Whether or not the Friars themselves were partly responsible through imprudent zeal, they shared none the less in the general enmity toward everything Spanish which had gradually grown up in the minds of the natives during the years preceding the uprising. Unfortunately for New Mexico, and, no doubt, for the development of the entire southwestern section of our country, the Friars do not appear to have ever fully regained their influence or their initiative in the missions of New Mexico. The rebellion was finally crushed. The Friars came back; churches and con-

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<sup>1</sup> Clinch, *California and its Missions*, I, p. 57.

vents were rebuilt; the natives were brought back gradually to the faith, but a feeling of hatred, distrust and fear, lingered on in the native mind. The long wars depopulated the country. There was no trade or industry, and the country was poverty-stricken. There was no means to rebuild the schools, even if there had been any effort or intention to do so. At any rate the schools disappeared with the rebellion of 1680 as completely as if they had never existed. Almost two centuries were to pass before New Mexico, under the inspiration of an American bishop, and the breath of a new national spirit, was to give evidence of the re-awakening of a healthy Catholic life, by the foundation of Catholic schools. Meanwhile, the Franciscans found new fields for the exercise of their zeal for Christian education in Texas and California.

#### TEXAS.

The first Spanish expedition to Texas took place in 1689. It was followed by others, until gradually the whole country fell under the Spanish sway, and presidios or military garrisons were established among all the leading native tribes. Franciscan Friars accompanied each of these expeditions, and when a presidio was planted, the work of civilizing and converting the natives was begun by the Friars. Often, however, the missionaries preceded the soldiers. The Indians in most cases were friendly, welcoming the good priests with open arms, and eager to learn from them the arts and manners of civilization, as well as to become Christians.

The Franciscans followed much the same methods they had made use of in New Mexico. Around the church and mission-house, groups of buildings were erected, forming a little Catholic settlement, composed of the converted natives and their children. The real work of conversion and civilization was made to center about the children. Their moral training was carefully looked after, segregation of the sexes being practiced to some extent, as was done later on in California. The girls were instructed in household arts, while the boys spent the greater part of their time at work in the shops or in the fields learning agriculture and stock-raising. There was a general instruction for all once a day at least, which was



chiefly catechetical in character. Little attention was given to the study of the ordinary school subjects. The ideal was that of an industrial training, pure and simple.<sup>1</sup>

As in New Mexico and afterwards in California, the educational work of the Franciscans in Texas was wonderfully successful, considering the difficulties in the way. The Indians in Texas were exceedingly hard to convert. "It is necessary first to transform them into men," said one of the missionaries, "afterward to labor to make them Christians."<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the missionaries succeeded. The Indians were converted, tribe after tribe, until nearly all except the Comanches and Apaches, were Christianized. The mission region extended from the Rio Grande on the southwest to the Sabine River on the east, and from the Gulf of Mexico on the south to the mountainous region in North Texas. San Antonio was the chief center of the Friars' work, five flourishing mission villages having been established in its vicinity.<sup>3</sup> What is more remarkable still, the Indians were led far along the way to material civilization and prosperity. They gave up, in large numbers, their wandering life. They substituted the plow for the bow and arrow, the quiet and peaceful life of the Christian presidio for the wild Arab life of their savage state. They became artisans, farmers, blacksmiths, bricklayers, carpenters, weavers. Many of their descendants are Christians to this day, even though ignorant and impoverished, owing to the operation of causes which have resulted in the entire disappearance of the Indians from other sections of our country.

The number of white settlers in Texas, as in New Mexico, was small, and this is probably the reason we do not hear of schools for Spanish children until a late date. San Antonio was the chief Spanish settlement, and a few years before 1789, a school was established there for the children of the colonists, which, although it had many ups and downs, continued to exist for a period of about thirty years.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Brown, *Hist. of Texas*, pp. 20-26. Yoakum, *Hist. of Texas*, pp. 53-64. Shea, *op. cit.*, pp. 479-509. Garrison, *Texas*, p. 56.

<sup>2</sup> Yoakum, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>3</sup> Garrison, *Texas*, p. 60.

<sup>4</sup> A full account of this interesting institution, its curriculum, and curious disciplinary rules, is given by I. J. Cox, in the *Texas Historical Association Quarterly* for July, 1902.

## FLORIDA.

In Florida, the educational work of the Franciscans on a systematic scale dates from about the year 1594, when a band of twelve Friars arrived from Spain to reinforce the four who were already laboring there.<sup>1</sup> The Franciscans, by their kind ways and methods of instruction, soon made many converts among the Indians. As in New Mexico, each mission-house became a school of instruction for the natives, especially the children, in the arts of civilized life, as well as in the doctrines of Christianity. Missions were established gradually up and down the coast and far into the interior. But the work of the Franciscans did not meet with the same success in Florida as in the provinces to the West. This was due partly to the more savage and treacherous character of the Indians of Florida, and partly to the wars with the French and English, which resulted in the destruction of many of the mission-houses and the dispersal of the missionaries.<sup>2</sup> For a time, however, much progress was made.

One of the first things the Franciscans did was to establish a classical school and preparatory seminary at St. Augustine, for the children of the Spanish settlers. This school existed as early as 1606, for in that year, we find Bishop Cabezas de Altamirano, of Santiago de Cuba, during the course of an episcopal visitation to Florida, conferring confirmation upon several candidates for holy orders in St. Augustine.<sup>3</sup> In 1602, there were already 1200 Christian Indians in Florida, and in 1612 and the following year, 31 new missionaries arrived from Spain, and the work of conversion and civilization was pushed rapidly on. The learned Father Francis Pareja, who was laboring among the Timuquan Indians at this time, published several catechisms, a grammar, and a number of other works in the native language, for the use of the missionaries and the instruction of the Indians.<sup>4</sup> By the year 1634, there were 35 Franciscans in Florida, with 44 missions, and 30,000 converts. Twelve years later, the number of missionaries had increased to 50.<sup>5</sup> That the Indians were instructed in reading

<sup>1</sup> Shea, *History*, I, p. 152.

<sup>2</sup> Fairbanks, *Hist. of Florida*, p. 177.

<sup>3</sup> Shea, *History*, I, p. 160.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 157.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 163, 164.



and writing is evidenced by documents embodying petitions to the King of Spain and signed with their names by the chiefs of the various tribes.<sup>1</sup>

The prospects for Florida at this time seemed very bright, but they were soon overclouded. The tyranny of the civil authorities provoked the revolt of the powerful Apalache tribe, among whom a flourishing mission had been established, and the example of the Apalaches was followed by other tribes. The hostility of the English in the neighboring settlements, as they grew up, was another disturbing influence upon the Florida Indians, and a fruitful cause of dissatisfaction with the Spanish rule and the discipline of the missionaries, which also at times appears to have been somewhat harsh.<sup>2</sup> Owing to these and other causes, the missions, from about the middle of the seventeenth century, declined. Their record from that time on was one of stagnation or decay, and presents little that is of educational interest until the year 1736, when Bishop Tejada, in attempting to bring about a revival of religion in Florida, reopened a classical school at St. Augustine,<sup>3</sup> the school being intended chiefly for the training of clerics. But it does not appear to have continued for more than a few years. In 1740, Gov. Oglethorpe, of Georgia, led an expedition against Florida, and in the long war which followed, the school probably disappeared, as no further reference to it is found after that date.

#### CALIFORNIA.

The history of the school system established by the Franciscans in Upper California belongs chronologically chiefly to the post-revolutionary period. The friars began their mission work there only in 1769, and the civilization and education of the native tribes went on under their direction until the year 1834. But the mission schools of California have a close historical connection with the school system established by the Jesuits in Lower California nearly a century before, and also with the school system set up by the Franciscans, or under their influence, in Mexico more than two centuries be-

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<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>2</sup> Shea, *History*, I, p. 173.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 470.

fore. The regulations framed by the Franciscan Cardinal Ximenes for the education of the Indians furnished a practical educational ideal for the members of his order doing missionary work among the natives of the New World, as well as for all the other religious orders. These regulations were, as we have seen, the guiding principle in the educational work of the Franciscans in New Mexico, Texas, and Florida. They were no less so for their work in California; only, as we shall see, they profited by the bitter lessons of experience in New Mexico and modified the system somewhat in its external arrangement. At any rate, the mission schools of California belong to the great educational movement inaugurated by Ximenes and Las Casas. They have no connection with the educational work that was being done simultaneously in the English-speaking colonies. It seems best, therefore, to consider them in connection with the movement of which they formed a part.

The Jesuits were the founders of the missions in Lower California, and the chief means they relied on for the success of their work seems to have been the building up of schools. As early as 1705, a school was set up at the mission at St. Xavier. This was followed by others, as fast as new missions were opened, each mission having two schools—one for boys, and another for girls. The subjects of instruction were Christian doctrine, reading, writing, music, and simple trades.<sup>1</sup> The school period lasted from the age of six to twelve. The Jesuits themselves, in the beginning, taught such trades as farming, carpentry, smithing, and brick-making, as well as the common branches of study. In the case of the girls, spinning and sewing took the place of the trades,<sup>2</sup> and, to crown the educational system, a boarding-school—a sort of normal school—was established in a central place, and to this the brightest boys were brought from each mission, and given a training in Spanish, as well as a higher training in the common branches. This school was counted on to furnish teachers for the other schools, as well as catechists and effective lay-missionaries to aid the Jesuits in the extension of the mission work.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Clinch, *California and its Missions*, I, p. 156. Gleeson, *Hist. of the Cath. Church in Cal.*, I, p. 253 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Clinch, p. 105.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156.

Such were the remarkable educational achievements of the missionaries in Lower California when, in 1767, Charles III issued his *fiat* for the expulsion and deportation of the Jesuits from every part of the Spanish dominions. The Jesuits in Lower California were replaced by Franciscans. Sixteen Fathers, under the famous Junipero Serra, returned on the vessel which carried the Jesuits away. They took up the missions and continued the work of the schools, but it was now found to be very up-hill work. The authorities threw obstacles in the way, and the natives were wasting away as the result of tyrannical oppression and disease.

Father Serra, who was far-seeing and enterprising, as well as a saint, cast his eyes northward, and saw in the expedition which was being fitted out for the occupation of Upper California, the opportunity for which he longed. An agreement with the authorities was arrived at whereby the Franciscans were to take charge of the missions in the new territory, and were to be given a free hand in their work among the natives. The mission settlements were to be entirely separate and at some distance from both the *presidios*, or garrisons, and the *pueblos*, or civil colonies. Father Serra had seen the magnificent results of the Jesuits' work in Lower California, where the plan had been to form new settlements consisting of the converts alone, and thus separate them completely from the baneful influence of the gentiles, and especially the medicine-men. It was the same plan as the Jesuits had carried out on a larger scale, and with even more splendid results, in the famous "Reductions" of Paraguay. He perceived, doubtless, that it was the failure to separate the gentiles from the Christians which had led to the ruin of the missions in New Mexico a century before.

It was natural that he should count largely on education for the success of his plans. A Majorcan by birth, the son of poor laboring people, he had made a brilliant academic course, and after teaching theology for three years with great applause, received the degree of doctor.<sup>1</sup> He seemed destined to add another to the long list of names that adorned the annals

<sup>1</sup> Life of Ven. Padre Junipero Serra, written by his companion, Rev. Francis Pallou, p. 24; Hittell, Hist. of California, I, p. 301.

of Franciscan scholarship in Europe, and such, apparently, was what his superiors' plans for him contemplated. But he longed for a more apostolic career, and seized an opportunity which presented itself, of coming to America, where his learning, joined to the eminent holiness of his life, soon placed him at the head of the Franciscan missions in the far Northwest.

Bancroft's summary statement, that there were no schools in California before Borica became Governor in 1793,<sup>1</sup> is true, so far as regards schools after the European fashion. But it is not true in the sense that nothing was done for the education of the natives. From the very first, the work of the Friars was largely educational, and the whole routine of daily life devised for the converts who took up their residence at the missions, formed a continuous educational process, in the large sense. Father Serra founded the first of the missions, at San Diego, in 1769. Others were founded by him year by year. San Gabriel was begun in 1771, and Father Font, a Franciscan who paid a visit to this mission in the year 1776, has left us in his diary a description of what he saw:

"The discipline of every day is this: in the morning at sunrise, mass is said regularly, and in this, or without it if it is not said, all the Indians join together, and the padre recites them all the Christian doctrine, which is finished by singing the Alabado which is sung in all the missions in one way and in the same tone, and the padres sing it even though they may not have good voices, inasmuch as uniformity is best. Then they go to breakfast on the mush (*atole*) which is made for all, and before partaking of it they cross themselves and sing the Bendito; then they go to work at whatever can be done, the padres inclining them and applying them to the work by setting an example themselves; at noon they eat their soup (*pozolo*) which is made for all alike; then they work another stint; and at sunset they return to recite doctrine and end by singing the Alabado. . . .

"If any Indian wishes to go to the woods to see his relatives, or to gather acorns, he is given permission for a specified number of days, and regularly they do not fail to return, and sometimes they come with a gentile relative who stays to catechism, either through the example of the others, or attracted by the soup, which suits them

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<sup>1</sup> Bancroft, *Hist. of California*, I, p. 642.

better than their herbs and eatables of the woods, and thus these Indians are wont to be gathered in by the mouth."<sup>1</sup>

The missions, were, in fact, immense boarding-schools. All the exercises of the day were in common. The great end in view was the formation of Christian character. This was aimed at, in the daily routine, by three means; religious practice and instruction, industrial occupation, and strict discipline. The padre stood to the converts *in loco parentis*, and the natives were treated as legal minors under a guardianship.<sup>2</sup> The converts, on the whole, accepted the conditions of life at the missions cheerfully. They loved the padres, and on some occasions showed their love and veneration for them by outward demonstrations which struck non-sympathetic observers with astonishment.<sup>3</sup>

As the formation of Christian character was the chief aim of the round of daily exercises prescribed for the convert, it was to be expected that special care would be bestowed upon the young. Father Serra early devised a system of training for girls, which became common throughout the missions, and a permanent feature of mission life. Font, in his description of the Missions, refers to it thus:

"In the missions it is arranged that the grown-up girls sleep apart in some place of retirement, and in the mission of San Louis (Obispo) I saw that a married soldier acted as major-domo of the mission, so that the padre had some assistance, and his wife took care of the girls, under whose charge they were, and whom they called the matron, and she by day kept them with her, teaching them to sew, and other things, and at night locked them up in a room, where she kept them safe from every insult, and for this were they called the nuns; the which seemed to me a very good thing."<sup>4</sup>

It was the strict convent discipline, common in the bringing up of girls in Spain, which the friars introduced in the

<sup>1</sup> In Garce's Diary, translated by Elliott Coues, I, p. 262; cf. Gleeson, *op. cit.*, II, p. 29 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Blackmar, Spanish Colonization in the Southwest, Johns Hopkins University Studies.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Vancouver's account of his visits to the missions, in Hittell, *Hist. of Cal.*, I, p. 471.

<sup>4</sup> Garce's Diary, I, p. 263.

work of training the native girls. A soldier's wife took the place of the Spanish cloistered nun, and the domestic arts, sewing, spinning, and cooking, were substituted for the convent curriculum of studies. When De Mofras visited California, more than sixty years later, the native girls were still being trained in this way.<sup>1</sup>

When Father Serra died in 1784, he was succeeded by Father Fermin Francis Lazuen. He was a man of refinement and scholarly attainments, even more markedly so than Father Junipero, and his administrative ability was equal to his learning.<sup>2</sup> For eighteen years he remained Prefect of California, founded many new missions, and labored to extend and perfect the work of the missionaries along the lines laid down by his predecessor.

Up to this time, there seems to have been no formal school work, outside of teaching the catechism. But little effort had been made to teach the natives Spanish. The boys spent most of the day in the fields.<sup>3</sup> Whatever teaching of the common branches there was was done incidentally, or in the case of individuals. Father Lazuen, however, introduced schools, wherein reading and writing and Spanish were taught, and singing by note, although only the most intelligent pupils were taught to read and write.<sup>4</sup> In the absence of books, these arts were not considered to have much practical value, but all were taught to sing, and were given plenty of practice in the daily religious exercises. Instruction in instrumental music was also given. Each boy was taught the rudiments of a trade, and much of the school-day went into practical lessons of this kind. Carpentry, black-smithing, stone-cutting, brick-making, weaving, agriculture and gardening, were the principal trades. Special stress was laid upon the value of steady occupation for the young, and habits of industry were inculcated as an essential to real Christian life.<sup>5</sup> School-houses or school-rooms were a regular feature of the mission-buildings

<sup>1</sup> Blackmar, *Spanish Colonization in the Southwest*, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Hittell, *Hist. of Cal.*, I, p. 489.

<sup>3</sup> One of their chief tasks was to keep the birds away from the ripening fruits and crops.

<sup>4</sup> Shea, *Hist. of the Cath. Church in the U. S.*, IV, p. 345.

<sup>5</sup> Clinch, *California and its Missions*, II, p. 208.



from this time on, but the training of the children continued always to be in the main industrial.

The slight importance attached to reading and writing and to the learning of Spanish, a knowledge of which was essential to the natives for much intellectual progress, is a point wherein the educational system established by the Franciscans in California is certainly open to criticism. Governor Borica, in 1795, issued a circular to the heads of the missions, directing them to form a school in every establishment, and teach the Indians to speak, read and write Spanish, to the absolute exclusion of the native language. To this little attention seems to have been paid. Borica showed himself a strong friend of education, and besides encouraging it in the missions, attempted to establish schools for the Spanish children in all the garrisons and pueblos. At this time the native Spanish population of California did not amount to more than 1,500.<sup>1</sup> It was very hard to find teachers, but Borica finally succeeded in starting several schools in the pueblos, a retired sergeant being the first school-master, and the public granary at San Jose the first school-house. The curriculum of these first public schools in California was very simple. Christian doctrine, reading and writing, with perhaps the elements of arithmetic, were the only subjects taught.<sup>2</sup> Some interesting facts respecting the illiteracy of the Spanish soldiers were brought to light by Borica's educational zeal. In 1791, only two out of 28 soldiers at San Francisco could write. In 1794 not a man in the garrison there was able to write, and the commandant asked that one who could write be sent from Santa Barbara. In 1800, many soldiers acting as corporals could not be promoted because they could not read.<sup>3</sup>

Before passing judgement upon the neglect of thorough instruction in the common branches under the mission system, we must consider that the aim of the missionaries was not primarily intellectual, but spiritual, and that the system of instruction adopted for boys and girls respectively, was held by the friars to be the best adapted to the immediate moral,

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<sup>1</sup> Bancroft, *Hist. of Cal.*, I, p. 603.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 643.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

material, and intellectual wants of a people who were in a state of transition from savagery to civilization. The natives were extremely lazy, and, generally speaking, stupid. Some among them were skilled in certain kinds of dyeing and carving, and they were all passionately fond of music. The missionaries, in framing their educational system, tried to adapt it to the characteristics and needs of the natives, just as they had done in New Mexico. All the children were taught to sing, and those who had inclination for it were taught the use of the musical instruments common in Europe. They were taught the manufacture and dyeing of cloths and fabrics of various kinds, from materials raised on the mission farms. With the help of skilled artisans, brought from Mexico for the purpose, they were schooled in the arts of masonry and carpentry, and the old mission churches still standing testify, although in ruins, to the high degree of technical skill they acquired, as well as to the architectural genius of the padres.

After all, was it not more important, at least for the first generation of converts, to learn to till the soil and to support themselves by the labor of their hands, than to learn to read and write? As between knowledge and industry, the friars might very sensibly have inclined to the belief that, in view of the inherited indolence of the natives, the first and most essential thing to teach them was work, and that it would be time enough to set up schools after the European fashion when their pupils had mastered the more elementary and necessary arts which would provide for them food, clothing, shelter, and other common conveniences of civilized life. When schools were actually established, the plan was to give instruction chiefly to the children who were brightest, with a view to making them teachers and superintendents of the others in the various trades and occupations. Eventually, there were schools established at most of the missions, and probably more or less common school education came to be given to every child. As late as 1829, however, several of the missions are reported as having no schools, and the complaint of some of the padres at that time, in reply to the circular of the Governor enjoining the establishment of schools, that the boys had

little time for learning on account of their work,<sup>1</sup> shows us the relative importance the missionaries attached to book-knowledge as compared with industrial skill.

If we would judge fairly of the wisdom and value of the educational methods of the friars, we must view their methods in the light of the results achieved. The test of the value of a method is in its working out. Certainly, the results achieved by the friars in the civilization of the natives of California, were without parallel in the English-speaking colonies, and were not surpassed even in Mexico or Paraguay. "History," says a careful and learned modern critic, "records no better work ever accomplished in modern times for an inferior race."<sup>2</sup> At the end of sixty years, there were twenty-one prosperous missions, on a line extending from south to north of about seven hundred miles. More than thirty thousand Indian converts were lodged in the mission buildings. They had been brought from the state of savagery, taught to wear clothes and accustomed to a regular life of toil, taught to read and write, instructed in music, accustomed to the service of the Church, partaking of its sacraments, and indoctrinated in the Christian religion.<sup>3</sup> De Mofras has left us a brilliant picture of the material prosperity of the missions at the time they reached their greatest development. The line of missions linked together the most fertile valleys of the coast. In the year 1834 they produced 100,000 bushels of grain. They possessed 424,000 horned cattle, and 100,000 cattle were slaughtered every year, yielding a product of ten dollars per head. The total annual product of the missions amounted to more than \$2,000,000, and the valuation of the movable stock, aside from the buildings, orchards, vineyards, etc., was not less than \$3,000,000. Besides this, the "Pious Fund" yielded an annual income of \$50,000.<sup>4</sup> The missions had grown wealthy, in fact, and a second line of missions, farther back from the coast, and extending parallel with the first, was being projected.

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<sup>1</sup> Bancroft, *Hist. of Cal.*, II, p. 680.

<sup>2</sup> Blackmar, *Spanish Colonization in the Southwest*, p. 47.

<sup>3</sup> Dwinelle, *Colonial History of San Francisco*, p. 84; Blackmar, *Ib.*

<sup>4</sup> Blackmar, p. 47.

But the material prosperity of the mission proved, in a way, to be their undoing. The country was filling up with colonists, and they looked with a covetous eye upon the fertile valleys from which the simple natives, under the mission discipline and management, were extracting all this wealth. Agitation for the secularization of the missions had been long going on, and was growing stronger every year. Mexico, meanwhile, had thrown off the Spanish yoke, and the Government of the new republic was violently hostile to the Friars. In 1834, the blow fell. The Governor of California, acting at the instance of the Mexican authorities, issued an edict for the "secularization" of the missions. The friars were driven off, and the property taken possession of by the Government. The poor Indians, of course, got little or nothing. The final result of the process of "secularization," as might have been expected, was the plunder and complete ruin of the missions, and the demoralization and dispersion of the Christianized Indians.<sup>1</sup>

The best tribute to the work of the Catholic missionaries, and to the effectiveness of the methods they employed for the civilization and education of the native races, is to be found in the contrast between the results produced under the system they established, and the systems that have been tried by other agencies. It is interesting to note that the United States Government, after experimenting for over a hundred years in the education of the Indians, is tending more and more towards the adoption of the methods used by the Franciscans in California over a century ago.<sup>2</sup> If we contrast the labors of the Franciscans for the Indians of California with the work of the Government and other agencies for them since, we shall not find it difficult to accept as just the following judgment of the work of the Friars, by one who was competent to speak with authority upon the subject:

"If we ask where are now the thirty thousand christianized Indians who once enjoyed the beneficence and created the wealth of the twenty-one Catholic missions of California, and then contemplate

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<sup>1</sup> Dwinelle, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> Blackmar, *op. cit.*, p. 48. Cf. also Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1905.

the most wretched of all want of system which has surrounded them under our own Government, we shall not withhold our admiration from those good and devoted men who, with such wisdom, sagacity, and self-sacrifice, reared these wonderful institutions in the wilderness of California. They at least would have preserved these Indian races if they had been left to pursue unmolested their work of pious beneficence."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dwinelle, Col. Hist. of San Francisco, p. 87. It may not be amiss to quote here what a distinguished English traveller, Mr. Alleyne Ireland, in a recently published book (*The Far Eastern Tropics*, 1905) has to say about the methods of education employed in the case of the native peoples of the Orient. Indirectly, his remarks form a striking tribute to the efficiency of the educational methods employed by the Franciscans in California and the Spanish Missionaries generally, in dealing with the native races in the Western World.

Speaking of the educational system we have set up in the Philippine Islands, he says: "Every effort is being made in the Philippines to give the people whatever advantages may be attached to a wide diffusion of educational facilities; but when it is reflected how small a proportion of the Philipinos can ever be utilized outside the field of manual labor until a great increase in industry has provided work of a higher character, it is at least open to doubt whether the present attempt to increase the literacy of the people is not premature.

"I may add in this connection, that in fifteen years of travel in tropical countries in which education has been in operation for more than a generation, I have observed no indication that the spread of instruction has had the effect of making the natives appreciate the dignity of manual labor. In fact, for every skilled workman turned out by the industrial schools in the tropics, the schools of general instruction have cast upon the country twenty men who from the very fact of their education refuse absolutely to have anything to do with any employment which involves manual labor" (p. 242).

## THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.<sup>1</sup>

Before examining the claims and merits of the new psychology, it will be useful to ask the question: What is meant by the new psychology? Generally adjectives are used to qualify a term and indicate exactly in what sense it is taken. This, however, is not the case here. "New" has reference only to the time of appearance, and right here the critic might find an objection, not against the science, but against the name which it has assumed. "New psychology" applies to a special kind, method or department of psychology, and is intended to mean more than the name implies, more than a recent as contrasted with an old psychology. Now, if it is no crime to be old; if, on the contrary, age entitles one to greater respect, it must be confessed that, at times, the new psychology seems to have failed in its duty, despising the old, and posing as the only true and genuine psychology. In the mouth of some among the young generation, "old" when applied to psychology sounds like an equivalent for antiquated, decrepit, worn out, good for nothing. What must be thought of this will be made clearer as we proceed. For the present, we may remark that youth has a tendency to be rash and inconsiderate, conceited and overbearing. Enthusiasm leads to exaggerated self-confidence. Men are apt to overestimate the importance of a new method or scientific discovery. We must add, however, that generally it is not the discoverer nor the true scientist who is responsible for this, but the retailer of science in the popular review or the newspaper. A good illustration is found in the recent talk concerning Dr. Burke's artificial production of life, or rather of "radiobes," in the Cambridge laboratory.

As for us, we shall not quarrel about names; the matter is of minor importance. Nevertheless, a little attention suffices to convince us that men are easily impressed by names; and I suppose that, in the present case, the very term new as applied to psychology has made some rather suspicious, just as they

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<sup>1</sup>A paper read at the meeting of the Society for Philosophical Inquiry, Washington, December 4, 1906.



would beware of articles offered as new on the market, whereas the same term may have been an attraction for others who, by nature, are fond of change and novelty or who aspire to be the pioneers in a new investigation.

To find the characteristics of the new psychology we should examine the problems, methods and points of view of psychology to-day, and see in what they differ from those of the past. But many recent features, though very important, are not included in the meaning commonly given to the term. Comparative, abnormal, genetic psychology are also of recent origin, but, in its ordinary use, the expression new psychology does not apply to them; it has been appropriated rather selfishly by experimental psychology. The new psychology presents itself as an autonomous and exact science. As autonomous, it claims freedom and independence of philosophy. As exact, it endeavors to obtain its data not only from simple observation but also from experimentation. In the present paper my intention is briefly to review these two features and to conclude with a summary of the main results reached so far.

### I.

Formerly psychology was philosophical. It was the science of the soul, of the ego. Its problems included those of the nature, origin and destiny of the soul, and all other considerations were primarily directed to or resulted from the solution of these problems. On a meager and inadequate basis of facts much speculation was indulged in. Long and generally fruitless discussions and polemics were carried on. In this respect psychology shared the fate of the physical sciences. At the beginning, they also were involved in highly metaphysical considerations on the essence of matter and motion, the primordial elements, and so on. These sciences were really what physics is still sometimes called, a "natural philosophy." The absence or scarcity of facts, and the absence of means and methods to obtain them, explain why the mind at once went higher into metaphysics.

But psychology has followed the example of the physical sciences. It has separated itself from philosophy and proclaimed its independence. Its problems are restricted to the

mental states, their description, analysis, classification, genesis, and the like. The other problems are referred to what is known as rational psychology or philosophical psychology, or better—since these are still psychologies—to the philosophy of mind.

Shall we object to modern psychology because it is empirical? Shall we repeat the trite accusation that is it a psychology without a soul, or, etymologically, a science of the psyche and yet without the psyche? In the first place it must be noted that psychology to-day is not without a soul in an exclusive, but rather in an agnostic, sense. *In his own science* the psychologist neither affirms nor denies it. He abstains from pronouncing because the question does not belong to him but to the philosopher. Moreover should the term psychology be a misnomer the harm would be slight. It is a simple matter of terminology, and we know that the name of a science means little because its signification has undergone many successive changes. Geometry is not the measurement of land. Biology no longer busies itself with life in its metaphysical aspects, but only with its manifestations. If we consider their names, we find very little difference between astronomy and astrology. Physiology is not the science of nature, and physics allied with it in etymology has an altogether different meaning. We need not be surprised then if the signification of the word psychology is more and more restricted. After all, what is that *ψυχή* which it implies? Its meaning is manifold in Greek, but in the first systematic treatise, Aristotle's *περὶ ψυχῆς*, it stands for the entelechy or substantial form of all living substances. It is the principle of life, not only conscious but even merely organic. To-day, however, no one claims such an extensive province for psychology.

If we recognize the right of physical sciences to proceed independently of metaphysics; if they are allowed to study material phenomena without pronouncing on the essence of matter, and if history shows therein a condition of progress, why should we insist on psychology remaining philosophical? It has an immense field of its own to explore—concrete facts may be studied scientifically without presupposing definitions—and if it is not the science of the psyche in its metaphysical

aspect, it is the science of psychic processes, and hence really a psychology.

Of course such a science by itself will be incomplete. Like all natural sciences it rests on certain assumptions and uses certain principles the value of which must be tested by philosophy. Like them it will call for a philosophical complement. More than any other it leads directly to metaphysics. The higher problems concerning the mind are of vital importance. But they need not belong to psychology. Their solution must be based on a solid foundation of established facts. If philosophy has failed so many times in its attempts, if construction after construction has fallen in ruins and been replaced by one as weak and as ephemeral, is it not because the foundation was insufficient, or because it was laid down not for philosophy but for a preconceived system of philosophy? It is neither necessary nor desirable for the psychologist to be at the same time a philosopher. I mean that in his psychological investigations he must leave aside whatever philosophical views of the mind he may entertain. Otherwise consciously or unconsciously there will be on his part a tendency to observe imperfectly, to observe so that the facts will fit in with his theory. The philosophy of mind ought to come after, not before psychology. Let then the psychologist, without any metaphysical bias, give us this needed basis on which may be constructed a sound and firm mental philosophy.

## II.

Not only does the new psychology refuse its allegiance to philosophy and pride itself on its autonomy, it has taken a bolder step in adopting experimental methods for the study of mental phenomena. In the first lesson of his *Cours de Philosophie Positive* (published 1830-1842) Auguste Comte teaches the "manifest impossibility" of introspection. The human mind can observe directly all phenomena except its own, since it cannot divide itself into two in such a way that while one-half should think the other should watch the process. He proclaims that the psychological method is radically wrong. In the forty-fifth lesson he speaks again of the deep absurdity and the evident contradiction involved in supposing that man

can perceive his own thinking process.<sup>1</sup> Later in England, a strong protest was also entered against the introspective method by Maudsley in the first chapter of his *Physiology of Mind*, a title which in itself is significant.

Meanwhile the sciences gave the example of fine and accurate determinations of fruitful experiments. It was in the early 40's that physics succeeded in establishing the law of the conservation of energy, showing that notwithstanding the various forms which energy may assume, its sum total in a closed system remains constant. While chemistry was engaged in the minutest analyses and measurements astronomy was calculating the enormous distances, the dimensions and motions of the stars. The discovery of errors in recording the transit of stars led Bessel (about 1820) to investigate the psychological causes of the "personal equation." Thus was attention called to what we know at present as reaction time. Physiology was shown to be in close touch with physics and chemistry. The relations of organic and of mental processes were determined more accurately. Brain physiology soon assumed the tendency to substitute itself for psychology and to consider psychic processes simply as organic functions. So in all the sciences accuracy and exactness were sought, and by experimentation all were progressing rapidly. Would psychology alone remain stationary? Would it be satisfied with the vague data that were at its disposal? Would it not also try the experimental methods so much superior to common observation? But how could mental processes be experimented on? How could they be measured?

Not physically as we calculate the dimensions, weight, energy, etc., of material substances. Evidently no physical unit can apply to mental states.

Not even psychologically, by taking one conscious state as a standard unit, as a psychological meter. Mental states have different qualities; none can be found that will apply to all the others. An emotion can no more be compared to a sensation or an image or a conation than a length to a weight or a certain

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<sup>1</sup> There is no place for psychology in the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. Only one lesson is devoted to the "intellectual and affective life," and it comes with the treatment of the physiological sciences.

degree of temperature. Even for mental states of the same quality we may know in a general way that they have not the same intensity, that a sensation is thus different from another, or that an emotion grows stronger or weaker, but no accurate comparison is possible. We have no applicable unit, none fixed and determined.

There are three main fields of investigation which it is possible to explore by experimentation.

1. A sensation or perception is always dependent on the presence of a physical stimulus. The determination of their relations is the object of psychophysics. Fechner whose name especially is associated with that of psychophysics considered two main points, the threshold and the minimal differences of sensations. It was known before, but in an indefinite manner, that a stimulus, if too strong or too weak, too near or too distant, though certainly existing physically, produces no sensation. Psychophysics endeavors to determine for each sense the initial point of sensation. It was known also that the sensation and the stimulus do not increase in the same ratio. An addition to the stimulus is not always felt; and the addition of the same quantity produces a different effect on the sensation according to the quantity of the original stimulus. It is evident, for instance, that the addition of one voice to a numerous chorus does not produce the same difference in the auditory sensation as an equal addition to one or two singers only. What is the exact proportion of a physical and of a mental increasing or decreasing series common observation cannot determine. Weber's and Fechner's law, even if not perfectly satisfactory and universally accurate, is a more definite though indirect and comparative determination of sensations.

2. Whatever explanation be given to the fact, it is certain that a mental state is always preceded, accompanied and followed by many complex changes in the organism. This is the province of physiological psychology. Modifications in the nervous system, the circulation, respiration, pulse, muscular contraction, temperature, etc., are carefully registered and compared. Concomitant variations of organic and of conscious processes in their complex variety are examined and determined with as much precision as possible.

3. Mental processes require time. There may be differences of opinion as to whether the time is spent only for physiological or for both physiological and mental processes; but the fact is certain that time is required, longer in proportion to the complexity of the mental process and varying greatly under certain conditions. This duration again psychology endeavors to analyse and measure, and it tries to find out what influences lengthen or shorten it.

In a word experimental psychology aims at controlling the mental states by controlling the physical and physiological processes with which they are related.

Beginning with Germany, psychological laboratories were soon established in universities. New problems were suggested, new methods devised, new apparatus constructed. A science was definitely organized and claimed a place, as a psychology, among the departments of scientific knowledge. We know what importance it has assumed at the present time.

From the beginning also objections were raised. In the first volume of the *Philosophische Studien* (1883) we find three articles by Wundt on the questions of methods and principles. He opens the first number with an article on psychological methods. Later, in answer to Zeller's objections, two other studies followed on the measurement of psychological processes. These papers are important as a vindication of experimental psychology, written by its recognized leader. Wundt remarks that the task of psychology is to analyse the contents of consciousness into their elements, to study these elements in their quantitative and qualitative aspects, and to find their relations of co-existence and succession. To the objection that we do not measure consciousness directly Wundt answers that it is not necessary. Frequently even in physical sciences we must be satisfied with indirect measurements. Nor can it be said that because the standards used are physical the new investigation is no longer psychological. All admit that physical science is real notwithstanding the fact that the objects it deals with cannot be reached except through sensations, that is, through consciousness, through something psychical. Physical standards are used, it is true, but at the same time they are also mental representations.



## III.

Before we pass to the results of the new psychology let us briefly review a few issues frequently raised and discussed and on which there is yet no agreement. Is what has been named the new psychology a psychology at all? Is it a science? Must it be affiliated with the philosophical or with the physical sciences? Of these three points the first as being more fundamental and essential in the solution of the others deserves a special attention.

1. Evidently experimental psychology is not the only psychology, not the whole psychology. It cannot claim to be more than one of its branches, one of its departments and one of its methods. Psychology has other sources of information. Many prominent psychologists are not experimentalists. They take into consideration the results obtained in the laboratories but do not rely exclusively nor even primarily on them. Yet their work is up-to-date and it would be an injustice to call them "old" psychologists. Experimentalists also when they no longer limit themselves to points of detail, but endeavor to systematize their results, have recourse to data obtained by other means. Information is derived from all possible sources, and the inventive genius in devising new means is marvellous. Not only introspection, but sociology, ethnology, art, religion, political institutions, speech, literature, statistics, crime, pathology, psychiatry, etc., are called upon to supply psychology with materials. One has only to peruse a few psychological periodicals to realize what a wealth of data has been accumulated from all directions.

Experiments have been added to these, but the problem remains always the same, namely, the problem of mental processes. Experiments are used in order to produce these processes systematically, and thus to examine more successfully their conditions and manifestations. In this way more light is thrown on their nature and genesis; consciousness is assisted in giving a more varied and more accurate report. The interest is not centered on the vibrations of ether or air, nor on the nerve conduction, but on the visual or the auditory sensation, the volition or the feeling. Take such researches as those of the rapidity of perception, the keenness of the senses, the

errors of judgment, the perception of space and time, the influence of fatigue, feelings, pain, attention or distraction, and a multitude of others, why should we hesitate to call them psychological? Because physical instruments, and, to a certain extent, physical methods are used? Or because not only the psychical but also the physiological processes are considered? Such reasons are insufficient. The same experiment might be performed by the physiologist and the psychologist, but for different purposes. The attention of the former is focussed on the movement, the chemical reaction, the organic changes. The attention of the psychologist is always focussed on the mental process. For him all the rest is only an external means, a side issue, an avenue that leads to a better comprehension of the inner mental state.

Not merely in its problems and points of view, in its methods also is experimental psychology really a psychology. Introspection is not set aside; it is not supplanted by experimentation, but helped, completed and perfected. There is no substitution but rather an addition. Without experiments self-observation is of great value; without self-observation experiments are of absolutely no value; they are even an impossibility. A man who can see and hear is capable of acquiring scientific notions by the simple use of his senses. But what is the use of giving the blind man a telescope or a microscope, or the deaf man a phonograph or the receiver of a telephone? In the same manner, even if the fact is not always recognized, self-observation is the vivifying principle in all methods of psychology. Even if in the report of the experiment descriptions of apparatus, illustrations, diagrams, tables, curves, etc., occupy the larger and seemingly the more important place, it must be kept in mind that all these tend to or result from the subject's introspection; that of themselves they would be worthless; and that without introspection no data whatever could be obtained. Physical stimuli may be controlled by the experimenter, but the report of the subject is always based on the conscious state which he has experienced. The method of the new psychology then is really experimental introspection.

Nowhere is it more important to control observation than

in psychology; nowhere therefore is experimentation more necessary. Comte's and Maudsley's objections do not show the impossibility of introspection—what can a priori reasonings do against the existence of a self-evident fact?—but they show its difficulties and dangers, which are real. Mental states are very complex. By experiments we can proceed further in their analysis; likewise physics and chemistry by experiments have reached, if not the elements of matter, at least something more simple than was obtainable by mere observation. Moreover mental states are unstable, transitory and changing. They are constantly undergoing modifications under the influence of concomitant processes conscious or subconscious. They cannot be produced at will, nor is their exact and perfectly identical reproduction possible. Frequently they are not observed while they take place, but only remembered, and we know that memory, especially of mental phenomena, is subject to many illusions. Preconceived ideas and prejudices also influence introspection. Let us add that mental processes take place in a closed world accessible only to one witness.

It is to obviate these difficulties and verify hypotheses that experiments are needed. A science of psychology cannot be built on mere introspection, for its aim is to infer general laws of mind, whereas introspection is necessarily limited to the processes of the same mind. With no other basis, valid generalization is impossible, for it runs the risk of mistaking special and individual features for essential; or, on the contrary, of omitting really essential features because they have not manifested themselves. This principle has always been recognized implicitly at least. Before our laboratory experiments there was the observation of the mental behavior of others. We find even some elementary or rudimentary experiments, for instance in watching the mental effects produced by words, circumstances, contradictions, pain, or the mental changes resulting from changes of stimuli, etc. At the present time experiments are far more elaborate, but their purpose is the same: to guide and control introspection.

One of the most prominent experimentalists, Professor E. W. Scripture, of Yale, in his book *Thinking, Feeling, Doing*, writes (p. 282): "The difference between the old and the new

is not one of material; the subject is the same for both, namely, the facts of mind. The difference lies in the carefulness with which the information in regard to these phenomena is obtained. Instead of careless observation and guess-work the utmost care and self-sacrificing labor are expended in the laboratory in order to obtain single facts." And again in his *New Psychology* (p. 453): "The method of direct observation of mental life is the only possible one, and until it had received a firm basis any science of psychology was impossible. . . . All the other methods of psychology are only refinements of this method. The new psychology is thus merely a development on the basis of the old; there is no difference in its material, no change in its point of view, and no degeneration in its aims. What the old tried to do, namely, to establish a science of mind, and what it did do, as far as its means allowed, the new psychology with vastly improved methods and facilities is striving to develop in finer detail."

2. Is the new psychology a science? This is a secondary question which need not detain us. It is largely a matter of terminology hinging on the meaning we give to that word science and the characters we consider as essential. To be sure, experimental psychology is young—fifty years is a very short time especially in such a line of research—few are the verified laws and even the ascertained facts. This is common to all beginnings. The young man has not yet all the qualities of the adult. The young bird is not able to soar very high. Yet we do not hesitate to call the former a man and the latter a bird although they are not yet fully developed. To be sure also, psychological laws have not and will never have the same accuracy, universality and necessity as the physical laws, nor consequently the same mathematical formulations. For on one hand experimental psychology has to rely on averages, and in many cases psychologists give different results. On the other hand, the results are greatly affected by the subject's dispositions, temper, habits and training. Some of these defects may be remedied with time; causes of variation will be found and eliminated. Others are inherent in the nature of the subject matter itself. But after all, physical sciences also are to a great extent hypothetical. Many of their conclusions

are only approximative. Very few are their laws which need no revision and no further determination.

3. Is psychology a philosophical or a natural science? This question has been discussed time and again. That it has received no answer acceptable to all was evidenced by the general discussion on "The Affiliation of Psychology with Philosophy and with the Natural Sciences" by members of both the American Philosophical and the American Psychological Associations at their meeting of last year, December 27, 1905. The opinions were about equally divided. Space does not allow me to give this point the development it deserves. I must limit myself to simply indicating what are, to my mind, the principles of solution. (1) The question presupposes the necessity of an affiliation, and of the affiliation with either philosophy or the natural sciences. But what is the value of this assumption? Is such a necessity clear and evident? If not, it is the first thing to establish. History, and economics, for example, claim a place among the sciences, and yet we do not reduce them to either group. Perhaps then affiliation is not a necessity at all, or the disjunction referred to, *i. e.*, philosophical and natural sciences, is not exhaustive but inadequate. (2) An indication that such is the case is that in examining the arguments brought forward by both parties one is impressed by their negative force on both sides. They demonstrate the impossibility of affiliating psychology with either member of the disjunction. On the contrary, in their positive aspect they are remarkable for their weakness. Thus the advocate of the affiliation with the natural sciences does not prove his own positive contention, but only the impossibility of an affiliation with philosophy. His opponent with equal success shows that affiliation with natural sciences is untenable, but fails to convince us that it must be with philosophy. (3) The terms used are vague and ambiguous. This is a frequent source of misunderstanding and controversy, and seems to be the important factor in the present difficulty. Affiliation may be conceived as implying nothing but sympathy, association, friendly relations; or it may be understood as an adoption, a dependence, a reduction. The definition of philosophy, its extension and connotation are matters on which there is very

little agreement. Again natural sciences may be taken as including only physical sciences, or as co-extensive with whatever is not philosophy. Besides the physical and the metaphysical there is room for what we might call the extraphysical sciences. (4) Psychology can be *reduced* to neither the *philosophical* nor the *physical* sciences. Its resemblance to them is only superficial. Both parts of this assertion have been sufficiently developed in the preceding pages. Psychology differs from philosophy in its points of view, problems and methods. Although in its methods it has a *partial* likeness to the physical sciences, yet its subject matter is the mental, not the material world. Hence it differs from the physical sciences as much as an ether vibration differs from a visual sensation, consciousness from motion, thought from secretion, mind from matter.

Notice, however, that separation and irreducibility do not mean absence of relations. As there is a certain unity and continuity of nature, so there is a certain unity and continuity of all the sciences. Psychology sends numerous ramifications in both directions, physical and philosophical. It has many points of contact with all other sciences. It gives to them and borrows from them. There is an exchange of good offices, a mutual usefulness without loss of autonomy. But it is neither philosophical nor physical; it is *sui generis*, it is psychological.

#### IV.

Has the new, that is, the experimental psychology fulfilled its promises? Does it manifest signs of strength and vitality? Can it show useful results of the past, and thus give hopes of better and greater results for the future?

On this point some may be disappointed because they expect too much, or because they want the work to progress more rapidly than is possible. Such expectations may have originated from a misconception of the undertaking; perhaps even from rash promises made by some enthusiastic and utopian representative of the new method.

It is clear that experiments cannot claim to be the only, or even the fundamental method of psychology. This we have shown already. We have indicated also the many difficulties



which the new psychology has to overcome. Its apparent sterility is due largely to the nature of the phenomena which it observes—they are complex and of difficult access—also to its recentness, especially when we consider that, being altogether new, it had to begin with forming and discussing its own methods, devising and constructing its instruments and training its specialists.

Moreover it has limitations in its range of applicability. At present at least the attempts to apply experimental methods to the higher mental processes are few, and, if those methods are empirical, such as statistics, questionnaires and various tests, they cannot be called experimental in the same sense as those applied to sensation, nor are the results so satisfactory.

With regard to the duration of psychic processes in themselves, I do not see that with the actual methods it is measured at all. For we cannot determine where the time is spent, in the mental or in the organic series. Complex mental processes lengthen the reaction time, but this may depend largely on the disposition of the nervous system which cannot be "set" and kept in the same state of readiness to react as soon and as rapidly. An important result for psychology however is to show how certain mental states, or organic conditions, or diverse circumstances such as food, sex, hour of the day, etc., affect the reaction time.

Let us also remark that experiments reach only a limited number of physiological processes, circulation, respiration, temperature, and the like. They cannot reach the central nervous processes which are more important. The limitations concerning the accuracy of the results have already been noticed.

All these difficulties and restrictions are recognized by experimentalists. If we consider what has been and what is their attitude toward their own work we find that it is a critical attitude. They have not been led by a blind enthusiasm, but are conscious of difficulties, not only of those that are raised by outsiders, but of other known only to themselves. Psychological literature abounds in discussions of principles and criticisms of methods. Great care is taken at every step, and every step is closely watched by an army of critics. The ambi-

tion is not so much toward a rapid as toward a safe progress. Frequent stops are made to reconsider and revise the work already done.

As to the results obtained so far, they may be few. Furthermore to the ordinary psychologist or the philosopher they may appear small, minute and insignificant. But sciences are built up with such details. That the edifice is small is no reason to despise it. Perhaps even it is no edifice at all yet, but only a few scattered and uncemented stones. They must not be thrown away. They have been gathered with great patience and labor; they are valuable. With time, with the help of other sciences and of philosophy, we may hope that they will be united and cemented in a compact and solid construction.

Besides points of fine details the new psychology has established more general laws. It has accomplished much already in showing the effects of habit, attention, distraction . . . , the conditions of memory and imagination, the influence of emotions, fatigue, heredity, drugs . . . , the nature of certain abnormal states. Psychopathology has proved an important field of research especially for the French school of experimentalists. They have shown that much can be learned concerning the processes of mind by approaching them in their abnormal manifestations. In Italy much attention has been given to criminology.

Experiments have been an abundant source, if not yet of solutions, certainly of problems and hypotheses. This is a very important feature which contains promises of future success. For hypotheses are the starting point of scientific discoveries, and they are useful even when disproved. At every step new hitherto unsuspected horizons are discovered. In current psychological books, periodicals, monographs, is found an abundance of materials partly elaborated, but always suggestive of new problems none of which could have been thought of without experimental methods.

How far experimental psychology has influenced what we might call the new pedagogy is difficult to determine. It would take us too far to examine the complex causes that led to the improvement of our system of education. It is certain that

good educational methods must rest on a true psychology. What physiology is to hygiene psychology must be to education. Education tends to produce a complete and harmonious development of all human faculties, to evolve the "*mens sana in corpore sano*." Hence the importance of those sciences which study the relations and the interdependence of body and mind. Even for the purely mental aspect of education it is important to follow exact methods, to know accurately the mode of working of the faculties, and to realize what quantity and what quality of knowledge is adapted to the various pupils according to age and dispositions. The new psychology has contributed to this result directly by tests and experiments, and indirectly by teaching the methods and giving the example of accuracy in all its investigations.

In conclusion we may say that experimental methods are a great help in psychology. They develop and control introspection, show its illusions and dangers. They accustom the mind to greater precision, and give the solution of problems otherwise inaccessible.

Separated from philosophy the new psychology is nevertheless of great utility to philosophers. If a true philosophy must be based on experience, its task will be facilitated when the facts at its disposal are more numerous and better ascertained. Philosophy cannot be indifferent to the relations of the mind with the physical world and the physiological functions. The solution of the problem of mind and body will depend largely on the data furnished by experimental psychology.

Thus there is room for the new department between the physical sciences and purely introspective psychology. But it must be remembered that if philosophy must not enter psychology, that is, if psychology must be simply the study of facts and of laws without any philosophical assumption or preoccupation, nevertheless psychology leads to philosophy and is incomplete without it. In fact we find that some prominent experimentalists (like Wundt, James, Baldwin, Ladd and others) have not neglected the consideration of higher problems. A psychophysical parallelism is postulated and this may suffice in psychology. But how many questions are sug-

gested! Is the postulate legitimate? Is it true that there is a perfect parallelism? Is it certain that the two series never come in contact? Why are they parallel, and why do we observe concomitant variations? What is the mind and what is the body? What is the source and the subject of mental phenomena? What is human personality? These are no new problems, but with a patient study of facts, with a better and firmer basis of experience, the chances of lasting success for the philosopher are greatly improved. Philosophy is the highest science, and in it all sciences must seek the ultimate solution of the problems which they suggest.

C. A. DUBRAY, S.M.

## INTROSPECTION AND EXPERIMENT.<sup>1</sup>

The claims advanced in behalf of the New Psychology and the criticism which it encounters, center for the most part around the question of methods and their validity. While it is generally admitted that without introspection there can be no genuine psychology, it is not so clear that introspection either requires the aid of experiment or profits very much by that aid when it is actually given. If we are told, on one hand, that experiment remedies the congenital defects of introspection, we are also warned that the remedy is ineffectual or possibly worse than the ill. And while much is said and written about accurate observation and quantitative results, no less is urged by way of protest against the value, for psychology, of experiment and its outcome. It would therefore seem proper and perhaps needful at this stage of the discussion to consider once more the relations that exist, or may possibly be established, between the introspective method and that which is called experimental. Supposing, in other words, that both methods are applicable to the processes of mind, that each is, in its own sphere, legitimate, we have still on our hands the question as to their mutual support, agreement and confirmation.

Even within these narrow limits, the question is altogether too large to admit of a single and definite reply. I shall therefore present under two separate questions, the more important issues. We may ask, in the first place, Does psychological experiment improve the power of introspection? And secondly, Does experiment furnish us with any items of knowledge concerning the mind which are not, or cannot, be furnished by introspection?

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<sup>1</sup> A paper read before the Society for Philosophical Inquiry, Washington, at the meeting, December 18, 1906, as a contribution to the discussion whose larger outlines are presented in Dr. Dubray's article, "The New Psychology." In the present paper, some slight changes and additions have been made in reply to inquiries and criticisms put forward at the time of its reading. The closing paragraphs were suggested by the remarks of my colleague, Rev. Dr. Turner. E. A. P.

It would of course be vain to contend that the educative function of experiment is such as to supply introspective ability where this is, in any large measure, wanting. There is no laboratory course that will atone for the lack of self-observation. In fact, one of the first aims of such a course must be to determine the degree of introspective ability which the subject possesses, and the particular way in which that ability can be most effectually called forth. But it is equally true that psychological experiment can and does impart a training which is advantageous and which may develop certain qualities hardly attainable by any other means. It is even found necessary, as a rule, in estimating the results of experiment, to make allowance for modifications in the subject due to greater familiarity with the work and to the gradual elimination of factors which at the outset had more or less seriously interfered with the purpose of investigation. It is not only that the novelty wears off and that the subject acquires skill in the requisite manipulations; but also that the mental qualities which are essential to fine introspection are steadily cultivated and made available both for the particular sort of observation which that line of experiment implies and for other lines in which the specific objects to be noted are quite different.

To present the grounds of this statement somewhat more in detail, we may at once assume that introspection is an affair of attention; it is the attentive consideration of our inner experience with the specific aim of bringing to clearer view the items of that experience. Its success, consequently, must be directly proportioned to the power of attending, or, in other words, to the degree of concentration. Now one important feature of experiment is to render possible and to facilitate concentration. The exclusion of distracting influences, the limitation of perception to a single object or at least to a narrow range of objects, and the requirement of a single response in the form of a spoken judgment or in that of movement, are so many conditions which tend to focus the mind and further the effort at voluntary attention. In particular, it should be noted that the stimuli employed are generally of such a character that they offer little or nothing in the shape of personal interest or association. Except in cases where it is desirable



to ascertain the value of aesthetic and affective elements, preference is given to colors, tones, stimulations of pressure and temperature, which merely arouse the appropriate state and isolate it, as far as may be, from the processes with which it is usually interwoven. While it is admitted that no experimental conditions, however nicely arranged, can secure us absolutely simple and elementary processes of mind, some approximation to this ideal result is obtained when the whole force of attention is directed upon states that are relatively simple. And while it is true that the fixation of attention is in itself a complex process, it still remains that by varying, under experimental conditions, the form of this complexity, we may eventually give ourselves an account of its several factors.

Here indeed we come upon another equally important function of experiment so far as the result depends upon attention. In proportion as the mind is concentrated upon a given object, the various qualities, peculiarities and details of that object, as well as its relations to other objects, are brought to light. Experimentation thus becomes an analytical procedure. The ability to discriminate grows with each perception of difference, until the finest shadings in quality and the slightest variations in intensity are recognized. A sensory impression which the mind at first seizes only in bulk, as it were, is made to yield, by successive observation and comparison, elements which were hardly suspected. There is thus developed a habit of analysis the keenness of which must increase the power and enhance the value of introspection, even where this is the only available method. When, for instance, the mind turns from outer objects to examine its store of images, ideas and motives, the acquired analytical power is surely a valuable aid. Even the complex processes of reasoning, since they require the constant use of distinction to determine the meaning and relations of thought, must become more thorough and more critically secure, in a mind that has been accustomed to discrimination.

The fact that psychological experiment deals mainly and directly with sensory functions, is no valid argument against its efficacy as a means of intellectual training. The judgment pronounced upon the likeness or unlikeness, equality or inequality, of two stimuli is based on sense-processes; but it is

not in itself a deliverance of sense. It is rather the application to objects presented through sensation of certain highly abstract ideas, such as those of identity and difference, which are conceived by the intellect and which always remain its exclusive function. Thus, in determining the differential threshold for any department of sense, the mind is engaged not only with the sensations taken severally, but also with the relation, in quality or intensity, which one sensation bears to another. The perception of this relation is undoubtedly an act of the intellect; and as the perception, by dint of repeated and methodical observation, attains a higher degree of refinement, the intellectual power of discrimination must correspondingly increase. If sense-training by the usual methods is of service in the development of mind, we may reasonably suppose that the training supplied by experiment will also be helpful.

Its value is the greater because it is systematic. Experiment implies a definite plan with a properly arranged series of steps. Mere random flashes of analytical insight do not constitute experiment any more than does toying with complicated apparatus. It is needful of course that analysis should reveal elementary processes; but this is not all. It must also exhibit the relations of process to process, the framework of the original complex state, and the relative value of each process as it appears in the whole and helps to determine the character of that whole. The extreme care which has been taken in devising and refining the so-called psycho-physical methods, is justified mainly on this ground—the necessity, not merely of discovering the elementary processes, but of getting, moreover, a correct idea of their mutual relations. To tear a tissue apart is one thing; to dissect it is quite another thing. And there is a parallel difference between casual glances at consciousness and the orderly painstaking analysis which experimentation pursues.

As I have just referred to the psycho-physical methods, I may be permitted to add that in my judgment the scrupulous testing and criticizing of these methods at the very outset is a hopeful symptom of the experimental movement. To the onlooker, indeed, the minuteness exhibited in contributions to the

literature of this subject may well occasion surprise and impatience. But whoever undertakes experimental research will quickly realize that this very refinement of method would not have been possible had not experiment detected the sources of error which have to be eliminated or at least to be reckoned with. Perhaps the most serious mistake that could have been committed was that of placing too much reliance upon the empirical results, with no heed or concern for what the subject himself might experience. Fortunately, this pitfall was soon laid bare. Experimentalists came to realize that the mechanical tracing of the kymograph and the accurate record of the chronoscope were not the sole requisites nor the most important. It was needful, in addition, to obtain information which the subject alone could supply as to what occurred in his mind at the critical moment of perception, judgment, and reaction. Wanderings of the attention, changes of the emotional state, surprise, fatigue and the curious play of individual fancy—all these were data of the highest value. They could not be registered, nor even seized by the subject, except through careful introspection. Now, however, it was introspection, not in any vague and arbitrary fashion, but under conditions the significance of which could be understood and regulated at will. One such report from the subject regarding his own experience is rightly preferred to long pages of figures or the most skillfully plotted of curves. It furnishes a clue to improvement in method, and it not seldom points the way to an entirely new line of research. Herein, I take it, we reach the essential relation between introspection and experiment in regard to their educative value. Experiment is simply a shorter way of saying that, so far as the circumstances of mental activity permit, the mind is for the time being so situated as to secure the utmost centering of attention upon objects that are presented and actions that are to be performed in a definite order. And such being the case, I am convinced that our first question must receive an affirmative answer.

The second question refers to the outcome of these two methods and their relative importance as means of adding to our psychological knowledge. Any adequate reply would evidently demand a treatise instead of an outline. There are,

however, some salient facts and considerations which even a brief survey must include; and these, I think, may be most clearly presented by first pointing out the extreme positions.

It is obvious, to begin with, that certain mental processes, and notably those which are chiefly influential in the practical conduct of life, lie beyond the reach of experimental investigation. A motive can be weighed, but only in figurative speech. Ambitions, hopes, joys and sorrows trace their effects upon the mind but not upon any record that we can handle and see. The whole scale of values, ethical, moral and religious, is surely exempt from our psycho-physical methods and from the laws that are experimentally determined. What we now know of these forms of mental life and what we may eventually learn, must result from our own introspection and our observation of other minds.

At the opposite extreme, we may set those phenomena which issue from the mind and modify in some conspicuous and tangible way the organic processes. While we are conscious in a general way of the bodily resonance produced by the coarser emotions, we cannot by introspection pure and simple ascertain the direction and extent of the change which is thus brought about. We are aware from ordinary experience that muscles, arteries and lungs are affected by our feelings. But in what particular way a given feeling modifies, for instance, the circulation, what changes it occasions in pulse and volume, how quickly or how slowly the bodily effect rises to its maximum and falls to its ordinary level—these are problems that can be solved by experimental methods alone. It is certainly a different idea that one gets from self-observation and again from the study of the plethysmograph record. And though one doubtless may know quite clearly how it feels to be fatigued, one may yet learn something from the ergograph curve. Broadly speaking, therefore, we may say that if psychology has an interest in ascertaining just how mental states influence the organism, experiment is indispensable.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The validity of the claim advanced here in behalf of experiment, is of course independent of any theory regarding the nature of emotion. Whichever of the rival theories one may adopt, one must, I think, recognize the value of experimental methods where the organic change permits their application.

Now between these two extremes, there stretches a wide area of investigation which is not the exclusive domain of introspection nor yet of experiment, but which can be mastered only by their co-operation. Many of the problems which confront us here have their origin in practical life and its needs. To this class belong the phenomena of color-blindness, contrast, rhythmic movement, reading, writing, and, in general, all those complex processes which include an outward action in response to a stimulus of sense. For practical purposes, it is often desirable to have the several processes so bound up, the one with the other, as to exclude hesitancy or uncertainty of execution. As in the case of the piano-player, there is a systematic attempt to link visual perception, auditory perception and muscular action in one automatic connection. And when the attempt is successful, free scope is left to the higher faculties of aesthetic enjoyment and artistic interpretation. Neither the artist himself nor those who judge of his skill would profit by a separate treatment of the various elements that make up the complex whole. But this is precisely what psychology undertakes. It is not content with the statement that the musician has a keen perception of tone; it asks further what this "keenness" amounts to, how far the ability to discriminate one tone from another may be carried. Now if such questions are legitimate, and if the correct answers will form an addition to our knowledge, psychology must resort to experiment. Once it takes this course there is no limit fixed *a priori* to the extent of research or the refinement of method.

On the contrary, as inquiry proceeds, new questions inevitably arise which lead the psychologist far from the practical concern which first suggested his labor. Hypothesis and theory, rather than application, become his paramount interest. His aim, above all, is to formulate the laws which control the activity of mind. The concept of law, however, in its scientific signification, is derived from those departments of knowledge which deal with the extra-mental world. We are accustomed to physical, chemical and physiological laws, long before we seek for psychological laws. Shall we then assume forthwith that law has the same meaning for mind that it has for nature, and that mental uniformities are exact parallels of physical

uniformities; or, shall we expect that conscious changes, however they may be related to physical changes, do nevertheless form a system of their own under laws peculiar to themselves? This question, theoretically at least, we cannot shirk. And certainly we cannot answer it completely by mere introspection. What it calls for is a detailed examination of the effects produced upon consciousness by changes in the physical order. It is not sufficient to say that a given state of consciousness is influenced, in quality and intensity, by variations which the external stimulus undergoes. The very terms "stimulus" and "stimulation" imply a relation. They cannot therefore be adequately defined, unless the psychical events be somehow compared with the physical events. And this comparison is possible only by means of experiment. But if this is true, it follows that the results of experiment form an important addition to our knowledge of mind. They enable us at any rate to deal with the fundamental question as to the nature of psychological laws, so far as these are determined by the self-activity of mind.

That this activity is not altogether immanent is a fact of common observation. We know that consciousness naturally seeks expression and we are familiar with the more conspicuous modes of that manifestation. If we furthermore take the view that the organism is in a way intermediate between physical energies and conscious perception, we may be led to inquire to what extent the action of the mind modifies the organic process. Is the modification in all cases the same; or has each form of consciousness a peculiar accompaniment on the organic side? Should the latter turn out to be true, as the results so far obtained seem to indicate, we may then reasonably claim to have learned something new regarding the mental process in question and regarding its connection with other processes. Should it appear, for instance, that the same vaso-motor effects occur when the state *A* is present in consciousness as those that accompany the state *B*, we have reason to infer that these two states, whether directly connected or not as mental events, are somehow related to the same processes in the brain. It is indeed a wide range of inquiry that opens before us at this point. We know through introspection what is meant by a



vivid recollection, a strong tendency, an easy flow of ideas, a forceful inhibition of desire and an immovable attitude of will. But introspection does not inform us whether these phrases, literally descriptive of our conscious experience, are also descriptive of the energy or rapidity or sluggishness which characterize cerebral change. It is only by experiment that we can hope to obtain even a beginning of the knowledge which an answer to these questions presupposes.

We may, if we choose, set these and similar questions aside and content ourselves with the thought that the most complete answer to be hoped for from experiment leaves us face to face with the problem of the connection between body and mind. Numerous and accurate as our data may become, they will not, in any explicit fashion, enable us to decide between the theory of interaction and that of parallelism. Knowing each and every coincidence of consciousness and brain, we should be as far as ever from understanding how the one affects the other, or perhaps from determining whether there is any "affecting" at all. The outlook is even less hopeful, when we inquire as to the ultimate nature of mind, its place in the real universe and, possibly, its relation to the Absolute. These, it may be urged are the all-important questions; and the failure of the experimental method to furnish an answer, far from ruling out the questions as irrelevant, simply shows that the method is its own condemnation.

The reply is, in part, obvious. Such problems are beyond the scope of experiment and of introspection alike. Their solution, if they are ever solved, must come from speculation, that is to say, from our reflection upon facts. To prove that the soul is a substantial being or to prove that it is merely an aggregate of conscious states, one must rely on deduction. Monism and dualism, materialism and spiritualism, inter-actionism and parallelism, are metaphysical theories. If the introspectionist believes that he can, by introspecting, decide upon their merits, his belief is groundless. And he is certainly doomed to a disappointment which the experimentalist avoids by declaring frankly that with these philosophical theories he has no concern.

A further reply, however, though by no means new, is worth

noting. As the history of speculation clearly shows, each of the rival solutions mentioned above claims to be the one correct and sufficient interpretation of facts. This is as true of Aristotle and the Scholastics as it is of any modern philosopher. The validity of each interpretation depends in great measure upon the manner of reasoning; but it also depends upon the data with which reason begins. Once it is shown that a considerable portion of these data can be supplied by experiment, the only outstanding question is whether the conclusions of reflective thought account logically for the facts. It would surely have been an error on the part of the experimentalists had they pretended to reveal the inner being of mind. And it would be no less disastrous on the philosopher's part to reject as trivial the evidence which experimental methods, while yet in the formative period, have furnished.

Viewed historically, these methods are new in their details and in the manner of their application. But their spirit and their underlying principles have prompted all really scientific research in the province of psychology. The alternative that is offered the psychologist to-day is not—introspection or experiment—but rather—introspection with primitive modes of experimentation or introspection with such perfected methods of experimentation as recent advance in neighboring fields of knowledge enables us to devise.

EDWARD A. PACE.

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF COLERIDGE.

It is the purpose of this article to set forth the philosophy of Coleridge—the philosophy, not the theological opinions; and to set it forth, not for the purpose of praising or of censuring, but in order that a scheme of thought which played a great part three-quarters of a century ago, and which is now again attracting much attention, may be understood before it is criticised. The writer of these pages might use the words of Dunoyer: “Je n'impose rien; je ne propose même pas; j'expose.” Such an exposition is by no means superfluous, for no philosopher has been the object of more superficial and flippant criticism. Walter Pater's essay, for example, which is admirable in its treatment of Coleridge the poet, betrays the completest misconception of the philosopher and his philosophy. Even Mr. J. Dykes Campbell, the accurate and sympathetic biographer, falls into the common delusion that Coleridge's talk about a *magnum opus* was either a pretence or a dream. In fact, there is a great mass of manuscript ready for publication, which it is hoped that some of our American universities may purchase; but, at all events, enough has already been published to enable us to draw out the broad outlines of his system. The scheme of thought shall be explained, as far as possible, in the philosopher's own words.

Coleridge's philosophy must be viewed as that of a man who, having fallen from Christianity into the lowest form of Unitarianism, and from that to Pantheism, recoiled with horror from the blank atheism to which false principles by logical consistency were leading him; and who gradually worked his way upward to “an ampler ether, a diviner air.” When he was brought by divine assistance to the Christian Faith, he employed his genius in assailing philosophical systems, some of which are directly hostile to religion, and others of which offer a downward slope to anyone disposed to fall away; and he spent his best thought in constructing a system that would place the mind in harmony with the spirit of Christianity, and which might be used to illustrate its doctrines. “I wish,” he

said a few days before his death, "that life and strength had been spared to complete my philosophy. For, as God hears me, the originating, continuing, and sustaining wish and design in my heart was to exalt the glory of His name, and (which is the same thing in other words) to promote the improvement of mankind. But *visum aliter Deo*, and His will be done." The system, therefore, was never brought to completion; but perhaps the "glorious insufficiencies" of Coleridge may be found as interesting as the perfectness of narrower and shallower minds.

His political philosophy may briefly be described as a development of Burke's. He says: "In Burke's writings the germs of almost all political truth may be found." Two paragraphs on Burke, in the *Biographia Literaria* and in *The Friend*, form the most judicious and discriminating criticism of Burke's mind to be found in the English or in any other language. It may be added that he was a hearty admirer of the American people; and that on Irish questions his sympathies were with the "masses" against the "classes." At the time when Catholics were relieved of political disabilities (a measure which he saw must lead to the disestablishment of the Irish Protestant Church), his intense attachment to the principle of the Christian State and State-support for the Church caused him to waver between a desire to see the United Kingdom divided, and a desire to see the Catholic Church established in Ireland. In metaphysics, it is a philosophy which has sometimes been supposed, or represented, to be peculiarly mystical, or fanciful, or dialectical; but he himself thought it coincident with common sense: "It is the two-fold function of philosophy to reconcile reason with common sense, and to elevate common sense into philosophy." "It is wonderful to myself," he said in the last year of his life in reference to a disquisition written many years before, "to think how far more profound my views now are, and yet how much clearer they are withal. The circle is coming round to—and to be—the common sense." This is, of course, something very different from the "common sense philosophy" of Reid. "The creed of true common sense," says Coleridge, "is composed of the results of scientific meditation, observa-

tion, and experiment, as far as they generally are intelligible. It differs, therefore, in different countries and in every different age of the same country. The common sense of a people is the movable *index* of its average judgment and information. Without metaphysics science could have no language, and common sense no material. In all countries of civilized men, metaphysics have outrun common sense. Fortunately for us that they have done so. For from all we know of the unmetaphysical tribes of New Holland and elsewhere, a common sense not preceded by metaphysics is no very enviable possession." He draws the distinction between common sense and philosophy in a note upon a statement made by a favorite author concerning the relation between accident and substance as objects of our perception: "This is the language of common sense, rightly so called, that is, truth without regard or reference to error; thus, only, differing from the language of genuine philosophy, which is truth intentionally guarded against error."

He claimed no special originality. "In Egypt, Palestine, Greece, and India, the analysis of mind had reached its noon and manhood while experimental research was still in its infancy.<sup>1</sup> For many, very many centuries, it has been difficult to advance a new truth, or even a new error, in the philosophy of intellect or of morals." "In philosophy, equally as in poetry, it is the highest and most useful prerogative of genius to produce the strongest impressions of novelty while it rescues admitted truths from the neglect caused by the very circumstances of their universal admission." "There neither are, have been, nor ever will be, but two essentially different schools of philosophy, the Platonic and the Aristotelian. To the former I profess myself an adherent. *Nihil novum vel inauditum audemus*; though as every man has a face of his own, without being more or less than a man, so is every philosopher an original, without ceasing to be an inmate of the *Academos* or the *Lyceum*."<sup>2</sup> "My system, if I may venture

<sup>1</sup> This statement remains true concerning Greece, notwithstanding the fact that among the Greeks, philosophy began (contrary to the general law) not with religion but with physics.

<sup>2</sup> Vide *Biographia Literaria*, ch. xii (Vol. III, p. 344), Table Talk, June 28,

to give it so fine a name, is an attempt, not to oppose other systems, but to show what was true in each, and how that which was true in particular, in each of them became error *because* it was only half the truth. I wish to connect by a moral *copula* natural history (science) and human history—to take from Science its fatalism and from history its accidentality, to make science historical and history scientific.” He described himself as a Platonist, and it was to his Platonic principles, under God, that he ascribed his return to the Christian Faith. (Compare Augustine, Confessions, VIII, 3, and VII, 9-21.) But he never overlooked the broad distinction between the highest philosophy and the truths of Revelation. “The nearest philosophy to Christianity is the Platonic; but the true honours of Christianity would be most easily manifested by a comparison between that *nec pari nec secundo* but yet *omnibus aliis propiore*, the Platonic.” He remarks that Cambridge “Platonists” of the seventeenth century are “more truly Plotinists,” and that “from confounding Plotinism with Platonism, they fell into the mistake of finding in the Greek philosophy many anticipations of the Christian Faith, which in fact were but its echoes.” His disciple, Mr. J. H. Green, who first sought the philosopher’s acquaintance in 1817 for the purpose of studying Schelling, says that he abandoned the design “in consequence of Coleridge’s declaring his dissent from Schelling’s doctrines; and Coleridge began immediately the exposition of his own views . . . At this period, his doctrines were based on the self-same principles which he retained to his dying hour (1834); and differing as they do fundamentally from those of Schelling, I cannot but avow my conviction that they were formed at a much earlier period, nay that they were growths of his own mind, growing with his growth, strengthening with his strength, the result of a Platonic spirit the stirrings of which had already evinced them-

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1834, Notes on Jeremy Taylor (V, 225), Biogr. Lit., ch. V (III, 208), Aids to Reflection, Aphorism IX on Spiritual religion, footnote (I, 267) and Introductory Aphorism I (I, 117), Letter to J. Gooden (Harper’s ed., IV, 339) dated 1814 by mistake. The references are to Harper’s edition of the works of Coleridge, except in the case of the “Letters,” which are published by Houghton & Mifflin, and the *Anima Poetæ* (a volume of excerpts from his note-books) published by Heine-  
mann, London.



selves in his early boyhood, and which had only been modified and indirectly shaped and developed by the German School."<sup>1</sup> The fact is that about the years 1814 and 1815, when he was composing the *Biographia Literaria*, he was much attracted by the mysticism of Jacob Böhme, of which he regarded Schelling's theories as the intellectual systematization; but scarcely was the work published, when he realized that Schelling's theories could not be purified from Pantheism. In consequence of the tone of the *Biographia*, the tradition of Schellingism long clung, and perhaps in some quarters still clings, to his name. In 1825, he wrote "Of the three schemes of philosophy, Kant's, Fichte's and Schelling's (as diverse each from the other as those of Aristotle, Zeno, and Plotinus), I should find it difficult to select the one from which I differ most. . . . Immanuel Kant I assuredly do value most highly, not however, as a metaphysician, but as a logician who has completed and systematised what Bacon had boldly designed and loosely sketched out in the miscellany of aphorisms, his *Novum Organum*. In Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' there is more than one fundamental error. . . . I can not only honestly assert, but I can satisfactorily prove by reference to writings . . . that all the elements, the *differentials* (as the algebraists say) of my present opinions existed for me before I had even seen a book of German metaphysics, later than Wolf and Leibnitz, or could have read it if I had. But what will this avail? A High German Transcendentalist I must be content to remain; and a young American painter, Leslie . . . has, I find, introduced a portrait of me in a picture from Sir W. Scott's 'Antiquary' as Dr. Duster Swivil, or whatever his name is." (Letters, II, 736). The absurdity of this opinion may best be seen if we reflect that, on the one hand, the German metaphysical systems are pantheistic ("pantheism," says Professor Kuno Francke, of Harvard, "is the inner religion of Germany") and, on the other hand, that Coleridge, as Professor W. G. T. Shedd remarks, is "the foremost and ablest English opponent of Pantheism; we do not speak of formal opposition . . . but we allude to the whole plan and structure of the philosophy

<sup>1</sup> Vide Notes on John Smith, V, 67, and introduction to B. L. (III, p. xxxi), also *Anima Poetæ* (p. 259).

which he finally adopted, as in its own nature the most effectual preventive of the adoption of Pantheism." Coleridge, at the time when he admired Schelling's system, gave Schelling abundance of praise; and Schelling magnanimously said that Coleridge did not plagiarise from him, but that he had borrowed a remark from Coleridge. It was a fortunate thing for Coleridge, as he said himself, that his first lectures on Shakespeare were delivered before those of Schlegel were published or even delivered; and in fact some of the passages in Schlegel with which a coincidence exists in Coleridge were not in Schlegel's lectures when they were orally given, but were added when the lectures were prepared for publication. It is astonishing that critical malice and literary jealousy should be blind, or should try to make others blind, to the law that similar ideas arise in similar intellects when occupied with the same subject.

In logic Coleridge is distinguished by the firmness and boldness with which he asserts the interdependence of the intellect and the moral disposition, in the attainment of ethical and spiritual truth: "My opinion is thus: that deep thinking is only attainable by a man of deep feeling, and that all truth is a species of revelation." He says concerning the Sensistie School of Hartley and Condillac: "[Some of the French adherents] have embraced this system with a full view of its moral and religious consequences: such men need discipline, not argument; they must be made better men before they can become wiser." Of his own method in moral philosophy he wrote: "We have begun, as in geometry, with defining our terms, and we proceed, like the geometricians with stating our postulates; the difference being that the postulates of geometry no man can deny: those of moral science are such as no *good* man will deny. For it is not in our power to disclaim our nature as sentient beings, but it is in our power to disclaim our prerogative as moral beings, . . . and a man need only persist in disobeying the Law of Conscience to *make* it possible for himself to deny its existence, or to reject or repel it as a phantom of superstition." "By undeceiving, enlarging, and informing the intellect, philosophy sought to purify and elevate the moral character. . . . Christianity reversed the

order. . . . Her first step was to cleanse the heart. . . . In preventing the rank vapours which steam up from the corrupt heart, Christianity restores the intellect likewise to its natural clearness. By relieving the mind from the distractions and importunities of the unruly passions, she improves the quality of the understanding." "There is small chance of truth at the goal where there is not a childlike humility at the starting-post." "Beware of arguments against Christianity, which cannot stop there, and consequently ought not to begin there."<sup>4</sup>

It may be seen, then, that the foundation of Coleridge's philosophy is the law of conscience, the freedom of the will, the fact of responsibility, and the sense of sinfulness. It was this which estranged him from all pantheistic theories (so plausible to the mere dialectical metaphysician); and it is the most striking proof of the nobleness of his disposition, that in the years in which he was falling a slave to opium, his mind sought no excuse for his conduct in the Necessitarian or the Pantheistic theories which then fascinated his youthful intellect, but that his faults only aroused and deepened in him a conviction of the reality of the moral law, of the responsibility of man, and of the freedom of the will, and finally led him from the personality of man to the personality of God. "Evidences of Christianity!", he exclaims in the *Aids to Reflection* (i, 363), "I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust it to its own evidence (remembering only the express declaration of Christ himself: 'No man cometh to me unless the Father leadeth him'). Whatever more is desirable for Christians generally (I speak not now with reference to professed students of theology) may, in my judgment, be far more safely and profitably taught, without controversy or the supposition of infidel antagonists, in the form of ecclesiastical history."

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<sup>4</sup> Vide *Letters*, March 23, 1801, B. Lit., ch. vii (III, p. 235); *Aids to Reflection*, I, p. 193. (Observe that in this passage Coleridge originally wrote "Our nature as moral beings," which he changed to "our prerogative as moral beings." The correction has been overlooked in the American edition) vide also pp. 225, 226, 290. With him "Nature" is a non-moral term.

In Epistemology he emphasizes the distinction between the imaginable (or unimaginable) and the conceivable (or inconceivable): "Materialism owes all its proselytes to the propensity, so common among men, to mistake distinct (vivid) images for clear conceptions and, *vice versa*, to reject as inconceivable that which from its own nature is unimaginable." Materialism is "an attempt to render *that* an object of sight which has no relation to sight. . . . Under the despotism of the senses, we are restless because invisible things are not the objects of vision; and metaphysical systems, for the most part, become popular, not for their truth, but in proportion as they attribute to causes a susceptibility of being seen if only our visual organs were sufficiently powerful." "Every system which is under the necessity of using terms not familiarized by the metaphysics in fashion, will be described as written in an unintelligible style, and the author must expect the charge of having substituted learned jargon for clear conceptions; while according to the creed of our modern philosophers, nothing is deemed a clear conception but what is representable by a distinct image. Thus the conceivable is reduced within the bounds of the picturable."<sup>5</sup>

"The position of Aristotelians, *nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*, on which Locke's essay is grounded, is irrefragable: Locke erred only in taking half the Truth for a whole Truth."<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, Coleridge insists, in season and out of season, on the distinction between the Understanding and the Reason: "The diversity, the difference in kind, between reason and understanding, was known to, and clearly admitted by, many of our older divines, by Hooker for instance; and it is implied in the whole of Bacon's *Novum Organum*." "In Hooker and the great divines of his age, it is evident that they knew and asserted the distinction, nay the diversity, of the things themselves, and it was merely an occasional carelessness in the use of the terms that reason is ever put where they

<sup>5</sup> B. Lit. ch. X, ch. VI, ch. XII (Vol. III, pp. 225, 226, 245, 351).

<sup>6</sup> Aids to Reflection, I, 154. Amid the extravagant praise and extravagant censure of which Locke has been the object, it is a pleasure to note Dr. Pace's article in the BULLETIN, January, 1905, as a model of two rare qualities, accuracy in representation and sobriety in judgment.

meant understanding. But alas! since the Revolution (1688), it has ceased to be a mere error of language, and in too many it now (1825) amounts to a denial of reason."

The Understanding is "the faculty judging according to the senses," "the faculty by which we generalize and reflect," "the faculty which, generalizing from particular experiences, judges of the future by the analogy of the past." The Reason is "the power of universal and necessary convictions, the source and substance of truths above sense, and having their evidence in themselves." "The understanding suggests the materials of reasoning; the reason decides upon them. The first can only say, This is so, or this is likely to be so; the last says, This must be so." It is the faculty of reason which establishes the essential distinction between man and brute; for, he says, the understanding, considered in itself and in abstraction from the soul in which it is rooted, and the reason by which it is illuminated, differs only in degree in man and brute. Hence, he remarks, we speak, without tautology, of "the human understanding." "Reason has no concern with the impermanent flux of particulars, but with the permanent relations, and is to be defined, even in its lowest or theoretical attribute, as the power which enables man to draw necessary and universal conclusions from particular facts.

. . . From the understanding to the reason, there is no continuous ascent possible, it is a *metabasis eis allo genos*." "They differ in kind, not in degree." "The essential peculiarity of the human understanding consists in its capability of being irradiated by reason—in its recipiency; and even this is *given* to it by the presence of a higher power than itself." "The understanding in all its judgments refers to some other faculty as its ultimate authority; the reason in all its decisions appeals to itself as the ground and substance of their truth." "In Kant's 'Critique of the Pure Reason' there is more than one fundamental error; but the main fault lies in the title-page, which, to the manifold advantage of the work, might be exchanged for 'An Inquisition respecting the constitution and limits of the Human Understanding,'"<sup>7</sup>—an inquisition to be conducted by the Reason.

<sup>7</sup> Concerning the Reason and Understanding, see Coleridge's Works *passim*,

The understanding and the reason are both divided into theoretic and practical; but observe that this distinction is not coincident with Kant's; for Coleridge again distinguishes the practical reason from the conscience. The practical understanding is the power of "adapting measures to circumstances," or means to proximate ends; it is the perception of utility and expediency; in religion it is "the mind of the flesh." The practical reason is the perception, not of utility, but of right and wrong, good and evil; it apprehends ultimate ends and the means to these. It is not exactly the same as conscience, for conscience adds to the perception of right and wrong the sense of responsibility and of obligation. It is the conscience that is the organ of the "Categorical Imperative." Thus Coleridge distinguishes what Kant did not; and with him the practical reason is the power which, since the time of Hutcheson, has been called in British philosophy the "Moral Sense." (Compare Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, ch. V, § I, and "W. G. Ward and the Catholic Revival," p. 217 and p. 334.) "Theoretic reason, as the ground of the universal and absolute in all logical *conclusion*, is rather the light of reason in the understanding. The practical reason alone is reason in the full and substantial sense." "The understanding is the faculty of reflection; the reason, of contemplation. Reason, indeed, is much nearer" (more analogous) "to sense than to understanding; for reason, says our great Hooker, is a direct aspect of truth, an inward beholding, having a similar relation to the intelligible or spiritual, as the sense has to the material or phenomenal." The objects of the reason he calls ideas; and the objects of the understanding conceptions. It is to be observed, however, with regard to the most general concepts, which, in his opinion, are not generalized by the understanding from experience, but constitute the understanding, that he thinks that "in strict and severe propriety of language I should have said *generalific* or *generific* rather than general, and *concienciencies* or conceptive acts rather than conceptions."

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but especially *Aids to Reflection*, *Aphorisms on Spiritual Religion*, no. VIII (Vol. I, p. 241). It may not be superfluous to note that the English word *faculty* represents both the scholastic *facultas* and *habitus*. The scholastic term for practical reason was "Synderesis."



It belongs to the understanding to conceive and to define the meaning of a common name, or name of a class, for "the proper functions of the understanding are, that of generalizing the notices received from the senses in order to the constitution of names; that of referring particular notices (that is, impressions or sensations) to their names; and, *vice versa*, names to their correspondent class or kind of notices." He is fond of pointing out that ideas, easily and naturally apprehended by the reason, appear, when presented to the understanding, to be inconceivable, that is to be definable only by means of two concepts contradictory (in appearance) to one another. Take, for example, "the idea of moral freedom as the ground of our proper responsibility. Speak to a young Liberal fresh from Edinburgh, or Hackney, or the Hospitals, of free-will as implied in free agency; he will perhaps confess with a smile that he is a Necessitarian, will proceed to assure his hearers that the liberty of the will is a contradiction in terms,<sup>8</sup> and finish by recommending a perusal of the works of Jonathan Edwards or of Dr. Crombie; or, as it may happen, he may declare the will itself a mere delusion, or nonentity, and advise the study of Lawrence's Lectures. Converse on the same subject with a plain simple-minded yet reflecting neighbour, and he may probably say (as St. Augustine said long before him in reply to the question, What is Time?) 'I know it well enough when you do not ask me.' But alike with both the supposed parties, with the self-complacent student just as certainly as with our less positive neighbour, if we attend to their actions, their feelings, and even their words, we shall be in ill-luck if ten minutes pass without having full and satisfactory proof that the idea of man's moral freedom possesses and modifies their whole practical being, in all they say, in all they feel, in all they do and are done to; even as the spirit of life, which is contained in no vessel because it permeates all." The idea, then, is not the less easily apprehended by the reason because it comes forth from the mould of the defining faculty, or understanding, in a self-contradictory

<sup>8</sup> So Huxley, in his *Life of Hume*, says that defenders of free-will "rather pride themselves on a fixed belief that our volitions have no cause, or that the will causes itself; which is either the same thing or a contradiction in terms."

form. "Of the understanding, considered in and of itself, the peripatetic aphorism, *nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*, is strictly true. . . . This insulation of the understanding, however, is our own act . . . A man of healthful intellect uses his understanding in this state of abstraction only as a tool or organ . . . as the means, not the end, of knowledge. . . . Of the discursive understanding, which forms for itself general notions and terms of classification for the purpose of comparing and arranging *phenomena*, the characteristic is clearness without depth; it contemplates the unity of things in their limits only, and is consequently a knowledge of superficies without substance. So much so, indeed, that it entangles itself in contradictions in the very effort of comprehending the idea of substance." He even goes so far as to assert the paradox that "this is one of the distinguishing characters of ideas, and marks at once the difference between an idea (truth-power of reason) and a conception of the understanding, namely, that the former, as expressed in words, is always a contradiction in terms."<sup>9</sup> Freedom, duty, the soul all in every part of the body, Immortality, God, these and similar ideas are for Coleridge the proper objects of the reason, mysterious to the understanding. For him, then, the reason has two functions; the lower, or speculative, to illuminate the understanding and to subordinate the generalizations of experience to necessary principles, and distinguish the essentials from the concomitants; the higher, or practical reason, to be "a Spiritual organ" for the intuition of moral principles and the apprehension of spiritual realities. He thought that "the controversy of the Nominalists and Realists was one of the greatest and most important that ever occupied the human mind; both were right and both were wrong; they each maintained opposite poles of the same truth; which truth neither of them saw for want of a higher premiss. Duns Scotus was the head of the Realists; Ockham, his own disciple, of the Nominalists. Ockham, though certainly very prolix, is a most extraordinary writer." (Coleridge elsewhere speaks of Scotus as the greatest metaphysical genius that the British

<sup>9</sup> Aids to Reflection, app. B. (I, 459), Church and State, ch. I (VI, p. 33).

Islands have produced). It is well, by the way, for us to remember that when modern writers speak of Scholastic Realism, they are thinking of the last phase when it assumed the extreme form which Ockham assailed. The moderate Realism of St. Thomas might be described from the other side as a moderate conceptualism. The controversy now chiefly concerns Relations. Moreover, moral ideas should be distinguished from others, for they are not abstracted from sense-perceptions or experience, but are prior to a reality which they aim at producing. No mere combination or modification of experiences, or of universals abstracted from experience, could create the idea of holiness. "Whether ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant, or likewise constitutive and one with the power and life of nature, according to Plato and Plotinus . . . is the highest problem of philosophy, and not part of its nomenclature. That which, considered objectively (that is, as existing externally to the mind) we call a law, the same contemplated subjectively (that is, as existing in a subject or mind) is an idea. Hence Plato often names ideas Laws; and Bacon, the British Plato, describes the laws of the material universe as ideas in nature." "Idea and Law are correlatives that mutually interpret each the other; an idea with adequate power of realizing itself being a law; and a law, considered abstractly from, or in the absence of, the power of manifesting itself in its appropriate product, being an idea."<sup>10</sup>

There is no writer in the study of whose opinions it is more requisite to observe the chronological order of the works; for his mind was constantly growing. At the time, however, of the re-publication, or rather the re-composition, of *The Friend* (1818), he had abandoned Schelling's philosophy, and had begun the exposition of a system of his own (as Mr. Green informs us); and therefore the following passage may be cited: "The grand problem the solution of which forms, according to Plato, the final object and distinctive character of philosophy, is this: for all that exists conditionally (that is, the existence of which is inconceivable except under the condition of its

<sup>10</sup> *Statesman's Manual*, *app. E.* (I. 484), Church and State, ch. I (VI, 31), Essay on the Prometheus of Æschylus (IV, 358).

dependency on some other as its antecedent) to find a ground that is unconditional and absolute, and thereby reduce the aggregate of human knowledge to a system. . . . And now, the remarkable fact forces itself upon our attention, namely that the material world is found to obey the same laws as had been deduced independently from the reason. . . . The problem, what is the ground of coincidence between reason and experience, or, between the laws of matter and the ideas of pure intellect—the only answer which Plato deemed the question capable of receiving, compels the reason to pass out of itself and seek the ground of this agreement in a supersensual essence, which being at once the ideal of the reason and the cause of the material world, is the pre-establisher of the harmony in and between both. Religion, therefore, is the ultimate aim of philosophy.” “Christ [is] the Self-subsisting Word, *the light which lighteth every man*, so that what we call reason is itself a light from that light, *lumen a luce*, as the Latin more distinctly expresses it.”<sup>11</sup>

The validity of the cognitive faculties is stated by Coleridge in the following manner: “The words of the Apostle are literally and philosophically true: ‘We (that is, the human race) live by faith.’ Whatever we do or know, that is in kind different from the brute creation, has its origin in a determination of the reason to have faith or trust in itself. This, its first act of faith, is scarcely less than identical with its own being. *Implicite* it is the copula—it contains the possibility—of every position to which there exists any correspondence in reality. (I mean that but for the confidence which we place in the assertions of our reason and conscience, we could have no certainty of the reality and actual outness of the material world. It might be affirmed that in what we call ‘sleep’ everyone has a dream of his own, and that in what we call ‘awake’ whole communities dream alike. The senses can only say ‘It seems’; ‘It is’ is a sense of reason.) It is itself, therefore, the realizing principle, the spiritual *substratum* of the whole complex body of truths. . . . This primal act of faith [is] a faith not derived from, but itself the ground and source of,

<sup>11</sup> The Friend, Sect. II, Essay V (Vol. II, p. 420); Notes on the Book of Common Prayer (Vol. V, p. 22).

experience, and without which the fleeting chaos of facts would no more form experience than the dust of the grave can of itself make a living man." "Man discovers, and recoils from the discovery, that the reality, the objective truth, of the objects he has been admiring, derives its whole and sole evidence from an obscure sensation, which he is alike unable to resist or to comprehend, which compels him to contemplate as without and independent of himself what yet he could not contemplate at all, were it not a modification of his own being." "Berkeleyism" (which in his youth he embraced) "can only be confuted or answered" he said, "by a single sentence. His premiss granted, the deduction is a chain of adamant." "Berkeley's scheme is merely an evolution of the positions—All perception is reducible to sensation, and All sensation is exclusively *subjective* (he who feels, feels himself) . . . Now, I would commence my reply to Berkeley by denying both positions, or—what is tantamount—the second." But he would only refute Berkeley; he would not undertake to demonstrate the opposite thesis: "I saw," he says, "that in the nature of things such proof is impossible." He attaches no weight to the argument that sensation must have a cause, because in fact the realism of the human race does not rest itself upon that argument, and because, he says, "the very faculty of deducing and concluding would equally demand an explanation." It rests then, he says, on trust or faith.<sup>12</sup>

Of Coleridge's cosmology, it is sufficient here to say that it was "Dynamic," and that he held the mechanical philosophy, which obtained the ascendancy at the revolution of 1688, in abhorrence as leading in logical consistency to rationalism, materialism, and atheism. In his psychology, that which signalizes the diversity of spirit from matter is the Will. In nature every cause is likewise an effect; every antecedent is likewise a consequent of some antecedent. But the Will is "a

<sup>12</sup> The Friend, pt. II, xi (Vol. II, 460); B. L. (vide Vol. III, p. 702, 704, 295, 244). For a criticism of the position that we trust, or put faith in, our faculties, see Newman, Gr. of Ass., pt. I, ch. iv, I, 4: "We use, not trust, our faculties . . . We do not confront or bargain with ourselves." Certainly we must have used them for many years before we can even think of trusting or distrusting.

power of originating an act or state." As for the objections to free will, "what but absurdity can follow if you decide on spirit by the laws of matter?" The objector admits that "in willing we *appear* to ourselves to constitute an actual *beginning*, and that this seems *unique* and without any example in our sensible experience or in the phenomena of nature; but may it not be an illusion arising from our ignorance of the antecedent causes?" To this Coleridge answers: "You *may* suppose this; you may suppose that the soul of every man should impose a *lie* on itself, and that this lie and the acting on the faith of its being the most important of all truths and the most real of all realities, should form the main contradistinctive character of Humanity, and the only basis of the distinction between things and persons, on which our whole moral and criminal law is grounded; you may suppose this; I cannot (as I could in the case of an arithmetical or a geometrical proposition) render it impossible for you to suppose it. . . . Were it not in your power to do so, the belief of the contrary would be no subject of a *command*, no part of a moral or religious duty. You would not, however, suppose it *without a reason*. But all the pretexts that ever have been, or ever can be, offered for this supposition are built on . . . certain conceptions of the understanding generalized or abstracted from objects of sense, and having therefore no force except in application to the objects of sense."<sup>13</sup> He considers freedom proved by the existence of a rule of morality (recognized in the practical reason), by the commands of conscience, by responsibility, conviction of guilt, and remorse as distinguished from regret.

The immortality of the soul is defended mainly, though not exclusively, on religious grounds. "My conscience forbids me," he wrote in 1815, "to propose to myself the pains and pleasures of this life as the primary motive, or the ultimate end, of my actions; on the contrary, it makes me perceive an utter disproportionateness and heterogeneity between the acts of the spirit, as virtue and vice, and the things of the sense, such as all earthly rewards and punishments must be. Its hopes and fears, therefore, refer me to a different and spiritual state of being; and I believe in the life to come, not through

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<sup>13</sup> Aids to Reflection, aphorism X, on spiritual religion (I, 273).



arguments acquired by my understanding or discursive faculty, but chiefly and effectively because so to believe is my duty, and in obedience to the commands of my conscience." But he afterwards advanced to a position in which he saw, not only that the reason on this point is not in apparent opposition to the conscience, but that it actually supports the command of conscience and makes its rationality clear.

"The main argument is that none but a wicked man dares to doubt it. When it is not in the light of a promise, it is in the law of fear, and at all times a part of the conscience, and pre-supposed in all spiritual conviction." In some Notes on Jeremy Taylor, he says: "Though I agree that the misallotment of worldly goods and fortunes was one principal occasion exciting well-disposed and spiritually awakened natures by reflections and reasonings, such as I have here supposed, to mature the presentment of immortality into full consciousness, into a principle of action and a well-spring of strength and consolation, I cannot concede to this circumstance anything like the importance which Taylor attributes to it. I am persuaded that, as the belief of all mankind, of all tribes and nations and languages, in all ages, and in all states of social union, it must be referred to far deeper grounds common to man as man, and that its fibres are to be traced to the tap-root of humanity. . . . Throughout animated nature, of each characteristic organ and faculty there exists a pre-assurance and instinctive and practical anticipation; and no pre-assurance common to a whole species does in any instance prove delusive. All other prophecies of nature have their exact fulfilment—in every other *engrafted word* of promise, nature is found true to her word: is it then in her noblest creature that she tells her first lie?"

The distinction and opposition between right and wrong, between good and evil, is for Coleridge essential and absolute. Utilitarian theories were to him as intellectually absurd as they are in the end morally deteriorating. "The greatest happiness of the greatest number! The question is, What happiness? A Chickasaw or Pawnee Bentham would necessarily hope for the most frequent opportunities possible of scalping the greatest possible number of enemies for the long-

est possible time. There is no escaping this absurdity unless you come back to a standard of reason and duty, imperative on our merely pleasurable sensations." Duty, however, or the unconditional command is no mere blind instinct, as it *might* be in the Kantian theory. The command of the conscience, on the one hand sanctions and enforces—but on the other is illuminated by—the intuitions of the practical reason, which is as truly as the speculative reason (or even more truly) a cognitive faculty. "That which is neither a sensation nor a perception, that which is neither individual (that is a sensible intuition) nor general (that is, a conception), which neither refers to outward facts, nor yet is abstracted from the forms of perception contained in the understanding, but which is an educt of the imagination actuated by the pure reason, to which there neither is nor can be an adequate correspondent in the world of the senses,—this and this alone is an idea." Such ideas are especially the object of the practical reason, or "moral sense."

Of our knowledge of God, and of the origin of that knowledge, he says: "The belief of a God and of a future state (if a passive acquiescence may be flattered with the name of belief) does not, indeed, always beget a good heart; but a good heart so naturally begets the belief that the very few exceptions must be regarded as strange anomalies from strange and unfortunate circumstances." In the *Biographia* he says that "for a very long time I could not reconcile personality with infinity; and my head was with Spinoza, though my heart was with John and Paul. . . . I became convinced that religion, as both the corner-stone and the key-stone of morality must have a moral origin. . . . It were, therefore, to be expected that its fundamental truth would be such as *might* be denied, though only by the fool, and even by the fool from madness of heart alone." When he had read Kant's works, his view was as follows: "The question, then, concerning our faith in the existence of a God, not only as the ground of the universe by his essence, but as its maker and judge by his wisdom and holy will, appeared to me to stand thus: The sciential reason, the objects of which are purely theoretical, remains neutral, as long as its name and semblance are not

usurped by the opponents of the doctrine; but it then becomes an effective ally by exposing the false show of demonstration, or by evincing the equal demonstrability of the contrary from premises equally logical. The understanding meantime suggests—the analogy of experience facilitates—the belief. Nature excites and recalls it, as by a perpetual revelation. Our feelings almost necessitate it; and the law of conscience peremptorily commands it. The arguments, that at all apply to it, are in its favor; and there is nothing against it but its own sublimity. It could not be intellectually more evident without becoming morally less effective; without counteracting its own end by sacrificing the life of faith to the cold mechanism of a worthless because compulsory assent." But he advanced to firmer ground. He always maintained, indeed, that the existence of a personal God—not a mere Absolute, or Infinite, or Fate,—is not susceptible of "scientific demonstration," for "all scientific demonstration is independent of the will, and is apodictic only as far as it is compulsory on the mind, *volentem, nolentem*." "But I also hold that this truth, the hardest to *demonstrate*, is the one which of all others least needs to be demonstrated. . . . For every mind not devoid of all reason and desperately conscience-proof, it is little less than impossible not to believe; only, indeed, just so much short of impossible as to leave some room for the will and moral election, and thereby keep it a truth of Religion, and the possible subject of a commandment." The proofs of the existence of a *personal* God are drawn from premises and principles furnished by the practical reason (and enforced by the conscience), not by the theoretic reason. He points out the result to which the dialectics of mere speculative reason must lead, in this region of mystery, unless they start from principles furnished by the practical reason and are controlled by the conscience: "The dialectic intellect by the exertions of its own powers exclusively can lead us to a general affirmation of the supreme reality of an absolute being; but here it stops. It is utterly incapable of communicating insight or conviction concerning the existence or possibility of the world as different from the Deity. It finds itself constrained to identify (more truly, to confound) the Creator with the aggregate of

his creature, and cutting the knot which it cannot untwist, to deny altogether the reality of all finite existence. . . . The inevitable result of all consequent reasoning, in which the intellect refuses to acknowledge a higher or deeper ground than it can itself supply, and weens to possess within itself the centre of its own system, is (and from Zeno the Eleatic to Spinoza, and from Spinoza to the Schellings, Okens, and their adherents of the present day ever have been) pantheism under one or another of its modes; the least repulsive of which differs from the rest, not in its consequences (which are one and the same in all, and in all alike practically atheistic) but only as it may express the striving of the philosopher himself to hide these consequences from his own mind. . . . All speculative disquisition must begin with postulates, which the conscience alone can at once authorize and substantiate; and from whichever point the reason may start,—from the things which are seen to the one invisible, or from the idea of the absolute one to the things that are seen,—it will find a chasm which the moral being only—which the spirit and religion of man alone—can fill up.” It is remarkable that he found that the idea of a personal God, intelligent, free, loving, holy, was to him most easily received in the Trinitarian form; and he held that the Unitarian denial of the three-fold personality led in logical consistence to the denial of all divine personality whatsoever. He speaks of the idea of God as being con-natural to man, as it were latent in the human mind, so that it is part of a fully-developed human nature. “Ideas, or truths of philosophy properly so called—as distinguished from formal or abstract sciences—correspond to substantial beings, to objects the actual subsistence of which is implied in their idea, though only by the idea revealable. To adopt the language of the great philosophical Apostle, they are ‘spiritual realities that can only spiritually be discerned,’ and the inherent aptitude and moral pre-configuration to which constitutes what we mean by ideas and by the presence of ideal truth and of ideal power in the human being. They, in fact, constitute his humanity; for, try to conceive a man without the ideas of God, eternity, freedom, will, absolute truth—of the good, the true, the beautiful, the infinite: an animal endowed with a

memory of appearances and facts might remain; but the man will have vanished; and you have instead a creature '*more subtle than any beast of the field,*' but likewise '*cursed above every beast of the field; upon its belly must it go, and dust must it eat all the days of its life.*' "

From the truth of a personal, infinite God, he drew the inference that mysteries were no ground for objection to religion. "From these premises I proceeded to draw the following conclusion: first, that having once fully admitted the existence of an infinite yet self-conscious Creator, we are not allowed to ground the irrationality of any other article of faith on arguments which would equally prove that to be irrational which we had admitted to be real; secondly, that whatever is deducible from the admission of a self-comprehending and creative spirit may legitimately be used in proof of the *possibility* of any further mystery concerning the divine nature." "Religion necessarily, as to its main and proper doctrines, consists of ideas, that is, spiritual truths that can only spiritually be discerned, and to the expression of which words are necessarily inadequate and must be used by accommodation. Hence the absolute indispensability of a Christian life with its conflicts and inward experiences, which alone can make a man answer to an opponent who charges one doctrine as contradictory to another: 'Yes,' it is a contradiction in terms" (in language and concepts of the understanding) "but nevertheless both are true, nay parts of the same truth."<sup>14</sup>

Yet without doubt he indulged in an excess of private judgment on questions of Christian doctrine. He was the introducer of Biblical Criticism into the United Kingdom by his *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit* (written in 1824, and long circulated in manuscript before being published) and by some Notes published in his *Literary Remains*. The conclusions indicated were mild enough, compared with those into which Reuss, Vatke, and Leopold George plunged, a few years later than the *Inquiring Spirit*. It was the Protestant idea of Inspiration, combined with the principle of private interpretation, and with the rejection of Tradition as an authority, that

<sup>14</sup> *B. L.* ch. x (III, 296, 298), *Confessio Fidei* (V, 15, 16), *Aids to Reflection* (I, 221), *The Friend*, II, xi (II, 470).

made the Higher Criticism so dangerous to Christianity. In the Oxford School, it encountered no adequate antagonist. In the very year in which Coleridge's *Literary Remains* were published, Newman became absorbed in the issue between the Church of England and the Catholic Church; while Pusey, who had studied in Germany, and who had written a description of German Schools of theology, now thought the higher criticism absolutely irreconcilable with the Inspiration of Scripture and therefore opposed it indiscriminately and unconditionally. Coleridge thus became a source of the Broad Church School of theology, while in ecclesiastical polity he is pronounced both by Carlyle and Newman (and in the mouth of two such witnesses the fact stands) the precursor of the Oxford or High Church Movement.

It is with his philosophy, however, that we are here concerned. Mr. Wilfrid Ward has lately pointed out that Coleridge is the link between Burke and Newman; and James Robert Hope (Hope-Scott) wrote to Newman (in 1839): "Coleridge's 'Church and State' has evidently had a great deal to do with the fundamental ideas of Gladstone's book" (*The State in its relation to the Church*). A Neo-Scholastic may be allowed to make two remarks on Coleridge's philosophy. (1) Coleridge had a hearty admiration for Aristotle and for the great Scholastics; he often censured the ignorance and inconsistency of those who at the same time praise Locke and censure the Scholastics.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, the great Scholastics are by no means pure Aristotelians; St. Thomas assuredly often corrects Aristotle by interpretation, and often, especially in *Ethics*, where he agrees with him in the letter, does not agree with him in the spirit. (2) If I were asked, not to criticise Coleridge's philosophy, but to point out its chief merits, I should say that these lie in his insistence upon our moral responsibility for our opinions as much as for our actions, and in his fixing attention on the fact that our arguments in religion must start from principles cognized by the practical reason and therefore dependent on our moral disposition and largely under the control of the will, which is,

<sup>15</sup> Vide Table Talk, July 2, 1830, April 30, 1830, and the note in the appendix dated April 20, 1811.



itself, bound by the conscience, man's first guide. "By sending from his solitude the voice of earnest spiritual instruction," wrote one who unfortunately was afterwards sucked into the vortex of Carlyle, "he came to be beloved, studied, and mourned for, by no small or careless school of disciples." "There was no week," wrote Southey to Henry Taylor when Coleridge's *Table Talk* was published, "in which his talk would not have furnished as much matter worthy of preservation as these two volumes contain."

The year 1860 marks the date when Coleridge's influence was at the Nadir, as it marks that in which Mill's was at the Zenith. It was about that year that Principal Shairp, who has been quoted in our former article, expressed the desire for a revival of Coleridge. The revival of spiritual philosophy began about 1870, with the publication of Newman's essay on Assent and methods of proof in morals and religion, and with W. G. Ward's controversy in the *Dublin Review* against Mill. A few years later came James Martineau; and since that time, true philosophy has steadily been gaining ground. To-day the antagonist in the United Kingdom is not Mill or Spencer, but something like Hegelianism (which also began about 1870); and to that, Coleridge is the best modern prophylactic.

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## THE WORD *CELT*.

Probably the earliest mention of the word *Celt* with which most readers are familiar occurs in that classic phrase where, in the introduction to his 'Commentaries on the Gallic War', Cæsar, speaking of the division of all Gaul into three parts, says that the native name of the group of peoples who occupied the centre of Gaul between the Seine, the Marne and the Garonne is a Celtic word. The word is found long before Cæsar's time, however. In fact, as early as the end of the sixth century, B. C., we find, for the first time in history, the word in a derived form, in the Greek writer Hecataeus of Miletus, who uses it in a geographic sense. In his 'Voyage around the World,' of which only fragments have been preserved, he says, speaking of Marseilles, that it is near *Celtica*, and he also says that Nyrax, wherever that may have been, is a Celtic city. The word *Celt*, itself, is found first in Herodotus, in a passage dating from the middle of the fifth century B. C., or, more precisely, between the years 445 and 443, where he informs us that the Celts, οἱ Κελτοί, live at the sources of the Danube, that is, in the southwest corner of Germany in the present Grand Duchy of Baden, and in Spain and on the coast of the Atlantic. The Latin *Celtae*, with which we are familiar in Cæsar, is the plural of a masculine *ā* stem and, on it, the later Greek historians and geographers built the form *Κελται*, as a variant of the older *Κελτοί*.

There are two very different applications of the word *Celt* in the ancient writers: as the name of a tribe in Gaul, and as the general name for all the Celts of the Continent. Apparently, the ancients never applied the name to the inhabitants of the British Isles. Since each tribe had its own name, it is probable that the word *Celt* was originally nothing more than the name of one of these tribes, but, just why it was given to that particular group of people that Cæsar speaks of, we have no way of knowing. On the other hand, the Greeks, up to the third century B. C., not only had no other name than this for all the Continental Celts, but the confusion is heightened by

their sometimes including under that denomination, the Germans. Of the three words, *Γαλάται*, *Κελτοί* and *Galli*, which are found applied to the Celts by the ancient authors, we may say that, as a rule, they are used without much difference of meaning. Some, however (as Diodorus the Sicilian), seem to mean by *Κελτοί*, the Celts of Gaul, and by *Γαλάται*, the Germans; to others (as Dio Cassius) these terms meant just the reverse. The poets probably had the Celts in mind when they wrote of Hyperboreans. There is not the slightest reason to believe that *Κελτοί*, *Γαλάται* and *Galli* are all forms of the same word, as was the opinion of Diefenbach (1840) and of Leibnitz (*Collect. Etymol.*, p. 79, Opera, Genève, 1768): "*Galatas et Celtas idem vocabulum putem.*"

The word Celt has had a checkered career. It has grown from the name of a single tribe, so as to include (in the *extra-Celtic* use of the word) in a vague way, all the members of the family, so that now it has come to mean anyone who speaks, or is descended from one who speaks, any Celtic language. This is a quite modern use of the word, and there is nothing to show that the Celts themselves ever employed it, or that it is employed properly to-day, in this wider meaning, in any of the neo-Celtic languages. It is doubtful if the Celts of antiquity ever felt or acted as a united people, except to a certain extent, under Vercingetorix' lead at the siege of Alesia.

It would be interesting to know why the Celts called themselves by that name or, what is just as likely, why they were called so by their neighbors or enemies. Here nothing certain is known. Pausanias, writing about the year 173 A. D., says that that was the name which the Celts had given themselves, and Cæsar (51 B. C.), as we have seen, says that, "*ipsorum lingua*," they were called Celts. It is well known that countries and their inhabitants more often bear names given them by their discoverers and first explorers than names that originated at home. For example, "Indian" as the name of the Red Skins. An interesting instance or two from Celtic toponymy will illustrate this point. The Gaulish *Allobroges* were originally those "of another, not of the speaker's country," and they must have got the name from another Celtic speaking tribe that lived outside their borders. *Argyll*, the name of

that part of Scotland that lies between the Mull of Kintyre and the Clyde is, in the dialect of that district, *Earra-gháidheal*, which represents an older *airer-gaidel*, the first member of which it has recently been sought to equate with the Irish *airther* "eastern", and to conclude that the name meant originally "the east-land of the Gail." It is true that it was precisely in that part of Scotland that the old Kingdom of *Dalriada* was established but, unfortunately for the value of *Argyll* as an illustration, there are some objections that will have to be met before this explanation of its meaning can be entirely satisfactory.

At all events, the name *Celt* may have been imposed upon some tribe from without, by the uitlander, and need not be of Celtic origin. This is at least a possibility, but highly improbable, and the statements of the ancient writers that the word belonged to the language of the people who bore the name is generally accepted. We must confess that we know nothing of the exact meaning of the word *Celt*, but it has at all times been the delight of dilettanti and bibliophiles to speculate on its origin and meaning. Court de Gébelin in the eighteenth century wished to bring it into relation with the German *Kälte*, Leibnitz, with the German *gelten*, and Davies (1804) makes it out to be the Hebrew כְּלִי, "the men of the extremity", to intimate the position occupied by the descendants of Gomer who, according to many of the scholars of the early part of the last century, were the Cymri. The relation of the word to the Irish *clethe*, "great, noble", is to be rejected along with the other explanations which are here resurrected only as curiosities. The only hypotheses worthy of consideration are the following: (1) It has been suggested that the root of the word is the same as that found in Old-Irish *ar-cel-im*, Middle-Irish *ar-chell-aim* "I carry off, plunder, steal", in Old-Irish *fo-chelim* "I protect", and in Latin (*per-, re-*) *cello*, *calamitas*, *in-columis*, *clā-des*, *clāva*, Lithuanian *kalti* "to beat, hammer." (2) It has been suggested that the word means "warrior", and that from it is derived the pre-Germanic \**Celtio-*, the Old-German *hildja-* "battle"; the Frankish, which is seen in (Bruni-) *childis*, the Old-Norse *hild-r* "war," and the Old-English *hild* "fight." (3) It has been suggested that the word is

connected with the word of the same form meaning "dress or raiment", which we know in the Scotch *kilt*. When applied to a tribe it would mean "the clothed ones", and according to this explanation, combined with that given under (2), the Celts would be "the people clothed in armor." (4) Finally, it has been suggested that the word is a participial formation in *-to-* from a root *kel* which we know in Latin *celsus* (*cel-to-s*), Lithuanian *kélta-s*. According to this etymology, the Celts are the "exalted, eminent ones", a derivation that cannot fail to suit the wishes of the most exacting Celt. Be that as it may, the meaning of the root *kel* eludes us, and no such root meaning "to raise" has been found in any of the living Celtic languages, and we are obliged to say that this explanation, as well as the others, is a pure supposition. The humanists of the Renaissance did not worry their heads long over the problem, but accounted for the name in a delightfully simple way, by an ingenious myth which brought into relation an autochthonous nymph named Celto, the Greek hero Hercules and the child Britto, the first and last of whom, they said, have given their names to the Celts of the Continent and of the Isles.

The word *Celtic* is of extremely rare occurrence in the neo-Celtic languages. But, an Irishman or a Breton, for example, when speaking in English or French of his native language, will often be found calling it "Celtic" as if it were the only one with a right to the name. It is obviously a misuse of the word to apply it to Irish, Gaelic, Manx, Welsh, Breton, Cornish or Gaulish, to any but the whole group of Celtic languages. Formerly, there were many "Celtic" grammars and dictionaries which were confined to Irish or Welsh, and celtists who knew but Irish, Welsh or Breton, as the case might be. That was as meaningless as if one who knows only Latin or Greek were to be called a classical philologist, or a romanist, one who is acquainted with the philology of but one of the Romance languages. The meaning of the word *Celtic*, as used even in scientific works, is not always unmistakable. The Germans sometimes write *keltisch* when they mean and had better write *urkeltisch*. The same mistake is occasionally met with in French works; that is, we find *celtique* in the sense of *celtique*

*primitif*, which is correctly called in German, *urkeltisch*, and in English, *protoceltique*. Besides, in French works on archæology, we sometimes find that a distinction is made between *Celtic* and *Gaulish*, by which the former denotes the era characterized by the appearance of metals, bronze arms and the practice of incineration, the latter, the era characterized by the prevalence of iron and the practice of inhumation. This difference of usage seems to be a survival of the old days when the ethnic distinction between Celts and Gauls was insisted upon.

The earliest instance of the word *Celt* in Irish literature is found in the *Leabhar na hUidhre* (f° 1, a) the "Book of the Dun Cow," a manuscript of miscellaneous contents compiled in the twelfth century. The word is *Celtecdai*, a nom. pl. substantivized adjective meaning "the Celts", and occurs in a fragmentary history of the six ages of the world. In the modern dialects of Irish the word is of very rare occurrence. It is not found in any of the Irish-English dictionaries except Dinneen's, and no Irish equivalents are given to *Celt*, *Celtic* in any of the English-Irish dictionaries. There are very few instances of its use in the modern literature, and always as a learned word, for example in an article by John Fleming in the *Gaelic Journal*, VII, 13 and by Dr. Douglas Hyde in his *Filidheacht Ghaedhealach*, pp. 12, 44, and such expressions as Irish *Coimthíní uile-Cheilteach*, Welsh *Cynghrair oll-Geltaidd*, Breton *Kendalc'h oll-Geltiek*, "The Panceltic Congress."

The dictionaries of Scotch-Gaelic, Welsh and Breton contain some curious entries under this head, but nothing of value. The prevalent opinion seems to have been that the word *Celt* is to be derived from the verb *celim* "conceal, hide" and, sometimes, another word *coill* "wood, forest", was brought in to help along the explanation. Consequently, the Celts are the "sequestered people or woodlanders", a Celt "one that abideth in a covert, or an inhabitant of the wood." This groundless assumption that the word *Celt* is related to *celim* was for a long time a favorite one and has found its way into most of our dictionaries of the English language.

There is considerable difference of opinion whether the word *Celt* should be (1) spelled with a *c* and pronounced with



an *s*, or (2) spelled and pronounced with a *k*, or (3) spelled with a *c* but pronounced with a *k*. There are none, it seem, who would spell it with a *k* but pronounce it with an *s*. The following reasons may be offered in favor of the first of these spellings and pronunciations. *C* is to be preferred to *k* in the spelling of *Celt*, since, in the oldest Irish alphabet, the character *k* is found very rarely and exclusively in loan words and, besides, the word is spelled with a *c* in Latin and, as we might expect from its position before *e*, also in all the Romance languages; it is only in Greek that it is spelled with a *k*, and there is no reason why the Greek spelling should be followed when the word is written in English.

It is hardly necessary to say that the Celts themselves pronounced their name with a *k*, since it is contrary to the genius of the Celtic languages, as it is of the Greek, Latin and German, to pronounce the *c* as *s*. But, we are not to conclude that English speakers in pronouncing *Kelt* are reproducing the exact sound that the *c* before *e* has in Modern-Irish, for example. There is a very large difference of articulation between the two sounds. In the English pronunciation of the word the contact is made much farther back on the palate, while in Irish it is pronounced in very much the same position as English speakers give to the initial sound in the word *kin*, the sound which is often represented phonetically *k*. This difference is not only proved by a study of the English and Irish pronunciation of the initial consonant in this word with the aid of the artificial palate, but it is easily sensible through the ear.

It may be said by the defenders of the pronunciation *k* that to give the "hard" sound to the letter *c* would help to differentiate our word from *celt* "a stone chisel", pronounced *selt*. But, by so doing, we should be adding to the *kelts*, viz. *kelt* (Scotch) "a salmon, sea-trout after spawning, foul fish", and *kelt* (Scotch and Northern dialects) "frieze, homespun cloth."

It has been objected to the pronunciation *selt(ik)* that the sibilant is not a pleasing sound; but, words do not stand or fall on the ground of euphony alone. And are *Keltism*, *Keltist*, *Keltology*, etc., really more euphonious than when

pronounced with an *s*? *Kelticist* and *Keltism* would, if left to themselves, tend to become *Celticist* etc., by anticipation of the following *s*-sound. We seldom, if ever, hear of a Pan-Keltic Congress or of *Keltia*. In Germany, the question *Celt* or *Kelt* is not settled, and we sometimes find the same scholars using now the one, now the other form. It would seem, however, that the choice depends some on the combination. Thus, for example, *Keltentum* and *Celtomanie* are more common than with *C* and *K* respectively. The titles of the two German periodicals in the very field that concerns us here, the *Zeitschrift für Celtische Philologie* and the *Archiv für Celtische Lexicographie*, may be adduced as testimony in favor of the *C*-form, and we may hold the view of the majority of German scholars, differing with Leibnitz, *o. c.* "*Celtas, vel (ut promuntiari deberet) Keltas,*" that the word is in the same class with *Cypern*, *Cyclus* and *Macedonien* and its *c* should be pronounced *ts*.

It cannot be objected to this conclusion that the native name of the British Celts, *Cymry* and the adjective *Cymric*, are always pronounced with a *k*. The initial consonant in these words, whether spelled with a *C* or a *K* (preferably with the former, though both letters are used indifferently in early Welsh manuscripts) should always be pronounced "hard" because of its position before a "broad" vowel. The word *Cymry* is genuinely Celtic and postulates a \**Cambroges*, "the compatriots, or men of the same country."

According to the Dictionary of the Philological Society, the first instance cited of the word *Celt* in English dates from the year 1607, and the first citation of the word *Celtic* is from the year 1656. In this Dictionary, which represents the most recent and highest scholarship applied to lexicography, a decided preference is given to the spelling *C* and the pronunciation *s* of *Celt*, *Celtic* and their derivatives, celtified, celtish, celtism, celtist, celtization, celtically, celtican, celticism, celtivist, celticity, celticize, celtologist, celtology, celtologue, celtomanie, celtophile, celto-Roman, etc.

One of the strongest arguments for this pronunciation is that the word *Celt* has become as thoroughly anglicized as *Cæsar* and *Cicero*. Whatever may have been the origin of the

word, it undoubtedly entered English from the French *Celte*, which, itself, had developed out of the Latin *Celta*. The analogy of the large number of other words beginning with *c* followed by *e* or *i* which English has taken from the French, of such Greek and Latin proper names as *Circe*, *Ceres*, *Cephissus*, *Cerberus*, *Alcibiades*, and even of Gaulish names as *Cingetorix*, *Vercingetorix*, in all of which it is customary, if one wishes to avoid being pedantic, to pronounce the letter *c* as *s*, is strong enough to carry the word *Celt* with them.

The remainder of this article will consist of a rather literal translation of those passages from the works of the Greek and Latin authors, glossaries, inscriptions and coins, ranging from the earliest times to the end of the Merovingian period (middle of the eighth century) in which the word *Celt* or any of its derivatives is found. The translation will be confined to these detached sentences in the order and extent in which they are cited by Dr. Alf. Holder in his epoch-making "Thesaurus of Old-Celtic" (*Alt-Celtischer Sprachschatz*, Leipzig, 1904 and fol.) cols. 888-977.

*Herodotus*, II, 33 (written between 445 and 443 B. C.): The river Ister (the Danube) rises in the territory of the CELTS and near the city of Pyrene (*i. e.*, in the Pyrenees) and it divides Europe in its course. The CELTS, however, dwell beyond the pillars of Hercules and border on the lands of the Cynesii (*i. e.*, in southern Portugal), who are the last inhabitants of Europe to the westward. IV, 49 (written between 443 and 432 B. C.): For, the Ister flows across all Europe. It rises in the country of the CELTS, who are next to the Cynetae (another name for the Cynesii) and inhabit the remotest parts of western Europe; its course is across Europe and it empties at the borders of Scythia.

*Avienus, Ora Maritima*, 130-137 (based on sources of the end of the fifth century, B. C.): If one dared steer his boat from the Oestrymnides through the sea that lies in Lycaon's clime, where the air is crisp with cold, he would land on soil once settled by Ligures but now devoid of inhabitants; for, the CELTS in long and frequent wars laid waste the lands and expelled the Ligures. . . . (The

Celts were more intimately known in Hellas, from having served as mercenaries in the service of the tyrant Dionysius and other commanders.)

*Plato, De Legibus*, I, 9, p. 637, D. E.: It is not of drinking, or not drinking, wine at all that I am speaking, but of drunkenness. The question is whether it is better to follow the custom of the Scythians, and Persians, and Carthaginians, and CELTS, and Iberians, and Thracians, who are all warlike people, than to follow your own custom (From this it would appear that Plato was familiar with the Celtic and Iberian troops in the pay of the Syracusans).

*Xenophon, Hellenica*, VII, 1, 20 (speaking of Celtic mercenaries in the service of the tyrant Dionysius, 369, B. C.): Triremes which carried CELTS, Iberians and about fifty horsemen. 31: When, then, Archidamus led them on, those few of the enemy who received their attack at the point of the spear, were killed; but as the rest fled they fell, some by the hands of horsemen, others by the CELTS.

*Scylax, Periplus*, 18 (here for the first time, about 356 B. C., the Gauls in Cisalpina are mentioned under the name of Celts): After the Tyrrheni, come the CELTS, who were left behind on an expedition (*i. e.*, the remnants of a Gaulish invasion); they extend on the narrow part as far as Adria which is at the inmost recess of the Adriatic. 19: After the CELTS, come the Veneti, in whose territory is the Eridanus (the Po).

*Ephorus*, 4 fr. 38 M: The region of the westerly wind and the setting sun is inhabited by the CELTS, while the Scythians occupy the region of the north wind and the bear. These (four) parts are not, however, of equal magnitude, for the territory of the Scythians and the Ethiopians is greater than that of the Indians and the CELTS, but each is of about the same size as the corresponding part of the other group. For, the Indians dwell between the summer and the winter rising sun, while the CELTS posses the territory from the summer to the winter setting sun, and thus the adjoining parts are of unequal size and the opposite parts are of the same size.

*Theopompus*, fr. 223 M (quoted by Stephanus Byzantinus):

Drilonios is a large city and the most distant of the CELTS.

*Aristotle, Meteorologica*, I, 13, p. 350<sup>b</sup> 2: The Ister and the Tartarus have their source in the Pyrenees which is a mountain towards the equinoctial west, in CELTICA—*Historia animalium*: VIII, 28, p. 606<sup>b</sup> 2-5: And in many places this difference is to be attributed to the climate. Thus, for example, in Illyria, Thrace and Epirus, the asses are small, but in Scythia and CELTICA no asses are born; for the cold in those countries is very severe—*De anim. generatione*, II, 8, p. 748, 22-26: Then again, the ass is a cold animal; hence, because it is naturally impatient of the cold, it cannot be raised in cold regions, as, for example, in Scythia and the neighboring lands, nor among the CELTS, who dwell beyond Spain; for that country, too, is cold—*Nicomachean Ethics*, III, 10 p. 1115<sup>b</sup> 26-29: He, however, is either insane, or has no sense of pain, who fears nothing, neither earthquakes nor floods, as it is said is the case with the CELTS.

*Eudemus of Rhodes, Ethics*, III, 1, 25 p. 1229<sup>b</sup> 25-30: Hence, we are not to conclude that he who endures terrible things through ignorance is a brave man, as if one were to expose himself in insanity to thunder and lightning. Nor is he a wise man who, knowing the danger, exposes himself to it, in consequence of anger, as the CELTS, who take up arms and attack the sea-waves. Generally speaking, barbaric bravery is accompanied with anger.

*Aristotle, Politics*, II, 9, p. 1269<sup>b</sup> 23-27: So that, of necessity, in such a state wealth is highly valued, especially if the citizens are governed by their wives, as is the case with all military and warlike nations, except the CELTS and a few others who openly approve of pederasty. VII, 2, p. 1324<sup>b</sup> 9-12: Moreover, in all nations that are able to gratify their ambition, military power is held in esteem, for example among the Scythians, and Persians, and Thracians, and CELTS. 17, p. 1336<sup>a</sup> 15-18: Hence, many barbarian peoples have a custom of plunging their infants in a cold stream; others, as the CELTS, clothe them in a light garment only—*Fragments*, 30 (35 Rose), quoted by Diogenes

Laertius (about 200 A. D.), I, 1: Some say that the profession of philosophy began among the barbarians. For, Aristotle in his work on "Magic" and Sotion (about 200 B. C.), in the twenty-third book of his (lost) "Succession of the Philosophers," say that the Persians had their interpreters of dreams, the Babylonians or Assyrians their astrologers, the Indians their naked philosophers, and the CELTS and Galates what they called druids and *Σεμνό-θεοι*. *Fragments*, 564, quoted by Stephanus Byzantinus, s. v. *Γέρμαρα*: Germara, a tribe in CELTICA who do not see the day, as Aristotle tells us in his *De Mirabilibus*. *Fragments*, 568 (610 Rose), quoted in Plutarch's *Camillus*. 22: The philosopher Aristotle appears to have heard a clear account of the capture of Rome by the CELTS, but he says that it was saved by Lucius; the deliverer of the city was not Lucius, but Marcus Camillus.

*Pseudo-Aristotle, De mirabilibus auscultationibus*, 50, p. 834<sup>a</sup> 6 = *Fragments*, 248, 9 p. 1524<sup>a</sup> 22 ff: It is said that CELTIC tin is melted down much more quickly than lead. 85, p. 837<sup>a</sup> 7-11: It is said that there is a certain road, called the 'Herculean,' which extends from Italy as far as CELTICA, the CELTO-Ligurians and the Iberians, and that any Greek or native travelling that road is protected by those who dwell along it, so that no harm shall be done him, and if any should be done, the penalty is paid by those in whose territory the wrong was committed. 86, p. 837<sup>a</sup> 12-23: It is said that the CELTS possess a poison to which they have given the name 'toxicon,' and it is said that this poison causes death so quickly that when the CELTIC huntsmen have shot a deer or other animal they run up to it and quickly cut away from the body the wounded flesh before the poison has time to penetrate, both to save the food and to keep the carcass from putrifying. They say that an antidote has been found for this poison in oak bark, but, according to others, the antidote is a certain leaf which they call *χοράκιον*, so called because it has been observed that when a crow has tasted of the poison, and feels the evil effects of it, it makes at once for that leaf, and, as soon as it has swallowed some of it, it is relieved of the pain.



*Ptolemaeus Lagida, Historia Alexandri*, fr. 2, p. 87 M (*ad a.* 336): the CELTS who live at Adria.

*Anyte* (a. 280-78), in *Anthologia Palatina*, 7, 492: We have departed, Miletus, our dear native land, three maidens, thy countrywomen, since we repulsed the lawless passion of the impious Galates (the Gauls in Asia Minor), and the mighty Mars of the CELTS has driven us to this death. (Compare Hieronymus, *Against Jovinianus*, I, 41, Opp. ed. Vall. Ven. 2 c. 308 E-309 A: Could any one pass over in silence the seven virgins of Miletus, who, when the Gauls were laying waste everything far and wide, that they might suffer no outrage at the hands of the enemy, escaped disgrace by death?)

*Callimachus, Hymn to Delos*, 171-175 (after the year 272 A. D.): Hereafter shall a common contest arise for us, when those latest born Titans from the extremest west shall raise their barbarous sword and their CELTIC god of war over the realm of Greece and hurl themselves (upon her) (Compare Pausanias, I, 7, 2).

Since the second century, B. C., the Celts find a place beside the Ligures in the legend of the Argonauts.

*Apollonius of Rhodes, Argonautics*, IV, 601-612: And round about, the unhappy daughters of the Sun, entwined with slender poplars, weep a plaintive lamentation, and the shining tears of amber trickle from their eyes and some, falling on the sand, dry in the sun. But, when the blast of the loud-sounding wind dashes the dark sea-waters high on the bank, the amber tears all flow together into Eridanus' waves in a swelling stream. The CELTS, however, have a legend that the tears which are whirled along in eddies are those that Leto's son, Apollo, shed without number when he came to live among the sacred Hyperboreans. 633-634: (Waters) which spread over the vast marvellous land of the CELTS. 641 ff: Journeying among countless tribes of CELTS and Ligures.

*Apollodorus*, I, c. 9, § 24, 5: Accordingly, the Argonauts sailed past the tribes of Ligures and CELTS, and were borne through the Sardinian sea, skirting Tyrrhenia until they arrived at Aea, where, as suppliants, they were purified by Circe.

*Polybius* uses the word *Γαλάται* only when his source of information are Roman writers. When referring to the west, he uses the names Celts and Galates without difference of meaning, and, according to him, there are only Galates, no Celts, along the Danube. I, 6, 4: The Romans waged war on the Etruscans, then on the CELTS, and next on the Samnites. 6: The Romans, having reduced the Etruscans and the Samnites to submission, and having worsted the CELTS in Italy in many battles . . . Having become thoroughly expert in the art of war from their contests with the Samnites and the CELTS . . . All the tribes inhabiting Italy, except the CELTS, were made subject to them (*a. u.* 484). 13, 4: The first expedition of the Romans into Illyria and these (eastern) parts of Europe, as well as their struggles against the CELTS in Italy, took place at about the same time. 17, 4: Accordingly, the Carthaginians levied mercenaries from over sea, many Ligures and CELTS and a still larger number of Iberians, and despatched them all to Sicily. 43, 4 (speaking of the mercenaries in the Carthaginian army): He at once commissioned some officers accompanied by Hannibal to go to the CELTS . . . he sent Alexon to fetch the other mercenaries. 67, 7: In the army were Iberians and CELTS, some Ligures and some from the Balearic Islands, and not a few half-breed Greeks. II, 13, 5: The Romans did not venture, however, at that time to impose conditions or make war on the Carthaginians, because of their fear of the CELTS, who were threatening their own affairs, and because they almost daily expected an attack from them. 6: And so they determined, by pacifying and mollifying Hasdrubal, to attack the CELTS and try conclusions with them, for they were convinced that, so long as they had such men on their flanks, not only would they be unable to keep their control over the tribes in Italy, but even to reckon on safety in their own country. 7: Accordingly, they at once despatched envoys to Hasdrubal with whom they concluded a treaty by which the Carthaginians, without saying anything of the rest of Iberia, engaged not to cross in arms the river that is called Iber. Then the Romans,

without delay, pushed on the war against the CELTS in Italy. 17, 3: The chief intercourse of the Etruscans was with the CELTS, who were their neighbors, and who, envying them the beauty of their lands, took some slight pretext to gather a large army and drive the Etruscans from the valley of the Po (424 B. C), which they themselves at once took possession of. 4: First, the country lying near the source of the Po was held by the Laiui and the Lebecii; after then, the Insubres settled in the country; they were the largest of those tribes, and, next them, along the river, dwelt the Cenomani. 5: The district along the shores of the Adriatic was occupied by another very ancient tribe called Veneti, in customs and dress not much unlike the CELTS, but using a quite different language, 6: about whom the tragic writers have written much and told many wonderful tales. 7: On the other (south) side of the Po, in the Apennine district, first come the Anares and, next them, the Boii settled. After them, towards the Adriatic, come the Lingones, and the last places, the country on the sea-coast is occupied by the Senones. 8-12: These are the most important tribes occupying the above mentioned districts; (9) they lived in unwalled villages and had no permanent buildings; they lived simple lives, made their beds of straw, fed on meat, and followed no pursuits but those of war and farming, without being acquainted with any other science or art whatever. Each man's property, moreover, consisted of flocks and herds and gold, as these were the only things that could easily be carried about at times of difficulty and removed from one place to another as their fancy directed. They made a great point of friendship, for the man who had the largest number of attendants and companions they regarded as the most powerful and formidable among them. 18, 1-4: At first, they did not merely take possession of the territory, but made many of the neighboring peoples subject to them, terrifying them by their recklessness and boldness. Some time afterwards (*a. u.* 364), having defeated the Romans in battle and those who, after the Romans, opposed them, they pursued the fugi-

tives and, in three days after the battle, occupied Rome itself with the exception of the Capitol. But it happened that war broke out between them and the Veneti who were invading their country. Accordingly, they made terms with the Romans to whom they handed over the city and returned to their own country. Subsequently, they were occupied with wars at home. Some of their tribes who lived on the Alps and saw with envy the rich possessions of others were continually gathering their forces and making raids upon them. 6 ff: When, again, thirty years after the taking of the city (*a. u.* 393), the CELTS advanced with a large army as far as Alba, the Romans, surprised by the unexpectedness of the attack and unable to collect their allies' forces, did not venture to lead their legions against them. But when, twelve years later, they invaded in great force, the Romans had become aware of their approach, and, having mustered their allies, they marched out in great spirit, being eager to engage them and make a final desperate attempt. But the Galates, etc. 22, 8: The CELTS had not yet set out from their country. 10: The Romans were anxious to first settle the trouble with the CELTS. 11: Then, with one accord, they gave their attention to the war with the CELTS, convinced that it was to their advantage to come to a decision with them. 23 (*a. u.* 529), 3-5: The kings of the CELTS were obliged to leave behind a portion of their forces to guard their territory, because of their fear of those tribes (the Veneti and Cenomani). They themselves with their main army struck camp and set out boldly, making their march through Etruria, their force consisting of about 50,000 foot, and twenty thousand horse and chariots. As soon as the Romans heard that the CELTS had crossed the Alps, etc. 25, 1: Having made their way into Etruria, the CELTS began their march through the country, devastating fearlessly and without opposition; finally, they took up their march to Rome. 5: The CELTS lit their watch fires and left their cavalry in camp. 7: (The Romans) believed the CELTS had fled. 8: The CELTS rose from their position and fell upon them (the Romans). The struggle was at

first fierce on both sides. 9: At length, the CELTS won by superior courage. 10: The first desire of the CELTS was to besiege them. 26, 1: (Lucius Aemilius) having been informed that the CELTS had entered Etruria and were drawing near Rome. 27, 2 ff: When the CELTS had reached Telamon in Etruria, some of their foragers fell in with the advance guard of Gaius and were made prisoners. Under examination by the commander they furnished precise information as to what had taken place; they informed him, besides, that both armies were in the neighborhood, that the CELTS were close at hand, and Lucius' forces hard upon their rear. 4: The CELTS (cut off by the two hostile armies) were left on the road. 5: Under which (ridge) the CELTS had to march. 6-8: At first, the CELTS, unaware of the presence of Atilius' forces, but supposing from what was taking that the cavalry of Aemilius had marched around them in the night, and were preoccupying the vantage points, immediately despatched their cavalry and some of their light infantry to contend with them for the possession of places along the eminence. But they soon learned from a prisoner who was brought in of the presence of Gaius, and then they hurriedly drew up their infantry so as to face two opposite ways, some towards the rear and others towards the front. For they knew that one army was pursuing them, and, judging from the intelligence which had reached them and from what was actually taking place, they expected that they would have to encounter another on their front. 28, 3-6: The CELTS, however, stationed on their rear the Alpine tribe called Gaesatae to oppose the enemy from that point where they expected the attack of Aemilius' force, and, behind them, the Insubres; on their front they placed the Taurisci, and the Boii who dwell south of the Po to hold the position opposite that just mentioned, and to await the attack of Gaius. Their waggons and chariots they placed on the extremity of either wing, while the booty was gathered together and placed under a guard on one of the adjacent hills. The result was that the army of the CELTS was double-faced and their arrangement not only

effective but also calculated to inspire terror. 10: And Gaius' head was brought to the king of the CELTS 29, 2: Whether the CELTS occupied the most dangerous position. 5-8: The ornaments and clamor of the CELTS terrified them (the Romans). For they had innumerable horns and trumpets, and with these and the shouting of their entire army they made so great and loud a noise, that it seemed that not only the trumpets and voices but even the nearby hills, resounded and gave forth cries. Not less astounding was the appearance and rapid movement of the naked warriors who were in the front of the army, men in the prime of youth and beauty. And all the warriors in the front ranks were richly adorned with golden bracelets and armlets. 30, 1 f: The CELTS in the inner ranks found their cloaks and breeches of great service, but the naked warriors in the front were in great difficulty and distress because of this unexpected mode of attack (of the Romans). 9: The infantry of the CELTS were cut to pieces on the field of battle, and their horse turned in flight. 31, 1 f: Forty thousand CELTS were slain and no fewer than ten thousand were taken prisoners, among whom was one of their kings, Concolitanus. The other king, Aneroestus, fled with a few followers to a certain place where he put an end to his own life and that of his relatives. 7: In this way the most important invasion of the CELTS was repelled. 8: The Romans hoped to be able to entirely expel the CELTS from the country along the Po, and, accordingly, great preparations were made and the appointed consuls, Quintus Fulvius and Titus Manlius were sent out with their legions against the CELTS (*a. u.* 530). 32, 1: Publius Furius and Gaius Flaminius again invaded CELTICA (*a. u.* 531), marching through the lands of the Anares, who dwell not far from Marseilles. 7: The Romans determined to avail themselves of the forces of the allied CELTS. 9: Finally, they themselves (the Romans) remained behind on this side of the river, and sending the CELTS who were with them to the other side, they pulled up the bridges over the stream. 33, 4: They attacked the CELTS full in front in regular battle. 5: They made the CELTS help-



less, by preventing them from fighting with broadswords. 34, 1: The next year (*a. u.* 532), embassies came from the CELTS seeking peace and promising to do everything, etc. 7: When the CELTS heard of the presence of the enemy, they raised the siege and came out to meet them and give battle. 15: The CELTS, encouraged by their success held their ground courageously, but after a while, they turned and fled to the mountainous districts. 35, 2: In this way, the war with the CELTS came to an end. 36, 1 (*a. u.* 533): Hasdrubal was assassinated, one night, in his own lodgings by a certain CELT for some private wrong. III, 2, 6: Acquiring a supremacy over the Iberians and the CELTS. 34, 1: Hannibal waited for the messengers who had been sent to him from the CELTS. 4: He took care to send messengers with unlimited promises to the chiefs of the CELTS, whether dwelling south of the Alps or actually in the mountains. 5-6: To reach the places just mentioned and to avail himself of the support and co-operation of the CELTS in the proposed undertaking. His messengers returned with the news that the CELTS were willing and expecting him, and that the passage of the Alps, though exceedingly difficult and toilsome, etc. 8: He hinted at the fertility of the country to which they (Hannibal's soldiers) would come and the good will and active alliance of the CELTS. 37, 9: The country around Narbonne and thence as far as the Pyrenees already mentioned, is the district which the CELTS possess. 39, 4: From the Pyrenees, which separate the Iberians from the CELTS. 40, 1: Hannibal, greatly alarmed at the impregnable positions occupied by the CELTS. 41, 1: Such was the state of affairs concerning the CELTS from the beginning until the arrival of Hannibal among them. 6 ff: Owing to the unevenness of the country and the number of tribes of CELTS intervening. But, contrary to expectations, Hannibal won over the CELTS, partly by bribes and partly by force. 9: Joining with them as leaders and supports some CELTS (= Livy's "Gaulish auxiliaries," XXI, 26, 5), who happened to be serving as mercenaries among the Marseillais. 43, 12: While the CELTS, both by reason

of their disorder and the unexpectedness of what had taken place, turned and were put to flight. 44, 9: When the CELTS had spoken thus, they withdrew. 45, 2: The Romans and the CELTS lost a hundred and forty horsemen. 47, 3: The Rhone flows, for the most part, through a deep valley, where, to the north, live the Ardues (*sic.* Read, Aedui) a CELTIC tribe, while it is walled in on the south by the northern slopes of the Alps. 48, 6: For, they (some historians) do not tell that not only once or twice before Hannibal came, but in very recent times, the CELTS who lived along the Rhone crossed the Alps with numerous forces and fought battles with the Romans who were allied with the CELTS occupying the plains along the Po. 60, 11: According to their original purpose, the remaining mass of CELTS inhabiting these plains (of the Po) were anxious to join the Carthaginians. 12: And some of them (the Celts) were even compelled to serve with the Romans. 66, 7: For, no sooner had he (Hannibal) gained the advantage than all the CELTS in the vicinity hastened, according to their original engagement, to proclaim themselves his friends, to furnish him with provisions and to join the Carthaginian army. 67, 1: While the CELTS who were serving in the Roman army, seeing that the prospect of the Carthaginians looked the brighter, conspired and set upon a time for carrying out their plans, waiting in their several tents, etc. 8: The CELTS in the neighborhood had long been unfavorably disposed towards them (the Romans). 68, 8: While the numerous CELTS who inhabited the plains, excited by the good prospects of the Carthaginians, provided their army with supplies in abundance and were ready to take part with Hannibal's troops in every undertaking and danger. 10: They (the Romans) attributed it (their defeat) to the treacherous neglect on the part of the CELTS, which they concluded from their recent revolt. 69, 5-7: But afterwards, Hannibal found out that certain CELTS who lived between the Po and the Trebbia were sending messages to the Romans, believing that in this way they would secure safety for themselves from both sides. He accordingly despatched

two thousand infantry and a thousand CELTIC and Numidian cavalry with orders to devastate their country. This order was executed and the Romans took possession of great booty; then, straitway, the CELTS appeared at the Roman palisade beseeching their aid. 9: The CELTS and Numidians fled and found a place of safety in their own camp. 11: After that skirmish, the CELTS again retreated and sought the protection of their own camp. 70, 4: When the CELTS would be idle and forced to remain inactive, their fickleness would not allow them to remain faithful to the Carthaginians, but they would turn against them once more. 9: Hannibal, wishing to avail himself first of the fresh spirit of the CELTS. 71, 2: Because the CELTS invariably set their ambuscades in such places (*i. e.*, in the woods). 72, 8 f.: Hannibal drew up his infantry, consisting of about twenty thousand Iberians, CELTS and Libyans, in one long line, while the cavalry, amounting to more than ten thousand, including the CELTIC allies, he divided and stationed on either wing. 74, 4: Those in the front ranks, hard pressed, defeated the CELTS and a division of the Libyans, and, after killing a large number of them, broke through the Carthaginian line. 10: For, it happened that the loss of the Iberians and Libyans had been slight, the heaviest having fallen on the CELTS. 75, 2: All the CELTS had gone over to their (the Carthaginian) side. 77, 3: Hannibal went into winter quarters in CELTICA. 78, 2: The lawlessness of the CELTS, who were restless and contentious. 5: Seeing that the CELTS were discontented at the length of time that the war dragged on within their borders, and were eagerly anxious for an engagement, on the pretence of hatred for Rome, but, much more from hopes of booty. 79, 3 ff: Behind these he (Hannibal) placed the CELTS, and last of all the cavalry. He entrusted the charge of the rear guard to his brother Mago, that he might see to the security of all, but especially to watch the impatience of the CELTS and their aversion to hard labor, in order that, if they should show a lack of endurance and should attempt to turn back, he might check them by means of the cavalry and force

them on. 6-8: But the CELTS suffered greatly on their march through the deep marshes which had been disturbed and trampled on, and, unaccustomed to all such pain and toil, they bore the fatigue with impatience and were soon exhausted, while they were prevented from turning back by the cavalry in their rear. All, however, suffered severely, especially because they had had no sleep for four continuous nights and three days while they marched over a road that was under water. But the CELTS suffered most of all and lost most men. 83, 4: Hannibal, by a *détour*, deployed his cavalry and CELTS into one line under cover of the hills on the left. 84, 6: Flaminius fell in with a company of CELTS and was killed. 85, 5: In all, fifteen hundred were killed, most of whom were CELTS. 93, 10: The Iberians and CELTS bringing up the rear. 106, 6: The Senate sent the Praetor, Lucius Postumius, as commander of a legion into Galatia (= Gallia Cisalpina), with instructions to affect a diversion with the CELTS who were campaigning with Hannibal. 113, 7 (*a. u.* 536): Close to the river, on his left wing, he (Hannibal) stationed the Iberian and CELTIC horse opposite the Roman cavalry; and, next to them, half the heavy-armed Libyan infantry; and, next in order, the Iberian and CELTIC foot. 8: He advanced with the central brigade of Iberians and CELTS. 9: He aimed to engage first with the Iberians and CELTS. 114, 2: The shields of the Iberians and CELTS were about the same size, but they were differently arranged. 4: Of the naked CELTS. 115, 2: But, as soon as the Iberian and CELTIC cavalry on the left got at the Romans. 5: For a short time, the lines of Iberians and CELTS held their ground and fought the Romans gallantly. 6: The CELTS had been drawn up in a thin line. 7: For, the centre, where the CELTS had been stationed on the arc of the crescent, advanced much before the wings, the curve of the crescent being towards the enemy. 11: As the Romans were pursuing the CELTS. 117, 6: Of those who fell on Hannibal's side, four thousand were CELTS. 118, 6: It (the Roman army in Gaul) was utterly annihilated by the CELTS. VII, 9, 6: All the cities

and tribes in Italy, CELTIA (but in III, 59, 7 Polybius uses *Ialuria* to mean *Gallia omnis*) and Liguria with whom we are on friendly terms. 7: Of all the tribes and cities in Italy, CELTIA and Liguria. VIII, 32, 1: He (Hannibal) detached two thousand CELTS, and, having divided them into three companies, he assigned two of the young men who were managing the affair to each company. 4: But he (Hannibal) directed the Carthaginian and CELTIC officers to kill all the Romans they met. 9: Some of them (the Romans) fell in with the Carthaginians, others with the CELTS. XI, 3, 1: The Romans slaughtered a number of the CELTS like victims as they lay asleep in their beds stupefied with drink. 3: In the battle, not less than ten thousand were killed, taking Carthaginians and CELTS together. 19, 4: For, Hannibal had (in his army) Libyans, Iberians, Ligurians, CELTS, Phoenicians, Italians and Greeks, who had naturally nothing in common, neither laws, nor customs, nor language. XII, 28<sup>a</sup>, 3 ff: At any rate, he (Timaeus) mentions the great expense and labor he went to in collecting records from Assyria and in enquiring closely into the customs of the Ligures, CELTS, and Iberians, so that he could not have himself expected to be believed in his account of them. One would like to ask the historian which of the two he thinks requires more expense and labor,—to remain at home and collect records and investigate the customs of the Ligurians and CELTS, or to obtain personal experience of all the tribes possible, and see with one's own eyes. XV, 11, 1 (*a. u.* 552): Hannibal placed the elephants, which numbered more than eighty, in the van of the whole army. Next, he stationed his mercenaries, of whom there were about twelve thousand, consisting of Ligurians, CELTS, Baliarians and Mauretani. XVIII (XVII), 11, 2: Because of fear of the CELTS. XXXIV, 10, 1: The rivers Illeberis and Ruscinus which flow past some cities of the same name inhabited by CELTS—*Fragments*, 20, p. 1390 (Hultsch) quoted by Suidas, *sub v.* ἐξισθενήτορας: The CELTS, seeing the Romans prepared to fight, and thinking that their bodies were so

weakened by hunger that they had chosen the quickest kind of death.

*Apollodorus, Chron.* 4, quoted by Stephanus Byzantinus, fr. 59 M: Aeria is a CELTIC city, as Apollodorus says in the IVth Book of his "Chronicles." 60: The Aedui were allies of the Romans in CELTIC Gaul, according to Apollodorus, "Chronicles," Bk. IV, 62: The Arverni, the most warlike tribes of the Galates of CELTICA. Apollodorus, in the IVth Book of his "Chronicles", speaks of the Arverni of the CELTS.

*Nicander*, quoted by Tertullian, *De Anima*, 57, p. 393, 17 R: For, the Nasamones consult private oracles by making prolonged visits to the tombs of their relatives, as is told by Heraclides, or Nymphodorus or Herodotus, and, as Nicander affirms, the CELTS, for the same purpose, pass the night at the tombs of their brave men.

*Eudoxus of Rhodes*, quoted by Apollonius, *Historia mirabil.* c. 24: Eudoxus of Rhodes, in his work on CELTICA, says that there is a certain people who do not see by day, but by night.

*Artemidorus*, quoted by Stephanus Byzantinus, p. 20, 7: The Agnotes are a tribe in CELTICA near the ocean, according to Artemidorus. p. 436, 18: Mastramela is a city and a marshy lake in CELTICA. Artemidorus in the "Epitome of the Eleven Books", p. 608, 6: Tauroeis, is a CELTIC colony of the Marseillais (of the Phocaeans. cf. Strabo, 4, p. 184). Artemidorus, in the 1st Book of his "Geography", says that it was a ship with the figure-head of a bull that carried over the founders of the city who were castaways from the fleet of the Phocaeans, and, having reached that place, they called their city after the ensign of the ship, the nation Tauroentii.

*Pseudo-Scymnus of Chios*, 165-169: (Tartessus), a famous city, produces tin which is carried down the river from CELTICA, and gold and copper in abundance. Then comes the land called CELTICA extending as far as the sea that lies near Sardinia, and this is the largest nation towards the west. 173 f: That region that extends from the west wind to the summer setting-sun the CELTS inhabit, but that to the



north, the Scythians. 176-177: The CELTS, on the other hand, dwell beneath the equinoctial and summer setting-sun, as they say. 183-195: The CELTS practice the Grecian manners, having friendly relations with the Greeks through those who have dwelt abroad and enjoyed their hospitality. They conduct their assemblies with music, which they cultivate as a means to civilization (*cf.* Diodorus II, 47, 2: This god (Apollo) they (the Hyperboreans) sing the praises of continually during the day in hymns, and they honor him especially. 4: They have a language of their own and are most friendly disposed towards the Greeks). At the very end of their region stands the so-called North Pole, which is very high and raises its head over the waving ocean. The lands nearest the Pole are occupied by those CELTS who are furthest away, the Enetoi, descendants of the Istrians, who extend inland as far as the Adriatic. It is said that it is thence that the Ister begins its course. 777: The Ister is doubtless known as far as CELTICA.

*Parthenius eroticus*, 8: (Aristodemus of Nysa tells the story in the 1st Book of his "Histories," except that he changes the names, calling Herippe, Euthymia, and the barbarian Cavarus). At the time when the Galates were making their incursions into Ionia and were laying waste the cities, the festival of the Thesmophoria was being celebrated in Miletus and the women had gathered together in the temple which was removed some little distance from the city. A band which had broken from the barbarian army reached Miletus and by a sudden attack seized the women, some of whom were at once ransomed for large sums of silver and gold, but the others, whom the barbarians claimed as their own, were carried off, and amongst them was Herippe, wife of Xantus, a man of the highest character and of the noblest family in Miletus; and she left behind a boy two years old. Now, Xantus felt much sorrow at her loss, and having converted a large portion of his wealth into gold, he took two thousand pieces of gold with him and went first to Italy, whence he was accompanied by certain friends to Marseilles and thence to

CELTICA. When he had come to the house where his wife was living with the man who happened to be one of the most highly esteemed among the CELTS, he asked to be entertained and, without hesitation, he was received most hospitably. As he went in, he saw his wife, and she threw her arms about him and embraced him lovingly. As soon as the CELT appeared, Herippe related to him her husband's wanderings, and that he had come to pay a ransom for her release. The barbarian admired Xantus' spirit, and at once, calling together his nearest relatives, he prepared a party and received him as his guest. While they drank, he made the woman sit on the same couch with her husband at the table and asked, through an interpreter, what sum of money had been gathered together; when he said that he had about a thousand pieces of gold, the barbarian ordered the sum to be divided into four portions, and three of them to be put aside for Xantus, his wife and his child, and to leave the remainder as the ransom for the woman. When they had gone to rest, Herippe found much fault with her husband because he had not the amount of gold that he had promised the barbarian, and she said that he would be in danger of his life if he failed to stand by his promise. But Xantus replied that he had hidden away in his servant's boots another thousand pieces, since he had not expected to find any barbarian so just but that he would have need of a heavy ransom. The next day, the woman made known to the CELT the great amount of gold, and urged him to put Xantus to death, saying that she much preferred him to her country and her son, and that she utterly loathed Xantus. This talk did not please the barbarian, and he had a mind to punish her. As Xantus was ready to depart, the CELT accompanied him in the friendliest way and conducted Herippe. When they reached the borders of the country of the CELTS, the barbarian said that he wished to offer sacrifice before they separated, and the victim having been brought up, he bade Herippe assist, and when she had taken hold, as she was accustomed to do on such occasions, he drew his sword and struck her

and cut off her head, and he asked Xantus not bear him any ill, telling him of her treachery, and he handed over to him all the gold to take with him. 30: It is told how Hercules, when he was driving Geryon's oxen from Erytheia, wandered across the country of the CELTS. And he reached Bretannus, whose daughter CELTINE fell in love with Hercules. She hid his cattle and refused to give them up, unless he would first consent to be united with her. Hercules, eager to recover the oxen, but much more because he was struck by the girl's beauty, consented, and, in the course of time, a son was born to them named CELTUS, from whom we are to suppose the CELTS are called. (cf. Herodotus, IV, 8-10.)

*Scholiast, Homer, Odyssey*, 208: When he (Phaethon) fell with the divine flash on Eridanus' stream and was destroyed, his sisters, who were near at hand near the CELTIC sea, bewailed him unceasingly night and day.

*Eustathius, to Homer, Iliad*, Z, 219, p. 1139, 57 (according to Mommsen this passage is probably from Poseidonius): The third (trumpet), that of the Galates, is formed by casting . . . it has a sharp sound, and is called *ἀόρυξ* by the CELTS.

*Cæsar, Gallic War*, I, 1, 1: All Gaul is divided into three parts, of which the Belgæ inhabit one, the Aquitani the other, and the third is inhabited by those who, in their own language are called CELTS, in ours (*scil.* the Roman) Gauls. 2: All these differ from each other in language, customs and laws. The Garonne separates the Gauls from the Aquitani, while the Marne and the Seine separate them from the Belgæ.

*Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo*, 3, p. 398<sup>b</sup> 8-14: Then, little by little, beyond the Scythians and CELTICA, the ocean holds together the inhabited world at the Galatic gulf and the columns of Hercules which we have already spoken of. Outside these pillars, the ocean flows around the earth. Nevertheless, out in that ocean are situated two very vast islands called British, namely Albion and Ierne (Ireland), larger than any we have yet described, lying beyond the CELTS.

*Crinagoras, Anthologia Palatina*, 9, 283, 1-4: Ye Pyrenees, and ye deep-valled Alps which face the mouth of the Rhine, ye were witnesses of the rays which Germanicus flashed, lightening many battles for the CELTS.

*Diodorus*, I, 4, 7: Up to the beginning of the war between the Romans and the CELTS, which was brought to a successful termination by Gaius Julius Cæsar who subdued most of the most warlike tribes of CELTS and who, because of his deeds, was proclaimed a god. 5, 1: And from the first Olympiad to the beginning of the CELTIC war, which I have made the end of my history, there are seven hundred and thirty years. II, 47, 1: Hecataeus and others say that in the ocean, on the other side of CELTICA, is an island that is not smaller than Sicily. IV, 19, 1: Hercules gave over the rule of the Iberians to the noblest of the country, and he himself with his army arrived in CELTICA, which he marched through and broke up the lawless practices of the natives, especially the murder of strangers. Because of the great multitude of men of all nations who willingly shared in his expedition, he founded a very great city, which, because of his many wanderings on this expedition, he called Alesia. 2: He allowed, also, many of the natives to settle in the city, and, since these soon became powerful through their number, the whole population became wild and barbarous. Even in our time, the CELTS regarded this city as the heart and metropolis of all CELTICA. It remained free and was never conquered until finally Gaius Julius Cæsar took it by storm and made it and all the CELTS subject to the Romans. 3: Hercules continued his journey from CELTICA to Italy, and, on his way across the Alps, he smoothed the roughness of the way and the impassable places, so that the road was practicable for armies and beasts of burden. 4: The wild tribes who inhabited the mountain, and who were in the habit of plundering and killing those who travelled through those impassable places, he subdued and the leaders of their lawlessness were put to death. Thus he (Hercules) made the way safe for future travellers. When he had crossed the Alps and the plains of what now is called Gaul, he con-

tinued his journey through Liguria. 56, 4 (from Timaeus): The CELTS who dwell by the ocean worship the Dioscuri most of all the gods. According to tradition handed down from ancient times, these gods came to them from the ocean. V, 24, 1: It is said that once there ruled in CELTICA a famous man, who had a daughter of uncommon stature and far surpassing others in beauty. So proud was she of her bodily strength and wonderful beauty, that she rejected the hand of every suitor, and believed that no one was worthy of her. 2: When Hercules came into CELTICA, after his expedition against Geryon, and built the city of Alesia therein, she saw him and wondered at his excellence and strength of body, and with all eagerness she agreed, with the consent of her parents, to a union with him. 3: She bore Hercules a son who was named Galates, etc. 25, 5: Many other navigable rivers flow through CELTICA, about which it would be too long to write. Most of these rivers freeze over and form natural bridges, but since the ice is extremely smooth and travellers are in danger of slipping on it, they strew straw on the ice and then there is no danger in crossing. 27, 4: There is a curious practice of the CELTS of the upper country in respect of the sacred precincts of their gods: in the temples and religious places which one finds scattered here and there in the land are piles of gold thrown on the ground and consecrated to the gods, and none of the natives dares touch it, because of their superstition, although the CELTS are exceedingly fond of money. 32, 1: It is necessary to make a distinction here that is not observed by many. Those who live above Marseilles in the interior and those who live on the Alps and this side of the Pyrenees are called CELTS; while those who live above this part of CELTICA, in the country towards the south (reading νότον; Niebuhr, however, reads ἄρκτον, the north) and along the coast and the Hercynian mountains, as well as all those who occupy the expanse as far as Scythia, are called Galates. (What follows is from Poseidonius). But the Romans have included all these nations under one general name, calling them all with-

out distinction Galates (Lat. *Galli*). 33, 1: Concerning the CELTS . . . The Iberians and the CELTS (*vd. sub Celt-iberes*, below). 38, 5: Much tin is also brought over from the island of Britain to the opposite coast of Gaul where merchants receive it and load their horses with it and bring it through the interior of CELTICA to the Marseillais and the city of Narbonne. XII, 26, 4 (*anno* 442 B. C.): There was peace besides among the peoples inhabiting Italy and CELTICA and Iberia and almost all the rest of the inhabited world. XIV, 113, 1: The CELTS who lived across the Alps, having passed in large bands through the defiles of the mountains, invaded the country situated between the Apennines and the Alps, and drove out the Etruscans who inhabited it. 3: The CELTS divided the land among themselves according to tribe, and those who were called Senones received as their part the most distant crest of the mountains along the sea. 4: The Roman Commons sent deputies into Etruria to make a careful examination of the movements of the CELTS. 6: As soon as the CELTS heard of the matter, they sent envoys to Rome to demand the surrender of the deputy who had unjustly begun hostilities. 7: To induce the envoys of the CELTS . . . 114, 1: The envoys of the CELTS having returned to their camp . . . (when the tribunes heard of) the approach of the CELTS . . . (informed of the approach) of the Galates . . . 3: But the CELTS were drawn up in a thin line and, whether by chance or by design, they had placed their best men on the hills. 4: At the same time, the trumpets on both sides gave the signal, and the armies, with loud shouts, came to close quarters. The picked men of the CELTS, who were opposed to the weakest of the Romans, drove them easily from the hills . . . 5: Their ranks were thrown into disorder and they fled, while the CELTS pressed them closely and struck them down . . . The CELTS cut down the hindmost. 115, 1: Although the CELTS had slaughtered so very many on the banks of the river, they did not stop in their eagerness for blood, but shot at those who were swimming, and, because of the crowds that were in the river and the great



number of missiles fired at them, they did not fail to reach their mark. 5 f: For, the first day (after the battle) the CELTS spent in cutting off the heads of the dead, according to their native custom. 116, 3: Because of the fact that the CELTS were encamped with heavy forces about the city. 4: To make a sortie against the CELTS. 5: But the CELTS noticed the fresh traces, which showed that some one had climbed up, and they decided to climb by the same rock during the night . . . and some of the CELTS succeeded in reaching the summit, etc. 117, 6: Those of the CELTS who had served in Iapygia, turned back through Roman territory, and, shortly after, they were ambushed by Cerians and completely destroyed on the Trausiun plain (*i. e.*, Pisaurum). XV, 70, 1: Two thousand CELTS and Iberians sailed from Sicily for Corinth; they had been sent by the tyrant Dionysius as auxiliaries for the Lacedemonians, with pay for five months. XVI, 73, 3: They (the Carthaginians) procured a large sum of money with which they levied Iberians, CELTS and Ligures as mercenaries. 94, 3 (Pausanias) with a CELTIC sword concealed under his garments. XX, 64, 2 (*anno* 307): Agathocles still had left six thousand Greeks and these with an equal number of CELTS, Samnites and Etruscans constituted his infantry. XXIII, 21 (*anno* 251 B. C.): But, since traders had brought to the camp a large quantity of wine, the CELTS became drunk and uproar and disorder spread among them. The Roman consul Caecilius attacked them suddenly and won a complete victory and took possession of sixty elephants which he sent to Rome, where they were an object of general wonder. XXV, 2, 2 (*a.* 241-237): The foreign troops who served in the Carthaginian army were Iberians, CELTS, men from the Balearic islands, Liby-Phoenicians, Ligurians and half-Greek slaves who had revolted. XXV, 9 (*a.* 238-230): The CELTS were many times more numerous than the rest and, highly conceited because of their strength and courage, they regarded the enemy with contempt. XXV, 10, 1 (*anno* 230): Hamilcar made war on the Iberians and Tartessians as well as on Istolatius, the general of the CELTS, and his brother. He

put them all to death, among them the two brothers and many other distinguished chiefs. XXV, 13 (*anno* 225): The CELTS, having united with the Galates for the war against the Romans, mustered a host of two hundred thousand men and won the first battle; they were victorious in the second assault also and killed one of the Roman consuls . . . Aemilius raided the territory of the Galates and the CELTS, and took possession of many cities and strongholds and filled Rome with their great spoils. Ch. 14 (*a.* 225): Hieron, king of Syracuse, provided the Romans with wheat during the CELTIC war. XXX, 21, 3: Alexander's character was far from being like that of Perseus. For, Alexander, by a magnanimity that was adapted to the greatness of his enterprises, gained an empire. But Perseus, by his pettiness, estranged the CELTS and, by other similar blunders, ruined a great and ancient kingdom.

*Strabo*, I, 1, 13, p. 7: In small distances, a little deviation north or south does not make much difference, but in the whole circle of the inhabited earth, the north extends to the utmost confines of Scythia or *CELTICA*. 17, p. 10: As in their (the Romans') war against the Germans and the CELTS, the barbarians took advantage of their position in marshes, woods and inaccessible deserts, deceiving the enemy, who were ignorant of the land, as to the location of different places, concealing the roads and the supplies of food and other necessities. 2, 27, p. 33: But, afterwards, becoming acquainted with these towards the west, they (the ancient Greeks) called them CELTS and Iberians, or by combining the names, *CELTIBERIANS* and *CELTOSCYTHIANS*, thus ignorantly uniting under one name various distinct peoples. 28, p. 34: Ephorus, in his treatise on Europe, likewise shows us the opinion of the ancients respecting Ethiopia. He says that if the celestial and terrestrial sphere were divided into four parts, the Indians would possess that towards the east, the Ethiopians that towards the south, the CELTS towards the west, and the Scythians towards the north. 4, 3, p. 63: The length of Britain itself is about the same as that of *CELTICA*, which

extends opposite to it. It is not greater than five thousand stadia in length, and its extremities are as far apart as those of the opposite continent . . . Pytheas says that Kent is some days' sail from *CELTICA*. 5, p. 64: . . . For all these (headlands and islands) lie to the north and belong to *CELTICA*, not to *Iberia*; this seems then to be only an invention of Pytheas. II, 1, 12, p. 71-72: Hipparchus states that the distance from *Byzantium* and the *Dnieper* is 3,700 stadia, and that there will be a like distance between *Marseilles* and the latitude of the *Dnieper*, which would be the latitude of that part of *CELTICA* next the ocean; for, on proceeding that many stadia, one reaches the ocean. 13, p. 72: There will remain a distance of 25,200 stadia from the parallel that separates the torrid from the temperate zone to that of the *Dnieper* and that part of *CELTICA* next the ocean. For, it is said that the farthest voyages now made from *CELTICA* northwards are to *Ierne* (*Ireland*), which lies beyond *Britain* and barely sustains life on account of its excessive cold. . . *Ierne* is supposed to be not more than 5,000 stadia distant from *CELTICA*, so that the whole breadth of the inhabited earth would be estimated at about 30,000 stadia, or a little more. 16, p. 73: Can one find such fertility as this (in the east) in the lands near the *Dnieper*, or in that part of *CELTICA* that lies next the ocean, where the vine either does not grow at all, or does not bring its fruit to perfection? P. 74: (To compare them with) those parts near the *Dnieper* and those districts inhabited by the most distant *CELT*s. For, they are not under so low a climate as *Amisus*, *Sinope*, *Byzantium* and *Marseilles*, which are generally held to be 3,700 stadia south of the *Dnieper* and *CELTICA*. 17, p. 74 (from Hipparchus): Consequently, they (*Bactria* and *Aria*) will be removed and placed 8,800 stadia north of the *Dnieper* and *CELTICA*; for this is the distance that the equator is south of the parallel of latitude which separates the torrid from the temperate zone, which, we say, is better drawn through the *Cinnamon* country. We have demonstrated that the regions that are not more than 5,000 stadia north of *CELTICA*, that is as far as *Ierne*,

are scarcely habitable. Their reasoning, however, would represent another habitable circle, even 3,800 stadia north of Ierne. P. 75: (That part of Bactriana next the Caucasus) 8,800 stadia north of *CELTICA* and the Dnieper. 18, p. 75: Hipparchus says that at the Dnieper and in *CELTICA* there is one continued dim sunlight during the whole of the summer nights from sunset to sunrise, but, at the winter solstice, the most the sun rises above the horizon is nine cubits. It is much more striking in regions distant 6,300 stadia from Marseilles (which region he supposes to be peopled by *CELTS*, but I believe they are Britons, and 2,500 stadia north of *CELTICA*). 41, p. 93: I shall only remark now that both Timosthenes and Eratosthenes, as well as those who preceded them, were quite ignorant of Iberia and *CELTICA*, and knew even a thousand times less about Germany, Britain and the country of the Getae and Bastarnae. II, 2, 1, p. 97: As if he (Polybius) were to arrange the zones according to the different nations inhabiting them, calling one the Ethiopian, another the Scythian and *CELTIC*, and a third the intermediate zone. 5, 8, p. 115: Navigators say that the longest passage by sea from *CELTICA* to Libya is, from the Galatic Gulf, 5,000 stadia. 19, p. 122: It (the Mediterranean) is bounded on the right hand by the shores of Libya as far as Carthage, and on the other by the shores of Iberia and *CELTICA* as far as Narbonne and Marseilles, thence by the Ligurian shore, and, finally, by the coast of Italy as far as the Strait of Sicily. 27, p. 127: The shape of Iberia resembles the hide of an ox, the parts corresponding to the neck projecting towards *CELTICA* which adjoins it. These are the eastern portions and on this side lies the chain of mountains called Pyrenees. 28, p. 128: Next this (Iberia) on the east is *CELTICA*, which extends as far as the Rhine. It is washed on its northern side by the whole course of the British channel, for this island (Britain) lies opposite and parallel to it throughout its length, which is as much as 5,000 stadia. It is bounded on the east by the river Rhine, whose course is parallel to the Pyrenees; its southern part is bounded by the Alps commencing from

the Rhine and by that part of our sea (the Mediterranean) where the so-called Galatic Gulf (of Lyons) extends, on which are situated the far-famed cities of Marseilles and Narbonne. Right opposite to this gulf, facing the other way, lies another gulf, likewise called Galatic (Bay of Biscay), looking towards the north and Britain. It is here that the breadth of *CELTICA* is narrowest; it contracts into an isthmus of less than 3,000 stadia, but more than 2,000. Within this region is a mountain-ridge at right angles to the Pyrenees, called Mount Cemmenus (Cevennes); it extends as far as the central plains of the *CELTIS*. The Alps, which are a very lofty range of mountains, form a curved line whose convex side is turned towards the above mentioned plains of *CELTICA* and Mount Cemmenus, and its concave side towards Liguria and Italy. Of the many tribes who inhabit this mountain range, all, with the exception of the Ligurians, are *CELTIC*. 30, p. 128: After Italy and *CELTICA*, the rest of Europe extends towards the east, and is divided into two parts by the Danube. III, 1, 3, p. 137: This range (the Pyrenees) extends in an unbroken line from south to north and divides *CELTICA* from Iberia. The breadth of both *CELTICA* and Iberia is irregular, the narrowest part in both being the strip of land along the Pyrenees from our sea (the Mediterranean) to the ocean, especially on either side of the mountain; this brings it about that there are gulfs both on the ocean side, and also on the side of the Mediterranean. The greatest of these bays are the *CELTIC*, which are also denominated the Galatic gulfs, and they make that isthmus (of Gaul) narrower than the Iberian. 2, 11, p. 148: The idea that the northern parts of Iberia are more accessible to *CELTICA*, than to proceed thither by sea, and other similar statements on the authority of Pytheas. III, 3, 7, p. 155: They make use of wooden (*ξύλινοις* Friedemann; *χηλίνους* 'plaited,' Meineke; *κηρίνοις* 'waxen,' codices) vessels like the *CELTIS*. III, 4, 5, p. 158: The *CELTIS*, now called *CELTIBERIANS* and *Berones*. 8, p. 159: This (Emporium) is a colony of the Marseillais, and it is about forty stadia distant from the Pyrenees and the

borders of Iberia and *CELTICA*. 10, p. 161: This constitutes the whole coast-line from the Pillars to the dividing line of the Iberians and the *CELTS*. 11, p. 162: The *CELTIC* (side of the Pyrenees) is bare of trees; in the midst are enclosed valleys admirably fitted for habitation. 12, p. 162: The Berones are neighbors of the Conian Cantabrians, and they, too, owe their origin to the *CELTIC* expedition. 16, p. 164: Unless one thinks that it will add to the pleasure of life to wash themselves and their wives in stale urine kept in tanks, and to rinse their teeth with it, as is said to be the custom with the Cantabrians and their neighbors. This practice and that of sleeping on the ground is common to the Iberians and the *CELTS*. 17, p. 165 . . . These feelings (of recklessness, cruelty) are common to the *CELTIC* tribes, and to the Thracians and Scythians, likewise their ideas of bravery both of their men and of their women. IV, 1, 1, p. 176: Next in order, comes *CELTICA* beyond the Alps, the general outline of which has already been sketched; we have now to describe it in greater detail. Some divide it into three parts, calling their inhabitants Aquitanians, Belgians and *CELTS* (*i. e.*, *Κέλται*, a form built on Cæsar's *Celtae*). The Aquitanians differ completely from the others, not only in their language, but also in their physical characteristics, and resemble the Iberians more than the Galates. The others are Galates in appearance, but they do not all speak the same language, some of them differing slightly in speech. They differ, too, a little in their form of government and mode of life. The dwellers near the Pyrenees, bounded by the Cevennes, are called Aquitanians and *CELTS*. For, it has been remarked that this *CELTICA* is bounded on the west by the range of Pyrenees, which extend to either sea, both the inner and the outer (p. 177); on the east the boundary is the Rhine, whose course is parallel to the Pyrenees; on the north it is enclosed by the ocean, from the northern headlands of the Pyrenees as far as the mouth of the Rhine; on the opposite side it is bounded by the sea of Marseilles and Narbonne and the Alps from Liguria as far as the sources of the Rhine. At right angles to the



Pyrenees are the Cevennes, traversing the plains and extending over about 2,000 stadia until they terminate in the middle near Lyons. The people who inhabit the northern portions of the Pyrenees and as far as the Cevennes extending towards the ocean and bounded by the river Garonne, they call Aquitanians; and CELTS, the inhabitants of the other parts, also towards the sea of Marseilles and Narbonne and touching a part of the Alpine chain; and Belgians, the rest who dwell along the ocean as far as the mouth of the Rhine, and some who dwell by the Rhine and the Alps. This was the division adopted by the divine Cæsar. But Augustus Cæsar, when making four grand divisions of the country, assigned the CELTS to the province of Narbonne, the Aquitanians he left the same as Julius Cæsar, but he added fourteen nations of those who dwell between the Garonne and the Loire. The rest he divided into two parts, assigning the district extending as far as the upper parts of the Rhine to the territory of Lyons, and the other to the Belgians. 2, p. 178: What we have said applies, in the main, to the whole of farther *CELTICA*. We shall now speak in detail of each of the four divisions, of which we have, thus far, spoken only summarily. 3, p. 178: Some, however, hold that the boundary of *CELTICA* is the spot where the Trophies of Pompey stand. 11, p. 185: The third (river) is the Sulgas which unites with the Rhone near the city of Vindalum, where Gnaeus Ahenobarbus in a great battle routed many myriads of CELTS. . . . At the point where the Isère and the Rhone unite near the Cevennes, Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, with not more than 30,000 men, destroyed 200,000 CELTS, and there he erected a white stone as a trophy and two temples, one dedicated to Mars, the other to Hercules. 12, p. 186: Their (the *Volcae Arecomisci*) seaport, which is called Narbonne, may justly be called the seaport of all *CELTICA*. 13, p. 187: That these nations immigrated from *CELTICA* is shown by their relationship to the Tectosages, but we are not able to say from which district they emigrated. 14, p. 189: This much we have said concerning the inhabitants of the district of Narbonne, whom earlier

writers called CELTS. It seem to me that the Greeks then called all the Galates CELTS from them, because of their great celebrity; the nearness of the Marseillais may also have contributed to it. 3, p. 192: It is from this part of the Alps that the Adda flows in an opposite direction (to the Rhine), towards hither *CELTICA*, and empties into the Lake of Como. 4, p. 193: The distance from the rivers of *CELTICA* to Britain is 320 stadia. IV, 1, p. 195: I believe that these Veneti (the Vannetais of Brittany) were the founders of those who live along the Adriatic; for, almost all the other CELTS in Italy, just as the Boii and the Senones, have come over from the land beyond the Alps. 6, p. 198: A certain tree, similar to the fig-tree, grows in *CELTICA*, and it bears a fruit shaped like a Corinthian capital; when this fruit is cut, it discharges a deadly juice which they smear over their arrows. It has often been remarked that all the CELTS are voluptuaries and that pederasty is not considered shameful. Ephorus says that *CELTICA* is exceedingly extensive, so that he assigns to it most of what we now call Iberia, as far as Gades; he asserts that the people are admirers of the Greeks, and he tells many peculiarities of them that do not appear in the present inhabitants. This is a curious practice of theirs: they mortify themselves so as not to become stout or pot-bellied, and if any young man exceeds the measure of a certain girdle he is punished. So much concerning *CELTICA* beyond the Alps. V, 1, p. 199: Britain is triangular in form; its longest side faces *CELTICA*, nor is it greater nor less in length than it; for, each of them is about 4,300 or 4,400 stadia, that is, the *CELTIC* side from the mouth of the Rhine as far as the northern end of the Pyrenees towards Aquitania, and the coast of Kent right opposite the mouth of the Rhine, and the most eastern point of Britain, to the western promontory of the island, which lies opposite Aquitania and the Pyrenees. 2, p. 200: (The Britons) have hounds naturally suited for hunting; the CELTS use these hounds, as well as their native dogs, for the purposes of war. The men are taller than the CELTS and their hair is less yellow and they are not so thick-

set . . . Their habits are like those of the CELTS, though simpler and more barbarous. . . . In battle they make use of war-chariots for the most part, as do most of the CELTS. 3: Because of the insurrections among the CELTS, both among his own (Cæsar's) soldiers and among the barbarians . . . (the Britons) were required to pay a moderate tax on imports to *CELTICA* and exports thence . . . 4, p. 201: And yet, to eat human flesh is said to be a Scythian custom; and even the CELTS and Iberians and many others are said to have done the like during the severities of a siege. IV, 6, 1, p. 201: After *CELTICA* beyond the Alps and the people who inhabit that country . . . 3, p. 203: These (Celtoligurians) were the first transalpine CELTS whom the Romans subdued, after having waged a long drawn out war against them and the Ligurians. 5: The Durias mingles with the Po after flowing in an opposite direction to it through the territory of the Salassi into Cisalpine *CELTICA*. 10, p. 207: The Iapodes, a nation now common to the Illyrians and the CELTS, dwell near these regions. 11, p. 208: One of the passes from Italy into farther and northern *CELTICA* is through the territory of the Salassi and leads to Lyons. V, 1, 3, p. 211: Cisalpine *CELTICA* is enclosed within these limits and its length along the coast together with the mountains is about 6,300 stadia; its breadth is rather less than 2,000. 4, p. 212: One division is inhabited by Ligurian and *CELTIC* tribes, of whom the former dwell in the mountainous parts, the latter in the plains; the other division is inhabited by CELTS and Heneti. These CELTS are of the same race as the transalpine CELTS. There are two views about the Heneti: some say that they are a colony of those CELTS of the same name who dwell along the ocean, etc. 6: In ancient times, as we have remarked, the district through which the Po flows was chiefly inhabited by CELTS. The greatest nations of the CELTS were the Boii and the Insubres, and the Senones and the Gaesatae, who once upon a time took the Roman Capitol by assault. 11, p. 217: Then come the Alps and *CELTICA*. . . . The boundaries of this country, which we call cisalpine *CELTICA*, from the rest of

Italy were marked by the Apennine mountains above Tyrrhenia and the river Aesis (Esino), and then by the Rubicon. Both these rivers empty into the Adriatic. 12, p. 218: The mines in that neighborhood are not now worked with so much care, because of the greater profit in the mines in the country of the transalpine CELTS and in Iberia; but, formerly they must have been, since there were gold-diggings even at Vercelli. V, 2, 1, p. 218: In the second place, we shall treat of that part of Liguria which lies in the Apennines themselves, between the establishments of that part of *CELTICA* already described and Tyrrhenia. 9, p. 226. Lake Trasimennus, near which is the army-pass from *CELTICA* into Tyrrhenia. 10, p. 227: For, about these parts are the boundaries of ancient Italy and *CELTICA*, on the side towards the Adriatic, although the boundary-lines have often been changed by the rulers. 4, 1, p. 240: We must begin again from the *CELTIC* boundaries. VI, 4, 2, p. 287: It happened that they lost their city (Rome) suddenly to the CELTS. . . . Having got rid of these difficulties, the first thing the Romans did was to reduce all the Latins, they then put a check to the frequent and unrestrained violence of the Tyrrheni and the CELTS who lived along the Po. . . . The Iberians and CELTS and all who yielded to the Romans, shared a similar fate. . . . Likewise, the whole of *CELTICA*, both within and beyond the Alps, together with Liguria, were annexed a part at a time, but, subsequently, the divine Cæsar, and, after him, Augustus subdued them by incessant and general warfare. VII, 1, 1, p. 289: We have spoken of Iberia and of the *CELTIC* and Italic nations and the islands adjacent. . . . North of the Danube are the countries beyond the Rhine and *CELTICA*. The nations (inhabiting these districts) are the Galatic and the Germanic, as far as the lands of the Bastarnæ, the Turegetæ and the river Dnieper; likewise (north of the Danube) is the country between that river, the Don and the mouth of the Sea of Azof which stretches inland as far as the ocean and is washed by the Euxine sea. South (of the Danube) are the people of Illyria and Thrace, and, mingled with

them, certain tribes of CELTS and other races, as far as Greece. 2, p. 290: Next after the CELTS come the Germans who inhabit the country across the Rhine to the east; they differ but little from the CELTIC race, except in their being more savage, of greater stature and with yellower hair; but, in other respects, in appearance, manners and customs they are like them, such as we have related of the CELTS. The Romans, therefore, seem to me to have applied this name (*Germani*) to them, wishing to signify the genuine Galates; for, in the Latin language, *Germani* means "the genuine." 3, p. 290: The first division of this country extends along the Rhine from its source to its mouth. The entire river-land extends over almost the whole breadth of the country on the west. The Romans have transplanted some of the people of that country into CELTICA. . . . 5, p. 292: So that one passing from CELTICA (but, Bergk reads *Ἑλβετικῆς*, "Helvetia, or eastern Switzerland") to the Hercynian Forest, has first to cross the lake and then the Danube. 2, p. 293: Nor is it true, what is told of the Cimbri, that they take up arms against the flood-tides, or that the CELTS exercise their intrepidity by permitting their houses to be washed away, and afterwards rebuild them, and that more of them perish by floods than by war, as Ephorus relates. VII, 3, 2, p. 296: There are, besides, the CELTIC tribes of the Boii, Scordisci and Taurisci. 8, p. 301 ff: And Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, tells us that in that campaign (of Alexander the Great against the Thracians) the CELTS who live along the Adriatic joined with Alexander for the purpose of making a treaty of peace and friendship, and that the king received them in a friendly way, and asked them, while drinking, what they feared most; for, he supposed that they would say it was he; but they replied that they feared no man, unless perhaps that the heavens would some time fall on them, but that they valued the friendship of such a man (as Alexander) above everything. 11, p. 304: (Boerebistas, a leader of the Getae) subdued the CELTS who lived among the Thracians and Illyrians. 5, 1, p. 313: Tracian tribes are found as far as the Propontis and Hellespont,

and Scythian or CELTIC tribes intermixed with them. 2, p. 313: The Daci subdued the Boii and Taurisci, CELTIC tribes under Critasiros. . . . The Alps, which extend to the Iapodes, a mixed CELTIC and Illyrian tribe. 4, p. 315: The CELTIC style of armor.

*(To be Continued.)*



## BOOK REVIEWS

**Le Livre d'Hénoch**, traduit sur le texte éthiopien par François Martin, Professeur de Langues Sémitiques à l'Institut Catholique de Paris et par L. Delaporte, J. Françon, B. Legris, J. Pressoir, membres de la Conférence d'Ethiopien (1904) de l'Institut Catholique de Paris. Paris, 1906. 8°, pp. clii + 319.

The present volume is the first of a series "Documents pour l'Etude de la Bible" which will comprise translations of the Apocrypha of the Old Testament, of the Assyrian and Babylonian religious texts, of the Phœnician Inscriptions and of the Targums. The purpose of the series is stated in the opening pages of the present work, and the considerations of Abbé Martin are well worth meditating. He wants to remedy the evil of speculation in Biblical studies, for, "on ne résout pas des difficultés historiques ou textuelles à coup de syllogismes sans s'exposer à de cruels mécomptes" (VI). Alluding to some recent Biblical syntheses, he says, and how truly! "Beaucoup d'adversaires ont combattu, uniquement parce qu'ils croyaient la foi en danger; beaucoup de partisans ont soutenu parce que les conclusions leur semblaient s'accorder avec leurs vues philosophiques personnelles. . . . De la question de fond, de la question de savoir si les théories proposées étaient réellement la conséquence rigoureuse, l'explication nécessaire des textes et des faits, on s'est généralement trop peu préoccupé et pour cause" (VII).

In place of these *a priori* conclusions and preferences, Fr. Martin advocates a more personal use of the originals, Biblical or extra-Biblical, or at least of reliable translations. While a real progress is being slowly achieved for the Sacred Scriptures, the other documents which bear on the correct understanding of the Bible, have been sadly neglected; it is this lacuna that Fr. Martin wants to fill. His aim is to make these documents accessible to the greatest number possible of readers. The use of a translation, it is true, will never adequately replace the originals, and it is to be hoped that many will devote their talents and energies to the mastery of these languages and the acquirement of sound critical methods; but as these workers will be comparatively few, it is of prime importance that the others should have, in a reliable translation, sufficient means for controlling assertions and for passing a more independent judgment on the questions of the day.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> We had already from the pen of Abbé Martin; *Textes Religieux Assyriens et Babyloniens*, Paris, 1903.

In accordance with this vast program, Fr. Martin offers to the public the book of Enoch. The choice of Enoch to open the series is most significant; it is in many respects the most complicated of the Apocrypha, and the success in the treatment of it is sufficient guarantee of the merits of the whole collection. The importance attached to the book of Enoch in early Christianity is too well known to be insisted upon here. Suffice it to recall to the reader that Enoch has had a deep influence in framing New Testament ideas and diction, and has been quoted by St. Jude in his Epistle; it has been considered as authoritative by many of the early Fathers, whose testimonies Fr. Martin has collected, pp. exxiii-cxxxvi. It is safe to say that a thorough knowledge of the Book of Enoch is indispensable for following the evolution of New Testament thought.

After a brief account of the various portions of the book of Enoch, the author analyzes the doctrines contained in it with regard to God, the world, angels, demons and satans, man and sin, eschatology, the Messiah, etc. This section might have fulfilled its end better by being placed after the Investigation of the sources. As Fr. Martin advocates, the book of Enoch is not homogenous, but is made up of several independent works put together without any regard to their chronological order; the reader would have been better prepared to follow the historical evolution of the ideas, had he had a clear concept of what belonged to each one of the sources.

In a third chapter Fr. Martin examines the history of the book as such. The book was originally written in Hebrew (perhaps, portions in Aramaic?) but the original is now lost. It has been preserved in its entirety only in an Ethiopic version, of which we have 26 MSS.<sup>1</sup> Of the Greek version,<sup>2</sup> only portions remain; the most important of these fragments is the Gizeh papyrus containing Chapters I-XXXII; other fragments have been preserved by Syncellus in his Chronography, etc. At one time, the whole book existed in several Greek recensions; it is from one of these—not the Gizeh, however—that the Ethiopic version was made. After a complete survey of the various opinions with regard to the literary problem (pp. lxxi-lxxvii) in which the author shows himself thoroughly familiar with the bibliography, he proceeds to give his own views on the structure of the book. Not only is the book, as it now stands, of a composite

<sup>1</sup> The best addition of the Ethiopic text, is that of Flemming, *Das Buch Henoch*.

<sup>2</sup> The Greek text has been edited by Radermacher, and more recently by Swete in his "Old Testament in Greek."

nature; not only are the main documents so many independent compositions, but most of them are themselves compilations, in which older fragments, notably the Noachic fragments, have been incorporated. It is not always easy to distinguish between fragments anterior to each compilation and later interpolations, and some of the conclusions of Abbé Martin might be controverted, but, on the whole, his distribution of sources is most satisfactory. The authors of Enoch are Palestinian Jews, occasionally Pharisees. The dates of the various documents range from 170 to 78 B. C. With regard to the influences that the various authors underwent and the various sources from which they drew their informations, Fr. Martin mentions after the Hebrew Scriptures, Babylonian cosmogony and mythology, and to a certain extent, Egyptian religious ideas. Greek philosophy and mythology have had little influence, owing to the anti-Hellenic and nationalist tendencies of the authors, who lived at an age when Hellenism was the great enemy. In this last assertion, however, there seems to be some exaggeration. The fight made against the Greeks at the time of the Maccabees was directed more against the Seleucidae of Syria than against the Ptolemies of Egypt, and was more national and political than philosophical. Besides, Greek ideas were already in the air when the fight began, and those that imbibed them perhaps never suspected their origin. For our part, we are convinced that the Greek influence of Alexandria over the Palestinian Jews themselves has been greatly underrated. Again Abbé Martin considers Persian infiltrations into the book of Enoch as very doubtful, because the date of the sacred books of Persia and even the reform of Zoroaster, is too problematic; in points of contact it may be the Persians who borrowed, not the Jews. This is certainly true, but it is beyond doubt also, that, broadly speaking, the work of Zoroaster must have been based largely on older national ideas and that these ideas are much older than their consignment to writing; just as the contents of the Koran existed among the Arabic tribes, long before Mahomet systematized them. Many things that Fr. Martin refers to Babylonian and Egyptian influences may have reached the Jews only through the medium of Alexandria, where literary men from almost every country found a home and a shelter.

We would strongly recommend all this chapter to the careful study—not cursory reading—of the Biblical student. Everything is treated with the greatest care and scholarship. The method followed is not different from the one used in the Bible itself not excepting the New Testament, however different the results may be. We also thank the author for having kept separate problems that should be kept separate,

such as the composite character of the book and of each portion, dates, authors and influences; the rejection of the latter does not entail the rejection of the others, and the first will stand, even if all the others were shown to be wrong. The translation is accompanied by valuable notes and commentaries which greatly contribute to making the publication one of the best if not the best on the subject. We would like, however, to see the various documents with their substrata and interpolations, presented graphically to the reader, e. g. by means of different types. If we want to succeed in making the public realize the importance of controlling assertions by a personal examination of the sources, we must render the task as easy as possible for them. The history of an idea and its evolution through the book of Enoch cannot be accurately given unless we take into account the chronological order of the documents; in a publication intended for a public not familiar with the methods of criticism, nothing better could have been done than to give those documents already separated and ready for use.

The undertaking of Abbé Martin is worthy of all encouragement and support. The great danger of the present day, as pointed out by him, lies in the fact that too often we seek the justification of our own views in the literature of the past, when we should primarily endeavor to grasp the true meaning of the documents, regardless of any preconceived theory. Real progress will be made only when "avec la disparition des préjugés, tous les prêtres appelés à l'enseignement de l'exégèse devront passer par les grandes écoles normales du clergé que sont nos Instituts Catholiques" (p. viii), read "Catholic University." Then, we hope by the diffusion of more accurate methods, true scientific results may be more and more appreciated by both clergy and people; then, by a deeper realization that an impartial examination of facts and texts must precede any theory or synthesis, slow and patient research will replace superficial, easy-going and therefore often intolerant generalizations; then finally, by a development of intellectual honesty, the one thing that God expects from us, truth, will stand higher than party systems and personal preferences.

R. BUTIN, S.M.

**A Modern Pilgrim's Progress**, with an introduction by Henry Sebastian Bowden, of the Oratory. London: Burns and Oates; New York: Benziger Bros., 1906.

This is the personal account of a woman's long, circuitous journey, extending over many years, whose precise number we are left to conjecture, from the Protestantism of her birth to the Catholic Church.

Born in England, she went at the age of fifteen to a British colony, where she resided for a considerable time, and then returned to London. Her extensive physical travel, however, bears but a slender proportion to her spiritual wanderings which led her from pole to pole, out of English Protestantism, towards Unitarianism, then to the verge of atheism, through the cheerless deserts of nineteenth-century agnosticism back again, for a short and uneasy stay, not of peace but of restless enquiry, in English Protestantism, and finally to the City of Peace. The writer does not profess to give a logical analysis of her beliefs, but a psychological history of them. Yet, she presents with great force some of the most effective and fundamental arguments for Theism and Catholicism. Her independent turn of mind, and disinclination to take her convictions from authority, was the trait to which, she owed both her departure from Protestantism and her protracted stay outside of the Catholic Church long after it had begun to exercise on her a mysterious attraction. Thrown into contact with clergymen of Low Church and High Church, she soon perceived that if the Bible were the exclusive rule of faith it would, nevertheless, be useless without a constituted authoritative interpreter. Her practical conclusion, to which she was assisted by Bishop Colenso was to give up her belief in inspiration; and soon afterwards, through the influence of Unitarian publications, she threw overboard the divinity of Christ. Then she entered upon a desultory study of philosophy as expounded by Kant, Darwinian evolutionists, Spencer, and some of their satellites. But the cravings of her moral nature refused to allow her to rest satisfied in disbelief in a Personal God. It is worthy of note that some of the greatest helps she got towards the Church were given by opponents, contrary to their purpose. An apostate priest arguing against Protestants in favor of Unitarianism, fashionable exponents of free thought and the philosophy of religions proved to be some of her best friends. Another was Dr. Littledale whom she challenged to make good some of his anti-Catholic allegations; and she says: "I think Darwin's teaching helped me to see in the growth and evolution of the Catholic Church a sign that it was formed by the same God who made the material world." After turning away hungry from agnosticism she threshed out ritualism with Mr. Mackonochie, Dr. Pusey, and Dr. Littledale. Then she passed on to Newman, as the goal came into view. The Pilgrim's gifts of self-analysis, sincerity, earnestness and the unusual variety of the phases of doubt and conviction which she has to relate, together with a fine power of expression, combine to make a piece of biography which is at once an interesting psychological study and a striking apologetic.

JAMES J. FOX.

**Early Essays and Lectures.** By Canon Sheehan, D.D. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1906.

The essays of this collection, twelve in number, have been disinterred from various magazines in which they appeared at various dates during the last quarter of a century. Their general subject is literature, education, and philosophic thought, viewed in their bearing upon the interests of religious truth. Whether he discusses the working of the intermediate system of education in Ireland, the character of German universities, the influence of Emerson, works belonging to recent Augustan literature, the poetry of Aubrey de Vere or Matthew Arnold, Dr. Sheehan's message is ever the superiority of the mental over the material, of faith over reason, of the eternal over the temporal. His position as a writer is too widely established by his later works to permit any space here to be devoted to pointing out his merits. In one of these essays he says: "It is a strange and significant fact that Catholic writers cannot catch the fire and the glow that illuminate every page of profane literature." At least we can claim that he himself has done a good deal to take away our reproach. If the thermometer of literary criticism would refuse to record any such high degree of heat as indicates fire in his pages, they are nevertheless everywhere suffused with the warmth of delicate sentiment and the glow of a rich and fervid imagination, and through them pulsates the force generated by earnest purpose and high ideals. Probably, as he says himself, if he were to write on the subjects of these essays, and of the addresses, seven in number, he would treat them in a different manner and in a modified style. It would not, we think, be difficult to find many thoughts, reflections, and opinions in the present volume which are more clearly and concisely expressed in *Luke Delmege*. Yet the diffuseness and iterations of the present volume which render it less attractive to older minds may very well make it the more useful to younger ones, who require to have an idea impressed by repetition and amplification. Were a young man, desirous of cultivating a sound taste for literature and high thinking, to ask for a short list of books that might help him, we should not hesitate to give a place on the file to this volume.

JAMES J. FOX.

**Catholicity and Progress in Ireland.** By Rev. M. O'Riordan D.Ph., D.D., D.C.L. London: Keegan, Paul, and Trench; St. Louis: B. Herder, 1905.

When Sir Horace Plunkett, the chief promoter of what is commonly called the Irish industrial revival, though birth would be a



more accurate term, published an account of the achievements and aims of that movement, he ventured to point out "certain defects of character not ethically grave, but economically paralyzing," which, in his opinion, have "prevented Irishmen from rising to their opportunities and giving practical evidence of the intellectual qualities with which the race is admittedly gifted." Besides, he stated, with considerable specification, that a contributory cause of these defects lay close to the religious belief of the people, and that the Irish clergy had not, as a body, done all that was in their power to promote the material and social welfare of their people. The high spiritual and moral excellence of the Irish clergy has not killed in them the tendency of human nature to resent unwelcome criticism however kindly and well-meaning may be the spirit in which it is offered. For a Protestant layman, even though he had proved himself a real benefactor to Ireland, to presume to pass strictures upon the Catholic clergy, was somewhat imprudent. The present volume contains the most systematic, extensive and able reply that was directed against him.

It takes up the charges of Sir Horace—defects in Irish character; the prevalence of extravagant church building; the failure of the clergy to do all that they might to promote habits of temperance and industry among their flocks; their undue activity in politics; their responsibility for the emigration evil by repressing innocent amusements among the young; the excessive multiplication of unproductive religious communities.

The author has greatly enhanced the permanent value of his book by extending its scope so as to embody instructive historical studies of the vicissitudes and development of Irish education, manufactures, agriculture, and commerce. He also makes an eloquent defense of the principle of asceticism. From a review of the industrial progress of Belgium he draws an argument against the commonplace charge that Catholicism is hostile to economic progress: and he shows that the University of Louvain is a standing proof that, even to-day, contrary to the frequently repeated assertion, a Catholic university can be a first-rate seat of learning.

The sympathetic public before whose bar Dr. O'Riordan impeached Sir Horace could not fail to give an enthusiastically unanimous verdict in his favor. A coldly impartial scrutiny of the pleading will note that the reply might have faced with more directness many of the criticisms which it challenged. For example, all the first encomiums which the Doctor passes on Irish character are perfectly consistent with the existence of the ethically negligible but econom-

ically important minor defects upon which Sir Horace insists. Again, to say that the Irish clergy have not done all that they might in the cause of temperance is not to say that they have done nothing. If Sir Horace were asked for instance in support of his complaint that meanings were attached to his words which he never intended them to bear, he would probably point out that when he asserted there is a survival of superstition in backward districts he had no idea of attacking the Catholic dogma of the Real Presence. One of the most pleasing features in the volume is the array of facts brought forward to show the beneficent activity displayed by the nuns in the promotion of small industries among the working classes—a fact to which Sir Horace Plunkett seems to have hardly paid due attention.

Dr. O'Riordan expresses his high estimate of the character of Sir Horace, and of the services rendered by him to the people of Ireland. We have not the slightest doubt but that if these two gentlemen were to meet face to face for the discussion of the topics that have brought them into conflict in print, misunderstandings would be cleared up, and then they would find that the residuum of disagreement separating them would be very small indeed.

JAMES J. FOX.

**Free Will and Four English Philosophers** (Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill). By the Reverend Joseph Rickaby, S.J. London: Burns and Oates; New York: Benziger Bros., 1906.

Although it is not a systematic presentation of the argument for, and a refutation of those against, free-will, this volume touches upon, pretty nearly everything that can be urged on either side of the question, from the purely philosophic point of view. The plan it pursues is to quote a passage from the author under discussion, another to criticize it. The commentary is usually of ample length. A favorite method of criticism of the statement attacked is to construct a hypothetical case of action or choice, and, applying the view in question to explain the behavior of the agent, to show that the result will not bear the judgment of good sense. This method Father Rickaby uses with conspicuous success, especially in discussing the utilitarian theory of punishment as taught by John Stuart Mill, to whose talents, honesty and sincerity Father Rickaby pays a handsome tribute. The student who would read the above philosophers at first hand—and, with all respect for our numerous text-books, there is no other road to a proper understanding of their doctrines—will find Father Rickaby a very helpful guide. He is, perhaps, here and there, unnecessarily diffuse; but, in compensation, he relieves the strain of metaphysical reasoning

with reflections of a religious character. His chief original contribution to the discussion of the problem is his view of the psychological character of the act of free-will.—“To will at all, our will must be struck by a motive which raises in us what I have called a ‘spontaneous complacency.’ As the four philosophers under review all agree, and I agree with them, this complacency is a fact of physical sequence, a necessity under the circumstances. But it is not yet a volition until it is hugged, embraced, enhanced, under advertence by the conscious self. This process takes time,—I do not mean so many seconds measured by the watch, for thought time goes on other wheels than motion time—but still it takes time. Free will turns upon the absence of any need of your making up your mind at once to accept the particular complacency presented to your soul; observe, you cannot here and now, accept any other; you cannot here and now accept what is not offered. You cannot just at present fling yourself on the absent. Thus time is gained for rival motions to come up, according to the ordinary laws of association, perception, or personal intercourse: each of these motives excites its own necessary complacency, till at last some present complacency is accepted and endorsed by the person and that is an act of free-will.” This explanation is not open to some of the criticisms that may be directed against the scholastic which raises the crux of the relation of the *ultimum iudicium practicum* to the will.

JAMES J. FOX.

**The Life of Christ.** By Mgr. É. Le Camus, Bishop of La Rochelle. Translated by Rev. W. A. Hickey. The Catholic Library Association, 1906.

The late Bishop Le Camus' work on the Life of Christ is, probably, the most important contribution to the literature of that august subject from a Catholic pen that has appeared since Sepp's great effort against Strauss. The bishop made this book his life-work in a literal sense. He paid several visits to Palestine; he concentrated upon his theme a wide reading that extended through many years of laborious research; and he mastered the principles and method of criticism, all toward the end of producing a life of our Lord which should at once be a consolation to the piety of the faithful and a defence against the attacks of the unbeliever. The several editions through which the work has passed in France bear witness to the success of his design. That English readers are now, through the correct, idiomatic, translation of Father Hickey, to share the good which the work has accomplished in Europe is reason for rejoicing. With us, too, this picture of the Master, which learning and piety have combined to paint, will

help to inspire spiritual vigor, and, one may hope, to stimulate some minds to devote themselves to a study of the momentous problems which attend the origin and transmission of the Gospel history.

JAMES J. FOX.

**L'Authenticité Mosaique du Pentateuque.** Par Eug. Mangenot, Prof. d'Ecriture Sainte à l'Institut Catholique de Paris. Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1907. Pp. 334.

On June 27, the Biblical Commission issued a decision concerning the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch; Abbé Mangenot's work, although written before the decision, has been remodeled so as to justify it in the eyes of those whom it might have surprised. The author aims at fighting the critics on their own ground. He tells us that he intends to indicate their objections fairly without minimizing or distorting them in any way. To act as an ostrich which does not fear the enemy because it does not see it any longer, is to him supremely ridiculous (p. 12). The work is divided into four parts, in which the author gives successively an historical sketch of the various modern views, pp. 15-202; the arguments in favor of the traditional opinion, pp. 204-265; his judgment on the theological certitude to be assigned to the thesis of the mosaic origin, pp. 267-310, and finally a few considerations on the nature of the mosaic origin, as allowed by the Biblical Commission, pp. 311-328.

The *exposé* of modern views is clear, agreeable, painstaking; generally accurate, and shows the wide reading of the author; as this first part covers more than half the entire work, the reader will agree that Abbé Mangenot has done the work conscientiously.

In the second part, the author defends his thesis; we say "thesis" because he tells us positively that all the efforts of Catholic criticism should tend to prove the mosaic origin of the Pentateuch and to vindicate it against its adversaries (p. 204). There is some danger in starting an historical investigation with a foregone conclusion; the thesis may be correct in itself, but, unless we are very careful in handling the materials, the mind is greatly exposed to being biased with regard to facts and texts. The positive arguments in favor of the mosaic origin of the Pentateuch are well given and many of them are far from being as weak as they are sometimes represented to be. Attention might have been directed to Condamin's article on Ecclesiastes, *Revue Biblique*, 1900, 31 ff. when the author discusses the argument drawn from the perpetual tradition of the Church, p. 228 ff., as well as when he examines whether the Fathers spoke as witnesses of divine tradition or simply as private Doctors, p. 286 ff.

With reference to the negative proofs or answers to the critics, pp. 246-265, we have serious reservations to make regardless of the question whether the critics be right or wrong. It is unfair to break up a cumulative argument into its various constituent parts, and examine them, as if they were independent of one another. Taken individually they may not be more than probable, but when probabilities are accumulated, all pointing to one direction, they often create moral certitude. The position of the critics, for one who takes into account the difference between the method of investigation and that of presentation, is not based on several arguments, standing by themselves, it is based on one argument made up of discrepancies between various groups of passages with regard to vocabulary, style, history, religious institutions, religious ideas, and many other details. If the argument has to be refuted at all, it must be done in a way that will explain all these differences taken together, for, they all appear and disappear *together*. Let it be noted here that the sources or documents are not classified arbitrarily, as Mangenot seems to assert, p. 263; the classification may be wrong, it is not arbitrary. What is needed then, is not a piecemeal refutation of individual assertions, but a system that will harmonize better than, or at least as well as, the one of the critics, the difficulties of the case. To give but one example: on p. 248, the author says that repetitions are due to the literary method of Moses who takes up an interrupted narrative, sketches it again before continuing it, etc. This is not impossible in itself, and might suffice if there was nothing else; but such is not the contention of the critics; if it is the same author who gives us both parallel narratives, why does he *at the same time* use different vocabulary and style? why does he adopt a different point of view with regard to the above peculiarities? In the same way, the answers of Mangenot concerning the unity of sanctuary, sacrifices, feasts, distinction between Priests and Levites, style, taken individually might be possible and even plausible, but as the solidarity of the differences just mentioned is overlooked, these answers fulfill their purpose neither historically nor polemically. We cannot change the position of the critics, we must take them as they are. It is true that Fr. Mangenot does not intend to give a regular refutation of the critics (p. 13) but still condensation should not exclude accurate reproduction of opposite positions.

In this section there are many instances where the author does not seem to have grasped the true import of the assertions which he refutes. In many others, the method, principles and motives of the critics are hardly given fairly. Besides, as it was the author's aim

not only to refute but to expose faithfully the position of the critics, why has he not felt the need of examining the answers of the critics to his own positive arguments? Is, for example, the hypothesis of Scribes so new that it has not yet been considered by critics? If it has, what is the value of the reasons given for its rejection? This is rather important for the thesis of Abbé Mangenot.

In spite of all these imperfections, however, the reader will find in this section, very valuable remarks, and pertinent suggestions. We hope sincerely that this part will be re-written more systematically and more in accordance with the real position of the critics.

The last portion of the work is a commentary on the other *dubia* decided by the Biblical Commission. Abbé Mangenot is very liberal in his admission of additions to the original work of Moses and of subsequent modifications: he mentions several opinions (317 ff.) which he declares to be essentially like that of the ancient Fathers. This assertion would necessitate some explanations; the more so, in view of his hypothesis on the theological value of the testimonies of the Fathers. Some of them knew, of course, the existence of variants, but they never suspected such extensive remodelings as those which he approves of; they would have been as much startled by such a theory as by that of a compilation from preexisting sources, some of them Mosaic. Besides, if pushed a little further, this would lead us into the *Supplement* hypothesis, a very questionable theological advantage.

We have no doubt that the decision of the Biblical Commission has been given after due deliberation, and with the full knowledge of the arguments on both sides, especially so, since the consultors whose views were evidently solicited, were to be found in both camps; but however justified this decision may be, we must confess that the contribution of Abbé Mangenot is too speculative and one-sided, to make converts in the ranks of critics. It lacks in many respects that scientific accuracy and perspective, an essential quality even in a polemical production. He has failed to deal with the modern critical theories as they really are and hence, has also failed in his attempt to fight the critics on their own chosen ground.

R. BUTIN, S.M.

**Ecclesia, The Church of Christ.** London: Burns and Oates, 1906.

*Ecclesia, The Church of Christ*, consists of a series of papers written by several well-known English Catholic writers and edited by Arnold Harris Mathews. The work is intended as a guide for those who, persuaded of the foundation of a Church by Christ, are



seeking to know where it is. It treats, therefore, principally of the Notes of the Church. The discussion of the Notes is preceded by a paper on the Church in the Parables, and followed by papers on Infallibility, Salvation outside of the Church, Schism and Ignorance. The work closes with an appendix on England and the Holy See in the Middle Ages. Dom. Gilbert Dolan, O.S.B., is the author of the paper on the Parables. Fr. Benedict Zimmermann, O.D.C., writes on the Visible Unity of the Church. Fr. Benson contributes the paper of the Sanctity of the Church. The paper on Catholicity is treated of by Dom. Chapman, the one on Apostolicity by Dom. Breen, O.S.B. There are two papers on Infallibility, a short one by the editor on the Notion of Infallibility, the other discusses the doctrine by Fr. Finlay, S.J. The editor discusses the question of Salvation outside the Church as well as that on Schism and Ignorance. The author of the Historical paper is the Rev. Spenser Jones, A.M. In a work of this kind one can not expect to find the harmonious treatment of a subject which is met with in a work produced by a single pen. If we judge of the value of the work by the merits of the several papers it can be pronounced excellent. There are no lengthy nor very profound discussions of topics, as neither the space allotted nor the purpose of the editor permits of either. Evidence, however, of the scholarship of the writers is abundant. In their several papers the principal difficulties raised are answered briefly and pointedly. In the opening paper the irenic method adopted favorably disposes the reader for the more dogmatic chapters which follow. The exposition of the parables is interesting, suggesting more than once contemporary conditions. In the paper on Unity the reader will recognize old arguments whose newness of exposition reinforces their efficacy. Fr. Benson, putting aside the bewildering contradiction of statistics, treats of the note of sanctity under the four general heads of (1) Personal Influence, (2) Charity, (3) Love of Suffering, (4) Its Miraculous Effects. He tells us that the evidence of the Church's sanctity more than the arguments of theologians or the fervor of her preachers has been the motive drawing towards her borders those who at last receive the gift of faith. Distinguishing between holiness and morality, he says that the first, like a sacramental character, may endure even in communities and countries where morality may have sunk to a low ebb. Under the head of suffering he defends the ascetic system of the Church. Dom. Chapman insists on the inseparability of miracles from the world-wide preaching, as the fulfillment of a promise. The name of Catholic and the right use and abuse of the term Roman Catholic are explained. He also makes good use of

Harnack's distinction between the Bishop and the Church of Rome. Dom. Breen writes interestingly of Anglican Orders. Fr. Finlay's paper is chiefly a refutation of difficulties raised against Infallibility by the late Dr. Salmon, Provost of Trinity College, Dublin. The remaining papers set forth clearly and impressively the teachings of theologians on these subjects, while the facts adduced in the historical appendix exclude any doubt as to England's attitude to Rome during the Middle Ages. The book will afford profitable reading for Catholics and will serve to suggest to those for whom it was written "that kind of thought which leads to action."

M. J. HOGAN.

**Lexicon Scholasticum Philosophico-Theologicum** in quo continentur Termini, Definitiones, Distinctiones et Effata a B. Joanne Duns Scoto Doctore Subtili atque Mariano O.F.M. . . . opere et studio R.P. Mariani Fernandez Garcia O.F.M. Distributio Prima, Quaracchi, 1906. Pp. 192.

The Franciscan Fathers of Quaracchi near Florence did good service to the cause of Catholic scholarship by their accurate and painstaking edition of the works of St. Bonaventure, which they brought to a successful termination a few years ago. They are, we understand, about to undertake a critical edition of the works of Roger Bacon, and it is the hope of all genuine admirers of the Subtle Doctor that the same learned editors will soon see their way to replace Vives' uncritical reprint of Wadding's edition of Scotus by a more scholarly edition of the Subtle Doctor's writings. Meantime, they have given us a valuable aid to the study of Scotus. They have just published the first instalment of a Scotistic *Lexicon* of philosophy and theology. The work, as planned, will contain about fifteen hundred pages in quarto, to be published every six months in instalments of 192 pages each. It will comprise the *Grammatica Speculativa*, so important for the study of Scotus' logic, a list of scholastic terms with Scotus' definitions thereof, and, finally, a collection of Scotistic *effata*. The author of the work is Father Mariano Fernandez Garcia, General Secretary of the Franciscan Order. He has chosen to give us in a very orderly arrangement the words of the Subtle Doctor himself, and herein lies the chief merit of the work. The *Lexicon* has for the ordinary student the value of an original source, besides being much more accessible than Wadding's edition and more convenient for ready reference. It will, we are sure, find a place in every library of theology and philosophy beside the *Scotus Academicus* and Fra Girolamo da Montefortino's *Summa Theologica*. The first instalment

contains the whole of the *Grammatica Speculativa* and the alphabetical list of scholastic terms with Scotus' definitions, as far as the term *Culpa*.

WILLIAM TURNER.

**Quellen u. Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters**, herausgegeben von Ludwig Traube. Bd. I, Erstes Heft, **Sedulius Scottus**, von S. Hellmann, München, 1906. Pp. 203; Zweites Heft, **Johannes Scottus**, von Edward Kennard Rand, München, 1906. Pp. 106.

This series of publications of early medieval Latin texts is prefaced by an introductory note from the pen of the learned editor, whose work on the texts of the Carolingian Poets as well as his share in the publication of the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* entitle him to speak with authority. He calls attention to the bearing which early medieval Latin texts have not only on classical, on German and on Romance, philology, but also on general history, on the history of paleography, and on the history of metrical and rhetorical composition. It may be added that some, if not all, of the texts in question promise to be of interest also to the student of medieval philosophy and theology.

The first instalment of the first volume includes a critical text of Sedulius' *Liber de Rectoribus Christianis*, Sedulius' *Collectaneum* and a critical dissertation on the relation of Sedulius to Pelagius in the domain of biblical exegesis. The work *De Rectoribus Christianis*, written by the Irishman Sedulius, probably at Liège, about the year 855, should receive more attention than it does in the history of Christian Ethics. It is in reality the first systematic contribution of the Middle Ages to the science of political government, and should rank in importance with St. Thomas' *De Regimine Principis*, Giles of Colonna's *De Regimine Principum* and Dante's *De Monarchia*. Moreover, it is, as Dr. Hellman remarks, drawn, if not from Irish sources exclusively, at least from sources which were held in the highest esteem by Irish writers of the Carolingian Age. Indeed, this Celtic conception of the responsibilities of a Christian ruler is of very special interest to the student of medieval political theories. Its sources are Christian and classical, its immediate purpose is the guidance of a Frankish ruler (probably Lothair II), the mind that planned it is Celtic—and here one has at the outset of medieval speculation a rare combination of the forces and interests which went to make up the medieval polity. From this point of view, the treatise will interest many besides the professed student of philology and philosophy. Needless to say, the text, as published by Dr. Hellmann, is fully provided with all the incidental aids necessary for a detailed study.

The second instalment, edited by Dr. Rand, Assistant Professor of Latin at Harvard University, contains two Commentaries on the *Opuscula Sacra* of Boethius, the first of which the editor ascribes to John Scotus Eriugena, and the second to Remi of Auxerre. Only the limited few who have seen and deciphered the original marginal glosses now published in so convenient form by Dr. Rand can appreciate the minute care and inexhaustible patience required in a task such as that which he has so successfully accomplished. Ninth and tenth century manuscripts, as a rule, are easy to read; but with the marginal notes it is different. They are written, generally, in a minute hand which, even under the magnifying glass, is not easy to decipher. Now that we possess those notes in accessible form, we are in a position to arrive at a correct judgment of the condition of speculation at the beginning of the medieval period. One thing, for instance, which was heretofore a matter of conjecture merely, is now capable of being verified by positive evidence, namely that in the dialectical discussions of the ninth century there was no Realism or Nominalism in the later sense of those terms, and that the whole scholastic movement *did not* originate from the famous dispute about Universals. The commentaries on Boethius' *Opuscula Sacra* show that general philosophical as well as special logical questions engaged the attention of the first schoolmen. Dr. Rand, it seems to us, is perfectly justified in ascribing to Eriugena, or, as his contemporaries called him, Johannes Scottus, these Commentaries which occur in a great number of ninth and tenth century manuscripts without any indication as to who their author was. They were written after the *De Divisione Naturae* was completed, and, indeed, not only supplement, but in many points correct, the doctrine contained in John's *magnum opus*. If, as Dr. Rand further contends, the year 867 is the earliest possible date of the Commentaries, we have here at least one more item to add to our too meagre knowledge of the life and literary activity of the greatest of the early medieval Irish philosophers. John the Scot was fated to be obscure in more senses than one; for that reason any additional light on his career as a writer and teacher is appreciated by those who have learned how little trace, after all, he left in the records of his times. Remi's Commentaries show the continuation of the influence of Eriugena in the school of Auxerre; which is not so strange when we remember the presence at Laon of the Irish teachers Elias, Daoch and Israel. Indeed, the more one studies the manuscript materials of the ninth and tenth centuries the more one is inclined to ascribe to Eriugena a far larger influence on his immediate posterity than is generally credited to him in histories of phi-

losophy. Dr. Rand's publication of these texts is a welcome and an important addition to the materials for the study of the beginnings of philosophical speculation in the Middle Ages.

WILLIAM TURNER.

**An Indexed Synopsis of the "Grammar of Assent."** By John J. Toohey, S.J. New York and London: Longmans, 1906. Pp. vi + 220.

This is not exactly an aid to the study of the "Grammar of Assent." It is rather a ready-reference volume by which passages, historical and topical allusions, points of doctrine and statements of fact in the Grammar may be quickly and easily found. The student, for instance, who wishes to know what Newman has to say about "Doubt" will find references to five different places in the Grammar, with cross-references to the word "Proposition." Now that Newman's treatise is receiving more attention in the philosophical training given in our Catholic Colleges—it has long been part of the prescribed reading for the Honors Course in Logic for the B.A. degree in the Royal University of Ireland—this little book is especially opportune. It ought to receive a welcome both from students and teachers.

WILLIAM TURNER.

**Catholic Educational Association: Report of the Proceedings and Addresses of the Third Annual Meeting,** Cleveland, O., July 9, 10, 11, 12, 1906. Published by the Association, Secretary's Office, Columbus, O. Pp. 294.

One has but to compare this volume of almost three hundred pages with the Reports of the two previous Meetings of the Association to see how much progress this organization has made in the few years which have elapsed since it was founded. It is true, the representatives of our various Catholic institutions from parochial school to university, assembled at their Annual Meeting, have no legislative powers conferred on them whereby the results of their deliberations may be issued in the form of legal enactments. Still, their discussions and the mutual enlightenment resulting therefrom have had an excellent effect on the entire system of Catholic education in this country. In educational matters Catholics are, so to speak, the "citizens of no mean city." The President of the Association gave this as an excellent reason why Catholics should meet for the purpose of studying their own system of education. "We of the Catholic Church are an old institution. We have educated the world. We have formed Europe. We have systems of our own, systems that have been proved

and tried by experience, and, therefore, we need go to no man's house to borrow" (p. 23). Another reason for coöperation in educational matters is set forth in the introduction to the *Report*. "The interests of higher education are of vital importance in an educational system. It is only the fortunate few that are able to avail themselves of the advantages of this higher education, but the quality of the higher education dominates and gives character to all other parts of the system." Organization, however, should have in view not only the coördination of studies in the different institutions, but coöperation as well. This point is very clearly put by Reverend Dr. Burns in the paper which he read before the General Meeting. "Education," he says, "is a vital process, and educational unity must be of the vital order. . . . There must be coördination among the various classes of our educational institutions if we are to avoid waste and inefficiency; and there must be hearty coöperation among Catholic educators . . . if we are to achieve results commensurate with the efforts we are making, the sacrifices that are being made, and the opportunities that are within our grasp" (p. 43). To understand our own system of education, to bring its various departments, university, seminary, college and parochial school, into harmonious adjustment, and to work out a scheme of practical coöperation—these are the aims towards which the Association is directing its efforts. Those who wish to see for themselves how these aims are being realized have but to read the various papers and discussions contained in the *Report*. Copies of the *Report* are to be had from the Reverend F. W. Howard, Secretary General, Columbus, O.

**Questions D'Histoire et D'Archéologie Chrétienne.** Par Jean Guiraud. Paris: Lecoffre, 1906. 12°, pp. 304. Price, Fres. 3.50.

This book of the eminent professor of the University of Besançon is a collection of eight articles on various historical subjects: (1) The Repression of Heresy in the Middle Ages; (2) The Moral Principles of the Albigenses; (3) The "Consolamentum" or Catharist Initiation-Rite; (4) Did St. Dominic copy St. Francis? (5) John Baptist de Rossi (1822-94); (6) The Coming of St. Peter to Rome; (7) Roman Relics in the IXth Century; (8) The Spirit of the Catholic Liturgy.

In his treatment of the repression of heresy, the author places himself on strictly historical ground, without considering the abstract theological question of right. He first mentions the explanations advanced by Catholic writers in answer to the oft-repeated charge, that the tyranny of the Roman Church cruelly suppressed the ever-renewed



attempts of the human soul to free itself from the enslaving bonds of dogmatism. Some have utterly denied the commission of acts of violence; others have claimed for the Church the right of physical repression; some, like Lacordaire, have maintained that the Church used only moral suasion, and, when this means had failed, merely let severe secular justice take its course; some, finally, have thought that the ecclesiastical tribunal did not inflict any penalties, but solely pronounced, as a committee of experts, on the orthodoxy of the accused. Guiraud proves that the Church claimed and exercised the right to use physical force against heretics. But the severe penalties inflicted, should, according to him, be considered in connection with the spirit of the age and the civil punishment of other offenses. Our surprise at medieval harshness will grow proportionately with the leniency introduced into our penal legislation. Even anti-Catholic historians admit that the Inquisitorial procedure marked a real progress on that of the civil courts. The Church generally exercised her severity against men who not only denied some particular dogma, but whose principles were subversive of all social order. The action of the Church is termed cruel, but was, in reality, a benefit conferred on society. The consideration of "the moral tenets of the Albigenses" illustrates and partly demonstrates the truth of this assertion. Suicide (*Endura*), under certain circumstances, was approved by them, while marriage, capital punishment and war were absolutely condemned. The very doctrine of the transmigration of souls formed part of their teaching. In his study on the "*Consolamentum*" or Catharist Initiation-Rite, the author points out its great resemblance to some Christian ceremonies. For the Catharists or Albigenses, the "*consolamentum*" took, to some extent, the place of several of our sacraments (Baptism, Penance, Order, Sacraments of the dying); hence a comparison is instituted between them and exhibits at times striking similarity. The fact that the mutual affinity is closer, when we turn to the consideration of the rites of the ancient Catholic Church, throws some light on the still obscure question of the origin of the Catharists. It is an additional reason justifying the appellation "*Neo-Manicheans*," applied to these heretics.

The fourth paper brings a refutation of Mr. Paul Sabatier's contention, that the Founder of the Friars-Preachers borrowed the idea of Monastic poverty, which he inserted in his rule, from St. Francis. Guiraud adduces facts tending to prove that the Order of St. Dominic did not become a mendicant order only after 1218, the year St. Dominic is alleged to have come under Franciscan influence, but practised poverty before that time.

We may be brief on John Baptist de Rossi, as, over ten years ago, the Very Rev. Dr. T. J. Shahan already wrote, in his usual attractive and reliable manner, a biographical sketch of the great Catholic archæologist (*Am. Cath. Quart. Rev.*, XX, 1895, 1-37, also separately, Washington, 1895). Quite recently a shorter article also concerning De Rossi and signed Epsilon, appeared in the "Irish Ecclesiastical Record," Aug., 1906, 144-56. De Rossi's great knowledge of classical antiquity, his chief work as the founder of Christian archæology, the extension of his studies to the Middle Ages, all these, combined with profound religious conviction, are reviewed in the book under consideration and make a Catholic heart feel proud of such a celebrated personage.

There are two distinct paragraphs in the "Coming of St. Peter to Rome." The first speaks of his twenty-five years' pontificate in the capital of the world and is too incomplete to satisfy the reader. For the writings of Lactantius, the *Vienna Corpus* (Vol. XXVII, ed. Brandt and Laubmann, 1897) should have been quoted and not Migne. The second paragraph treats of the fact of St. Peter's presence in Rome, without specifying the duration of his sojourn. No new proofs are given, but the traditional ones are presented in a clear and cogent manner that will convince the fair-minded reader.

The essay on Roman Relics is a very interesting contribution to the ecclesiastical history of the IXth century. We see how the ardent but not very judicious desire of the populations of eastern France and western Germany, to possess relics of Saints, was cleverly taken advantage of by wily Romans. Not only were individual relic-venders to be found in Rome, but an association existed whose object was the trade in relics.

The book concludes with a study on the "Spirit of the Catholic Liturgy." The title of this essay but vaguely expresses its contents. The author, after making mention of some of the writers who have recently aroused new interest in the subject, treats, by interspersing his remarks with frequent liturgical citations, of the sources of the Catholic Liturgy and its universal character both as regards time and object. His considerations will promote the better understanding and livelier appreciation of the Liturgy.

Some of these subjects have been frequently studied and written about; others are less known. In both classes, Mr. Guiraud's treatment is such as will hold and repay the attention of the reader. The book ought to prove very useful and instructive, not only to the clergy, but also to the cultured laity. Without having to wade through a multitude of details and notes, they will find in it a scientific presenta-

tion of the various topics treated. The book was written by a competent authority, two of whose previous works, "L'Eglise et Les Origines de La Renaissance" and "Saint Dominique," were crowned by the French Academy.

N. A. WEBER, S.M.

**Hrabanus Maurus.** Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Exegese. Von Joh. Bapt. Hablitzel. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1906. Pp. vi + 105. Price, \$0.70.

**Das Alte Testament in der Mitchna.** Von Georg Aicher. Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1906. Pp. xvii + 181. Price, \$1.25.

**Ezechias und Senacherib.** Exegetische Studie. Von M. Theresia Brems, Ursulinerin. Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1906. Pp. xii + 133. Price, \$0.85.

The three preceding monographs form part of Vol. XI of the *Biblische Studien*, edited by O. Bardenhewer. Their admission into such a well known collection is sufficient guarantee of their scientific value.

1. According to Hablitzel, we should not look in the works of Hrabanus Maurus for any original or historical interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures. He was not acquainted with Hebrew and probably not with Greek. In accordance with the prevalent preoccupation of his day, his exegesis consists mainly in quoting from previous authors especially from the Church Fathers. The sources which he utilized in his Commentary on S. Matthew, are given here in detail, pp. 32-70. In one respect, the mediæval method, so defective in itself, has served a good purpose: it has preserved for us many fragments of works now lost. All these features are well brought out by the author. In the present work the reader will find a great deal to learn. It is only by means of such exhaustive monographs that a complete and reliable history of exegesis can be prepared. We are too impatient of syntheses, but in spite of a great show of erudition, the foundations on which we build are often very insecure. The student of mediæval exegesis cannot overlook Hablitzel's contribution.

2. The study of Aicher on the Old Testament in the Mishnah, deserves also great credit. For us, Christians, it is important to know the methods and views of the Jews who witnessed the origin and growth of the New Testament. Many difficult passages disappear, when viewed in the light of contemporaneous Jewish thought. As illustrating the methods followed in New Testament times, the Mishnah and the pre-Talmudic Halachah are more reliable than the Gemarah. Aicher has, therefore, limited his study to the Mishnah.

The reader will find original views with regard to the formation of the Canon, pp. 6-34, and will be glad to see that every assertion is justified by good reasons and sound critical interpretation. The author comes to the following conclusions: Promiscuous collections preceded canonical collections; out of these general collections some books were eventually considered as sacred, but the norm followed to make the distinction was primarily the use that the Synagogue made of some of them for religious instruction and edification; although the dogma or theory of a Canon is rather old, the canonization of individual books was gradual; the close of the Jewish canon is comparatively late; still it must be placed before the year 70, A. D.; some sporadic doubts with regard to the inspiration of some books may have existed even after this date. The expression that "Scripture defiles the hands," on which so much depends, is well explained, pp. 21 ff.

To the question whether the ancient Jews made a distinction in their appreciation of the Bible, the author answers that the Pentateuch, in Mishnic times, was considered more directly divine, and hence, more valuable than the other books; these latter were conceived as a supplement to the Torah and as an authentic explanation of it, pp. 34 ff.

The Mishnah treats the Bible with the greatest respect and attributes to it perfect inerrancy, pp. 47-53.

The reader will find very good remarks on the origin of the Halachah and Haggadah, and on their external relations to the Sacred Scriptures, pp. 53-67. Most instructive is the investigation by the author of the use that the Mishnic Rabbis made of the Bible, pp. 67-107. With them, Scripture was not studied for its own sake, but as a means of justifying or supporting ideas entertained at that time; interpretation practically meant to read into the Bible one's own thought. This is true to a certain extent; we may smile at such an arbitrary method and ridicule the Jews for having had recourse to it; the truth is that the Jews were not worse than many of us. We, too, find in the Bible, not what the Sacred writer has put in it, but what we ourselves have introduced into it surreptitiously, before beginning our interpretation. Then comes an exposition of the rules of interpretation followed by the Rabbis; these rules, Aicher pronounces objectionable in many points, and justly so, if logic and scholarship is the norm by which we have to judge them; before throwing stones, however, it might be well to examine what kind of system most of our preachers follow in their exegesis of the Bible. Aicher does well to note that most of the objectionable features were later

accretions to the more sober rules of the early Tannaites. Machum of Gimzo and especially Aquiba, so exaggerated the idea of divine inspiration that every particle or letter must have been placed by God for a special purpose and hence conveyed a special hint to some hidden meaning.

The work of Aicher is very thorough, richly documented; the bibliography is well chosen. His treatment of the subject is scholarly, and nobody will read the present volume without deriving much profit from it.

3. The Third monograph under consideration is the work of an Ursuline Nun, and deals with the war between Ezechias and Sennacherib (4 K. XVIII, 13—XIX, 37; Isaias, XXXVI—XXXVII; 2 Chron. XXXII). It opens with a brief survey of the political conditions of the East, at the time of the war. Then, the author devotes four chapters to her chosen subject. I. Sources: Biblical, Assyrian, Greek. II. Critical examination of the contents of the various sources. III. Comparison of the sources and determination of what should be considered as historical, out of the conflicting testimonies. IV. History of the campaign of Sennacherib, according to the data reached in the preceding chapters. What will strike the reader, even in this short analysis, is the strictly scientific method adhered to by the author. Nothing is assumed; she feels the ground on which she is going to step very carefully, and it is only when she finds her footing secure that she goes further, only to do the same thing as she progresses with the investigation. The work is scientific throughout, and does great honor both to the author and to the collection into which it has been incorporated. Some will disagree with her in some rather important details, as, *v. g.*, in her arrangement and interpretation of the sources of the 4th Book of Kings, and hence, will not consider the final result beyond dispute, but of the soundness of her method there can be no question. The bibliography is extensive, well chosen and up-to-date, which is not always the case in many of our so-called Biblical apologies. The result is conservative, but of that sound conservatism which does not ignore, misrepresent or minimize opposite opinions. We recommend this work to our readers as a model to be followed in all such historical investigations.

R. BUTIN, S.M.

**Les Idées de Mr. Loisy sur le Quatrième Evangile.** Par Constantin Chauvin. Paris: Beauchesne, 1906. Pp. 293. Fr. 3.50.

Abbé C. Chauvin is well known to our readers through various very creditable publications, *v. g.*, on Biblical Introduction and In-

spiration. In the present volume he undertakes the refutation of Loisy's ideas on the fourth Gospel. Chauvin follows his opponent step by step, in seven successive chapters, and deals with the following problems: I, External Testimonies; II, Internal Testimonies; III, Literary Origin; IV, Is the Fourth Gospel a Mystical Contemplation, or, V, a Theological Meditation? VI, Allegory in the Fourth Gospel, and VII, Examples of Loisy's Wrong Appeals to Allegory. Loisy's views are given in his own words, and we may be satisfied that they have been accurately reproduced; the weak points of his argumentation are brought forward and corrected. The book is admirably clear, and systematic. To prevent any misapprehension, each chapter is followed by a summary of the various points refuted and of the various positions defended. Still in spite of such fine qualities one will ask himself, after having closed the volume, has Loisy really been refuted? For our part, we cannot help feeling some uneasiness about the success of Abbé Chauvin's undertaking. Is it because the problem of the fourth Gospel has been too much dissociated from the Synoptists and from the early Christian literature, with which, in Loisy's mind, it is closely allied? Is it because, in his attempt at refuting Loisy, he has taken a position too negative to be of much service, and has contented himself rather with excerpts from the ideas of Loisy than with a fundamental discussion of his system? It is very questionable whether, even in such a polemical work, it suffices to show that an author may be or is wrong in many particulars, in order to refute him. Such a method may be a prerequisite but we should not be satisfied with that. The present work of Chauvin calls for another; it needs to be supplemented by a constructive study in which a complete survey of the field shall be given, difficulties adjusted and a system proposed that can be opposed successfully to that of Loisy.

We regret also that in a work that claims to be scientific, the author should have had recourse to remarks and hints that have nothing to do with this aspect of the case. What is the purpose of emphasizing so often—more than twenty times explicitly, and many more implicitly—the fact that Loisy agrees with Rationalist or Protestant writers? The reasons given are what they are, and it matters little who originated them or who gives them. Again, why should the priestly character of Loisy be brought against him for holding the views that he holds (*v. g.*, p. 122)? Is not a priest bound to tell what he considers to be true just as he sees it? Is it lawful for anybody and in particular for a priest to palliate truth, simply to avoid speaking like a Rationalist? We may and should refute Loisy, if we think



that he is wrong, but it was elementary honesty for Loisy himself, if he chose to speak, not to misrepresent his thought. All such foreign arguments give a wrong impression that one is trying to refute, not to examine impartially, and that the real reason for holding the Johanne authorship is a theological not an historical one. However, we repeat, a great deal can be derived from the study of the present volume; and we recommend it to all the students of the fourth Gospel.

R. BUTIN, S.M.

**Christian Education.** By Very Rev. C. J. O'Connell. New York: Benziger Bros, 1906. Pp. 192.

That there are a great many people outside of the Church who are dissatisfied with the present divorce of religion and education in our public school system, has been made evident of late in a number of ways, notably by the utterances of prominent Protestant ministers, by the organization and work of the Religious Educational Association, and by occasional papers and discussions at the meetings of the National Educational Association. It would probably be found that the number of patrons of the public schools who would like to see their children receive more religious instruction than they are now getting is much larger than is commonly supposed. The insufficiency of Sunday-school instruction is widely recognized, and it is only the apparently insurmountable difficulty of securing more and more a thorough religious instruction for their children without disturbing the public school system, which produces a sort of passive contentment with the present system, even where a feeling of dissatisfaction exists. It is encouraging for Catholics to note this drift of thought in the non-Catholic mind, since its effects, in the long run, cannot but be favorable to Catholic educational interests, whatever be its practical outcome, if it have any such outcome at all.

The plea for the union of religion and education which is put forth in the series of addresses or essays which make up this little volume on "Christian Education," is admirably adapted to further the development of this movement among non-Catholics, while affording to Catholics, at the same time, fresh and solid assurance of the soundness and wisdom of the position which the Church has consistently maintained on the vexed "school question." The author's treatment of the subject is broad enough to attract the sympathetic interest of those outside the Church, although he distinctly champions the cause of the Catholic school, which combines with the teaching of the secular branches not only moral training and formal religious instruction, but also those more subtle and perhaps more effective religious influ-

ences which go to make up the atmosphere of the Catholic school. After a preliminary chapter on the nature and scope of religion in general, he considers the subject of education in a number of its more important aspects and functions, such as the home, the obligations of citizenship, the teacher, the child, the school, and the methods of the school, and from each of these standpoints, there is pointed out the necessity of combining religious with secular instruction, if the training that is given is to measure up to the definition of education as "the development of all the powers of the child's being, the mind, the heart, the conscience."

Although it is the static rather than the dynamic view of education which we have presented to us in this volume, this is, on the whole, not to be regarded as a fault. There is urgent need of a work which shall present the argument for the Christian school from the standpoint of modern psychology, if the plea for the union of religion and education is ever to find acceptance with the great body of teachers and educators with whom the facts and principles of modern psychology form the indispensable basis of any work of a constructive kind in the field of pedagogy. But it is not to this class that the author of "Christian Education" has primarily addressed himself. He speaks rather to the general public, to that great body of citizens who, while having a vital interest in education, look to experience and authority for guidance in matters educational, and not to principles of pedagogy. It is to experience and authority that the author of this little book appeals, and in doing so he has, happily, been able to draw upon a large fund of practical educational wisdom, representing the personal fruit of his own work as an educator, and has presented, in a scholarly and effective form, the great lessons of educational experience which have come down to us from the past.

JAMES A. BURNS, C.S.C.

## JAMES BARRY, PAINTER, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.

John D. Crimmius, Esq., of New York, has recently presented to this University an engraving of rare historic interest. It now hangs in McMahon Hall in a lecture room of the Department of American History. Copies of this picture appear to be exceedingly scarce. A few years ago the original was obtained in London by the distinguished American interviewer and well-known war correspondent, Mr. James Creelman. This picture, by James Barry, the celebrated Irish painter, shows Cecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore, exhibiting to Lysurgus the patent of 1649 granting to Maryland colonists religious and civil liberty. The Spartan lawgiver is examining carefully that famous document. Well in the foreground is Alfred the Great, whose right hand is resting lightly upon the shoulder of Calvert, while in the left is held a scroll inscribed *dom bec*.<sup>1</sup> Behind Calvert, the central figure in the piece, stands William Penn, holding in his hand a document, probably his Frame of Government of April, 1682. The date in the picture is scarcely legible, and may refer to the charter to Penn, of March 4, 1681.

Into his picture the artist has crowded many other figures, among them, grasping "The Case of Ireland," is William Molyneux, a famous leader of public opinion in that country. In another group are seen the fur cap and the familiar face of Franklin. The American Nestor is surrounded by other distinguished lawmakers, among them a doctor, a pontiff, other prelates and statesmen; the two with beards of formal cut were doubtless intended for Puritans. Over the head of Calvert Fame is holding the laurel crown.

In a corner of the picture is found the following explanation of its origin:

"In the Elysium—one of the series of Pictures on Human Culture in the Great Room of the Society for the encouragement of Arts &c, at the Adelphi, a mistake was committed owing to the delusion which has been so generally spread of considering Wm. Penn as the first colonizer who established equal laws of Religious and Civil Liberty:

<sup>1</sup> In Hodgkin's Political History of England, from the earliest times to 1066, the student of legal history will find an interesting examination of Alfred's Book of Dooms; also of similar legislation by his kinsman Ine and of the dooms of Ethelbert.

this design is therefore added to the series in order to rectify the mistake in the groupe of Legislators by making Lyeurgus looking at those exemplary laws as placed in the hands of Cecilius Calvert Baron of Baltimore who was the original establisher of them in his Colony of Maryland many years before W<sup>m</sup>. Penn & his Colony arrived in America to copy the worthy example.

"Designed Engraved & published by James Barry. R. A. Professor of Painting to the Royal Academy, Feb<sup>y</sup> 28, 1793, L. D."

The series of pictures on human culture mentioned in this inscription was to have been prepared by several eminent artists, but it was finally undertaken by Barry alone, who completed it in seven years.

This picture is interesting not only because it is the work of a great artist but for the reason that it marks an early attempt to give to Cecil Calvert that place among the benefactors of the human race which the muse of history will no doubt eventually assign him. Indeed even now Calvert's fame is securely established.

James Barry, the painter who thus endeavored to correct an error of his own, was born in Cork during the year 1741. As a school boy he was regarded as a prodigy, developed a considerable talent for painting, and at the age of twenty-one years had on exhibition in London a picture which established his reputation in his art and gained for him the acquaintance and the patronage of Burke. From that great man Barry was finally somewhat estranged. It has been suggested that jealousy of Sir Joshua Reynolds was not unconnected with this decay of friendship.

On the continent Barry studied his art in all the famous capitals; soon after his return to England he was chosen a member of the Royal Academy, and in 1782 was appointed a professor of painting in that institution. Those who are competent critics in such matters tell us that though splendid in conception, he was deficient in execution. Among English-speaking artists, however, Barry must be accorded high rank.

CHAS. H. MCCARTHY.

## ANNUAL LETTER OF HIS EMINENCE THE CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY.

CARDINAL'S RESIDENCE, BALTIMORE, MD.,  
November 6, 1906.

REV. DEAR SIR:

I take pleasure in bringing to your attention the excellent condition of the Catholic University of America shown in the Rector's report for the current year. As an evidence of careful administration, this statement is both creditable and encouraging; and I have noted with special gratification the favorable impression it produced throughout the country.

In addition I am happy to state with a great feeling of gratitude that the amount of the collection for 1905-1906 was \$100,489.45. As the University is now free from debt, this sum has been employed, partly in meeting current expenses and partly in increasing the endowment fund which at present amounts to \$431,290.46 and which is invested in the best securities.

By their loyal support our hierarchy and faithful people have enabled the University to discharge fully all its financial obligations and to continue its work during a most critical period without closing a department or releasing a single professor. They have moreover by their prompt sympathy filled us all with fresh confidence and hope and have infused new vigor into the academic life of the University itself.

In considering the prosperous situation of the University, I cannot but feel that Almighty God has set the seal of His blessing upon our work. I appreciate most highly the good-will of all our generous benefactors and especially of those who replied to my personal appeal. I am repaid by their hearty coöperation for many an anxious care suffered during the past few years in order to place the University on a sound financial basis. With all my heart I thank you, your clergy, and the devoted people of your diocese for the aid and encouragement given me in these trying circumstances and I shall remember it gratefully as long as I live.

Now that the great trials of the University are over, it remains for us to push on by common endeavor, the development of this great work, having in mind the needs of our schools and colleges and the educational wants of all our people. In this hope and aspiration I

most respectfully commend to your paternal care the collection for the coming year. Not only are the hearts of all our people turned towards our beloved institution, but our Holy Father himself, as I personally know, is following its growing development day by day with loving care. As you will remember the collection recommended by him for the University is to be taken up on the First Sunday of Advent, or if that day should be inconvenient the nearest day thereafter that you should approve.

With sentiments of profound respect I remain,

Your obedient servant,

J. CARD. GIBBONS,  
*Chancellor.*



## UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

**Dr. Joseph Dunn.**—During the Christmas Recess Dr. Joseph Dunn, our Professor of the Celtic Language and Literature, read a paper on "The Irish Version of the Old-French *chanson de geste*, *Fierabras*," at the annual meeting of the Modern Language Association of America at Yale University. The following is a synopsis: The name *Fierabras*; The Irish not an original composition; Relation of the several Irish to the Romance and English versions; Latin loan-words and proper names in the Irish version; Anglo-Saxon words; In some respects, the Irish is closer to the Provençal than to the Old-French versions; The original of the Irish was none of the known Old-French versions; Probability of a Latin original.

**Meeting of the Board of Trustees.**—The semi-annual meeting of the Board of Trustees was held at Caldwell Hall, November 27 and 28. The following appointments were made. Rev. John Thomas Creagh, S.T.L., J.C.D., J.V.D.; Associate Professor of Canon Law, was appointed Professor of Canon Law; Rev. John Damen Maguire, S.T.L., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Latin Language and Literature was appointed Professor of Latin Language and Literature; Rev. Charles Francis Aiken, S.T.D., Associate Professor of Apologetics, was appointed Professor of Apologetics; Rev. William Joseph Kerby, S.T.L., Docteur en Sciences Politiques et Sociales, Associate Professor of Sociology, was appointed Professor of Sociology, and George Melville Bolling, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Greek Language and Literature was appointed Professor of Greek Language and Literature and Comparative Philology and Sanskrit.

Rev. Dr. Kennedy, President of the Dominican College of The Immaculate Conception, was invited to deliver a course of lectures on the treatise "De Sacramentis."

The Building heretofore known as "The Dormitory" was made a University College, under the title of "Albert Hall." It was so named in honor of Captain Albert F. Ryan, of Norfolk, Va., through whose generosity it was erected.

**Treasurer's Report.**—The financial report submitted to the Board of Trustees at their meeting November 27th and 28th, 1906, showed that all the debts of the University were paid, that there were no obligations to be met except current expenses, and that the permanent investments of the University at that date amounted to \$431,290.46.

**The Cardinal's Fund.**—During the six months ending September 30, 1906, the sum of \$5,381.20 was added to the Cardinal's Fund, making a grand total of \$144,768.13 contributed to this fund during the past two years.

**Third Annual Collection.**—The total amount of the Third Annual Collection up to date is \$100,489.45.

**Father Walburg's Donation.**—During the last six months the Rev. Anthony H. Walburg, of Cincinnati, O., increased his donation for the German Chair by \$15,000, making a total of \$30,000, which he has contributed for that purpose.

**Patronal Feast of the University.**—The Patronal Feast of the University was celebrated on Saturday, December 8, by a solemn Pontifical Mass, at which the celebrant was Rt. Rev. A. A. Curtis, V.G., of Baltimore. An eloquent and impressive sermon was preached by the Right Rev. Mgr. Lavelle, V.G., Rector of St. Patrick's Cathedral, New York.

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA.  
GENERAL BALANCE SHEET, SEPTEMBER 30, 1906, AND MARCH 31, 1906, AND COMPARISON.

ASSETS.		Sept. 30, 1906.	March 31, 1906.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.
<b>LANDS AND BUILDING:</b>					
University Grounds and Farm .....	\$	39,899.90	\$	39,899.90	
Caldwell Hall .....		338,242.78		338,242.78	
McMahon Hall .....		310,969.33		310,969.33	
Keene Hall .....		50,444.03		50,444.03	
St. Thomas' College .....		1,000.00		1,000.00	
Observatory .....		4,654.81		4,654.81	
Convent .....		7,684.38		7,684.38	
Temple House .....		7,644.42		7,644.42	
Farm Buildings and Equipment .....		3,449.90		5,000.00	\$ 1,550.10
Long Branch .....		29,500.00		32,000.00	2,500.00
<b>Total Lands and Buildings .....</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>786,881.25</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>790,731.35</b>	<b>\$ 4,050.10</b>
<b>FURNITURE, APPARATUS, ETC.:</b>					
Caldwell Hall .....	\$	23,851.64	\$	23,846.14	\$ 5.50
McMahon .....		7,476.79		7,440.24	36.55
Keene Hall .....		2,977.85		2,977.85	
Chapel .....		4,500.00		4,500.00	
Divinity Library .....		21,163.11		21,071.15	91.96
Bouquillon Library .....		5,001.00		5,000.00	
Other Departments .....		44,364.08		43,684.95	679.13
<b>Total Furniture, Apparatus, Etc. ....</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>109,333.47</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>108,520.33</b>	<b>\$ 813.14</b>
<b>ENDOWMENT PROPERTY:</b>					
Real Estate—Chicago, Ill. ....	\$	13,000.00	\$	8,600.00	\$ 4,400.00
Real Estate—Omaha, Neb. ....		13,271.36		13,271.36	
<b>Total Endowment Property .....</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>26,271.36</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>21,871.36</b>	<b>\$ 4,400.00</b>
<b>INVESTMENTS:</b>					
Bonds and Stocks—Schedule attached .....	\$	424,047.81	\$	361,148.15	\$ 62,899.66
Real Estate Loans .....		808,335.46		816,007.21	
Ground Rents—Baltimore, Md. ....		5,442.65		5,442.65	
Magruder Farm Mortgage .....		1,800.00		1,800.00	
<b>Total Investments .....</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>1,239,525.92</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>1,184,998.01</b>	<b>\$ 54,527.91</b>
<b>CURRENT ASSETS:</b>					
Cash on Hand and in Banks .....	\$	22,430.06	\$	34,341.63	\$ 11,911.57
Bills Receivable .....		8,645.00		4,500.00	\$ 4,145.00
Uncollected Subscriptions to Bishops' Guaranty Fund .....		12,400.00		12,400.00	
Uncollected Subscriptions to Guaranty Fund for General Expenses .....		5,071.00		5,071.00	
<b>Total Current Assets .....</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>48,546.06</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>56,512.63</b>	<b>\$ 7,966.57</b>
<b>DEFERRED ASSETS:</b>					
Uncollected Endowment .....	\$	10,000.00	\$	10,000.00	
Keane Hall Advances .....		1,389.31		1,188.32	\$ 200.99
Premiums for Perpetual Insurance .....		875.00		875.00	
<b>Total Deferred Assets .....</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>12,264.31</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>12,063.32</b>	<b>\$ 200.99</b>
<b>TOTAL ASSETS .....</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>\$2,221,923.37</b>	<b>\$</b>	<b>\$2,174,097.00</b>	<b>\$48,225.37</b>

LIABILITIES.	Sept. 30, 1906.	March 31, 1906.	INCREASE.	DECREASE.
<b>DONATIONS—GROUNDS AND BUILDINGS:</b>				
University Grounds and Farm .....	\$ 29,893.90	\$ 29,893.90		
Caldwell Hall .....	220,100.10	220,100.10		
McMahon Hall .....	221,456.60	221,456.60		
<b>Total Donations—Grounds and Buildings .....</b>	<b>\$ 471,456.60</b>	<b>\$ 471,456.60</b>		
<b>ENDOWMENT RESERVES:</b>				
<b>Chairs—Caldwell Hall:</b>	<b>\$ 350,000.00</b>	<b>\$ 350,000.00</b>		
Fully Endowed .....	4,750.00	4,750.00		
Partially Endowed .....				
<b>Chairs—McMahon Hall:</b>	<b>\$ 425,000.00</b>	<b>\$ 425,000.00</b>		
Fully Endowed .....	62,129.07	69,132.46		
Partially Endowed .....	11,783.00	11,783.00		
Archbishop Kenrick's Chair—Partially Endowed .....	7,940.00	7,940.00		
Archbishop Williams' Chair—Partially Endowed .....	15,000.00	15,000.00		
Fellowships—Caldwell Hall .....	10,000.00	10,000.00		
Fellowships—McMahon Hall .....	125,072.62	125,072.62		
Scholarships—Caldwell Hall .....	19,575.52	19,575.52		
Scholarships—McMahon Hall .....	11,485.00	11,485.00		
General Endowment .....	2,385.00	2,385.00		
Bouquillon Library Endowment .....				
<b>Total Endowment Reserves .....</b>	<b>\$1,048,256.14</b>	<b>\$1,048,256.63</b>		
<b>ESTATE OF A. F. RYAN .....</b>	<b>\$ 105,427.55</b>	<b>\$ 105,427.55</b>		
<b>CAPITAL .....</b>	<b>499,555.37</b>	<b>492,532.88</b>		
<b>SURPLUS .....</b>	<b>98,246.71</b>	<b>70,021.34</b>		
<b>TOTAL LIABILITIES .....</b>	<b>\$2,222,922.37</b>	<b>\$2,174,697.00</b>		
			<b>\$ 2,997.51</b>	
				<b>\$ 2,997.51</b>

# The Catholic University Bulletin.

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*No. 2.*

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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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